PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XXXII. NO. 121 APRIL 1957

FEELINGS AND THEIR EXPRESSION

KARL BRITTON

CONSCIOUS feelings are connections. A man fears an enemy (although perhaps he has no enemy to be feared); he hopes for a rise in salary, he wishes he were twenty years younger, or that he could construct a square which could be proved to be equal in area to a given circle.

Conscious feelings are, or can be, expressed in language. To express a feeling in language means to incorporate a name or a description of the *object* of the feeling (the thing one wishes for or fears or hates) in an utterance which expresses the feeling. So that a man may express his feelings towards a woman by saying that he loves her, wishing that she were here, writing to her when she is away, inscribing her name upon the barks of trees—or simply by the tone in which he always speaks of her. These, to the observant, are tokens of affection: and the fact that he uses her name leaves no doubt that this affection is something he is fully aware of. He knows (we may judge) what his own feelings are and where he has lost his heart.

I want to discuss the question: What is the relation between a conscious feeling and its object? Between wishing to see Polly and seeing Polly; between being afraid of being ill and being ill; between being jealous of A on B's account and A and B and their feelings? In heaven (according to Abelard's hymn "O quanta qualia sunt illa sabbata") every wish is fulfilled before it is uttered:

> Ubi non praevenit rem desiderium
> Nec desiderio minus est praemium.

But that is in another country and in another language.

What is a man doing when he expresses a fear, a regret, a hope, a wish? I shall speak mostly of wishes, since what I have to say arises directly out of Wittgenstein's remarks on wishes in the *Philosophical Investigations* (especially I. 437–45). I suppose a young man standing under the church clock at ten minutes to seven on Saturday evening

and saying: "I wish Polly would come" or "If only Polly would hurry up" or "Would that Polly were here". What is he doing when he says these words?

It is, of course, very natural to suppose that he is describing something that is going on inside him: something that he has learned to recognize as a *wish*; distinguishable from regrets or fears or hopes or intentions because different in feeling-tone, or quality, or in accompaniments. And, moreover, something which he is able to recognize as *connected with Polly*. We might suppose that it is accompanied by an image of Polly, perhaps in fact (though he need not know this) the wish is causally connected with past events in which Polly prominently featured—they met, they became friends; and now from time to time he has a wish which leads him to think of Polly and not of any of his other friends. Or perhaps we might suppose that the man has a feeling which is one of tension, of unsatisfiedness: and he has come to know through happy experience that meeting Polly brings this tension to an end. So that now when just this kind of feeling arises he recognizes it as a wish for Polly. In saying then: "Oh that Polly were here" or "I wish Polly were here" he is describing something that he has observed going on inside him.

Of course there are difficulties in this view: but it seems to explain very naturally certain things that happen—for example, certain things that can seem to go wrong in the expression of wishes, hopes, fears, and other feelings.

For instance, people sometimes report that *they do not know* what they wish for: they cannot tell us what they wish for simply because they do not know. How could this be? Perhaps I have a feeling but I am not sure whether it is a wish-feeling or some other sort of feeling. I may observe that I am *disturbed* about Polly but simply not be able to discover whether I wish she would come or am afraid that she may come. Or again I may have a feeling which I recognize as a wish but not be able to trace its connection with an object. Is it a wish for Polly or for Peggy? Or is it a wish to be left alone? Might one not at first be uncertain and then, by further introspection (and perhaps further experience of meeting Polly and meeting Peggy) come to recognize that the wish I have is in fact a wish for Polly?

Of course, if what the man is doing is to describe something, then his description may always be mistaken or otherwise misleading. A man might very *carelessly* say: "Oh I do wish Polly were here" when as a matter of fact he intended to say *Peggy* instead of *Polly*. (Such men are dangerous.) For since there is a correct way of describing what he introspects there must also always be an incorrect way which a careless person may unfortunately take. And, of course, he could deliberately lie about his wishes: he might tell Polly he wishes to see her next Saturday evening when in fact he hopes very

much to dodge her. And one might very well see a connection between not admitting a wish, making a silly mistake in expressing a wish, and not being able to recognize whom it is one wishes for.

If when a man expresses a wish he is describing something that goes on inside him, then we have to accept what he says as testimony, or reject it or reserve our judgment about it, as unconvincing testimony. But it is commonly claimed that we have many methods of *checking* what he tells us about what goes on inside him. E.g. we sometimes learn from experience whether the things a man says he wishes for, do in fact satisfy him: this of course we can learn only in cases where the wishes (or alleged wishes) were fulfilled: i.e. the thing he said he wished for did in fact come about. So we have to say of one child: "He knows what he wants all right" and of another: "Poor mite, she never knows what she wants". Of course this test is not in every case decisive even where it is applicable: If a man says he is wishing Polly would come, but, when Polly does come he does not after all welcome her, it by no means follows that he was mistaken (or deceiving us) when he said he wished for Polly. Perhaps he did indeed wish for her but she delayed so long that his wish had entirely disappeared by the time she arrived. In negative cases then, the test is not decisive: and this suggests the further reflection that of course the test is not absolutely decisive in positive cases either. A man might say: "I wish Polly were here" without wishing for her at all: but when she comes he might be moved to give her a very genuine welcome. Clearly we cannot hope to know in any one case that a man did or does truly say that he wishes for Polly: but our confidence would naturally be increased if it had often happened that he had welcomed what he had said that he wished for.

And, of course, we use other collateral evidence of the truth or falsity, accuracy or inaccuracy, of such statements. A man who is wishing for Polly may very well show this *in his behaviour*; in the manner in which he speaks her name, in the preparations he makes, in his tone of voice, gestures and facial expressions. We are not supposing that his statement: "I wish that Polly would come" is a description of these things: indeed, it is most unlikely that he observes them at all. But *we* can observe them: and we can learn from experience that when a man behaves in just this way and says that he wishes for Polly, then very likely what he says is true and accurate. Of course, this evidence is more likely to tell us that he is wishing for somebody, than to give us any independent indication that it is Polly he wishes for. But sometimes there could be pretty useful evidence that it is indeed Polly that he wishes for. This surely must be the case, since we seem able to guess by these means (and by the evidence of fulfilment where that occurs) what are the wishes of foreigners who cannot speak any language we understand: of

infants who have no language but a cry, and (some would certainly wish to add) of animals, too. In the case of infants and animals we may suppose that they have feelings inside them which they are sometimes able to recognize as wishes for certain objects (especially food, toys, sleep, going out, coming in). They recognize the wishes: but of course they cannot describe them to us. We are left guessing, but by no means without evidence. The wish gives rise to certain changes in their appearance—in their behaviour and manner, their tone and expression. A child may *cry* for its dinner and a cat may cry for hers. And from these signs we are able to infer the presence of the wish. The wish is the causal something by which we explain their behaviour. But our knowledge of the wishes of infants and animals is no doubt very restricted: for the only one who observes the wish directly is unable to describe what he observes.

This account of wishes could be extended to other feelings for objects: hopes, fears, regrets, etc. On this view we suppose (1) that "I wish Polly were here" is a description which a man offers of his own wish, his own feeling, on the basis of some sort of direct observation; and (2) that when we say "he wishes for Polly" we mean the same by "wishing for Polly" as he does, although our statement is always based *upon secondary evidence*—on our observation of the way he behaves. When we say: "He wishes for Polly" we mean that the statement he made ("I wish Polly were here") is true: when we say: "Oh no, he doesn't really" we mean that the statement he made is false.

(1) Now one familiar difficulty is that we seem to need some good reason for connecting our observations of his behaviour with the truth of his statements. Remember that his statement is being regarded as a description of his own feeling: primarily that, at all events. What is our reason for thinking that when he behaves in a certain sort of way, then the statement he utters ("I wish Polly were here") is true: but when he behaves in a different way then this statement which he utters is *false*? Have we experience of cases where his behaviour pointed towards the truth of his statement, but after all we found that the statement was untrue? Have we experience of cases where his behaviour suggested that his statement was true, and we found that indeed it was true? Clearly we have no experience of any cases of either kind. Of course, it often happens that we are at first inclined to believe that he is wishing for Polly, but later on we make up our minds that he does not wish for her. But this change of view is due simply to a reassessment of the external evidence, or to observation of new external evidence—or "secondary evidence" as one may call it.

Of course, one might simply appeal to a man's general veracity. We learn how far people are reliable on matters which we can directly

check: we learn to know the difference between a man when he is telling the truth and a man when he is not—when he tells us although he does not really know, or when he lies. So that we might say of the man who says "Oh that Polly would come": he talks like an honest man and a man who knows what he is talking about. In other words, part of the external evidence which we can consider may be called: Evidence of good or bad testimony as this has been learned by us from the testimony which we can directly test.

But how far can we treat expressions of wishes in the same sort of way as we treat the testimony about external things? A man says: "There is a new novel inside this envelope". To this I may reply: "No doubt you're right" or "I wonder". Here there is a clear distinction between the primary evidence (which is, of course, inside the envelope and can be taken out) and the secondary evidence—the tone and manner and context of the man's remark. The question at issue cannot be settled beyond doubt by reference to the secondary evidence only: the secondary evidence would not be evidence at all unless in the past we had often checked statements of this kind by appeal to the primary evidence. The secondary evidence (it is true) is not very sharply delineated: different aspects of a man's utterance might be differently weighed by different hearers, and one might dismiss as utterly irrelevant what another considered of some account. But although its extent and value are vague there is no possibility of confusing it with the primary evidence. For the primary evidence is something quite different: it consists of the contents of the envelope, and it can be decisive against any amount of secondary evidence.

But a man's testimony about his feelings (I am wishing for a better job and a bigger house) shows no such distinction. What one might be inclined to call the signs of confidence or honesty in his remark cannot be sharply contrasted with the other evidence which we consider when we ask ourselves: Does he really wish for this? For the fact that he confidently and openly says he wishes for Polly is itself taken by us as *primary* evidence that he does wish for her: and if it has to be checked against other evidence, then this other evidence is not different in kind (as the evidence of what is inside the envelope differs in kind). The other evidence is just the other things we notice about the way he speaks and the way he behaves; and it is by no means always to be preferred to the evidence of what he says—his confident and open expression of feeling. So that we can say—if we suppose him to be desiring something he alone is aware of—that all our evidence is in such cases *secondary* evidence. Or we can say that the statement whose truth we are testing is not the statement he makes, but a statement we may decide to make—not "I wish for Polly" but "he wishes for Polly". And the *primary*

evidence for this statement is the way he expresses himself and the way he behaves, taken together.

Again. Consider the sense in which what a man says may be evidence for the truth of what he says. *That you tell me* that you have a novel in the envelope is no doubt evidence for the truth of what you say: evidence to me but of course not evidence to you. But when we consider what a man says about his feelings (I wish Polly were here), then if this really means a statement about what he alone can observe, it cannot, as a statement, be evidence to anybody. But undoubtedly his words are evidence of supreme importance—evidence to us about whether he wishes and if so what for. They must then be taken not as testimony which may be true or false, but as *conduct* which bears upon the question at issue.

(2) A second familiar difficulty is how a man comes to be able to describe a feeling which he alone can observe. He has a feeling and he must recognize it—first as a wish, and secondly as a wish for Polly. He must be in a position to say: This is what they call "wishing for Polly". It isn't as if he gave a name to his wish: we do not call *our wishes* Polly or Molly (as Americans call hurricanes). The name Polly comes in because somebody's godparents at her baptism gave her that name: it has its ordinary public reference. Surely there is only one way in which a man could come to be in a position to describe his wish and that is by learning a language (including proper names) from other people. But the descriptive statement: "X is wishing for Polly" is (as we have just shown) applied by reference to other people's observation of X, and in particular other people's noting what X says. Are we to suppose then that X applies this description to himself in the same way? That he is making a statement (as some other person might do) about his own conduct and condition? If so, he will have *less* reason than anyone else to come to the conclusion that he is wishing for Polly. For they have his words to take into consideration and he cannot utter these words until he has satisfied himself (by observing his own behaviour) what it is he wishes for. And indeed it would be very odd if a man who says: "I wish Polly were here" should be in a position to observe the behaviour which other people observe in him. A man who was preoccupied in observing his own pulse-rate, his sighs or anguished looks would be most unlikely to be *really* wishing for Polly at all.

I have been suggesting that the words "I wish that Polly would come" should be regarded as an expression and not as a statement about a man's feeling. And the view I have in mind as an alternative to the statement-view, is the view that the expression of a wish is like the vocal expression of a sensation—of a pain, for example. We say that a cat or an infant is in pain when we notice certain behaviour, certain movements and positions and (especially) when they whine,

cry, howl or moan. Nobody supposes that the cat or the infant is telling us something by such noises: the noises are mere noises but highly characteristic. Now adult men of course make just the same noises if they are hurt suddenly or very badly. But they also make use of words: there is a difference between what an Englishman will say in sudden terror and what an Irishman will say. Sometimes the words are simply conventionalized whines, sighs or cries: often they are words taken out of the language in which we make statements and address remarks. And sometimes one can see that the words or exclamations have particular associations: they tend to arouse and express feeling because they are also used in describing situations where feeling runs high. (Swearing and obscenities are examples.) But still we do not think that a man who cries: Oh, Murder! or Oh, Hell, or Damn and blast, or Oh, Mary is in any way using these words to describe what he feels. The words are alternative modes of expression to the cat's hiss or snarl, the infant's sudden shriek.

So that in the vocal expressions of sensations we seem to have an example of a purely expressive use of language: of language which could be called appropriate or not appropriate but which would not be said to perform *any* function which could not be performed equally well by unlearned cries and noises.

However, there is no doubt that when hurt or surprised we also make use of language in a rather different way. We cry: "My hand! My hand!" or "My hand hurts". Cats do not do this: a cat lifts up her paw and (very sensibly) she licks it and one knows at once where the hurt is. But suppose the cat has a pain somewhere inside, somewhere she cannot reach with her tongue? The educated human has an advantage here: he has a tongue that will really reach to every part of his body. "Oh, my back!" "Oh, my head!" "Oh, my cervical vertebrae!" Such exclamations certainly *inform us* of the whereabouts of the pain. And of course they do so in virtue of their ordinary descriptive meaning. To say: "Oh, my cervical vertebrae!" is a new kind of pain-behaviour which (as Wittgenstein says, *Phil. Inv.* I, 244) we somehow teach to children. It has to be learned: it can be done correctly or incorrectly. That is why we have to watch out: The man who says Oh, my cervical vertebrae may really mean Oh, my coccyx.

Obviously we describe a man's pain by reference to the different expressions of it: we say that he is writhing or wincing or uncomfortable or groaning: and in particular we describe it by reference to the words he uses, or other sounds. We might say a man was suffering "Oh Jesus" or that he was feeling "Oh Mother, Oh Mother". And (again in particular) we localize the sensation by reference to certain expressions: the part the cat licks; the part *mentioned or described* by the man who complains of a pain (his back or his stomach). Of

course some injury may also help us to describe the place of a pain: but sometimes there is no apparent injury, sometimes the injury and the pain are in different places. It is important then to know what part of his body (if any) the person complains of; in the case of animals and infants, one may make a guess all the same.

The use of descriptive language referring to the place of the pain is in certain respects rather like the use of descriptive language to refer to the object of a feeling—the thing feared or wished for, loved or hated. Without such language we have to guess; and indeed one can guess well enough that a cat wants to be let out, or wants her dinner; that a baby wants her toy or wants to stand up. There are so many bodily expressions common to the cat, the baby and the man who wants to smoke in a non-smoking compartment, that the words of the man who can talk are often quite redundant. Of course one can feel a sensation only *now* and *in one's own body*: not in some other thing or at some other time. Feelings are different: one can want what is not part of one's body and one can want to have it later on—soon—when dinner is over. And of course we can often see *what* an animal wants (as well as that it wants); *what* an infant is expecting as well as that it is expecting. Here again, as in the case of sensations, the descriptive words an adult might use (I should be glad to light my pipe if you have no objection) are alternative modes of expression. As a matter of fact they have a tendency to exclude or modify other modes of expression: a man who is in pain does not moan or complain as a child or animal would: he simply says where it hurts. In learning a new pain-expression he unlearns some of the older expressions. And a man who has been well brought up does not go scratching at the kitchen door when dinner is late: he merely makes an icy remark. However, so far we have been dealing with verbal expressions of sensations and of feelings which are (one might say) *largely* dispensable. We should still be able to describe the sensation or the feeling even if no words were used by the person who felt it. But not quite so simply or fully.

There are, however, feelings which could hardly be diagnosed or described except by reference to the descriptive language used in their expression. That a child is wishing for Christmas, that an old man is wishing they would reduce the level of death-duties—these wishes could hardly be diagnosed except by reference to what is said: "Oh that Christmas would come!" "Oh that they would reduce the present level of death-duties!" They can be described only by reference to what is said. And surely it is evident that no one who was not able to express his feelings in some such words could have anything at all closely resembling the feeling. Perhaps this last really is an analytical statement. An old man has a certain feeling. What sort of feeling? The only answer one could give is: the feeling

that could be expressed in the words he used or their equivalent. And *this* feeling, at all events, could not be enjoyed by an infant or a cat. As Wittgenstein says, we never do say that a dog is expecting his master next week. As Yeats reminds us, we have to be careful what we mean when we say that an animal is in fear of its life:

> Nor dread nor hope attend
> A dying animal;
> A man awaits his end
> Dreading and hoping all . . . .
> Man has created death.

We have, then, a series of cases in which language plays a more and more important part in the expression of sensations and feelings: important to the person who has the feelings and important to somebody else who wishes to recognize what sort of feelings the man has. It seems to me evident that unless feelings for objects had been expressed in words for those objects, nobody would ever have guessed that people have such feelings at all. Where we can guess that a man who has said nothing about it, is wishing for Polly, this is by analogy with other cases where he has behaved in rather the same way but has also said: "Oh, if only Polly would come!" I should certainly want to go further: surely we would say that the dog wishes for his master to come home, or the infant wants her mother, because their behaviour is analogous with that of a person who might say, if asked what was the matter, "I want mummy". And we never say a dog wants his master to come home next week, just because the only behaviour that is characteristic of such a feeling is *saying* "I want so and so to come next week". We do not argue by analogy that a dog wants his master to come next week, simply because there is now no analogy. (Of course one must not overlook the ever-popular fanciful description of cats and babies. "The cat is worrying about the price of liver.")

I now return to the main question. When the young man says: "I wish Polly were here" what is he doing? He is expressing a feeling for a distant object: and the kind of feeling that could not occur to anyone who could not use language. He would not be having just this feeling unless he said these words, or equivalent words, or would say them if suitably prompted. If he could not utter some such expression, then he may well be in a state of Unsatisfiedness (Unbefriedigung) but it is not a state of wishing for Polly.

But of course the uttering of these words is not itself a wish. He must (we say) *feel* it, too. Feelings are not expressed simply by the use of such words (although there is certainly a tendency to inhibit, up to a degree, certain other more natural expressions). We also consider the tone of voice, the facial expression, the manner, the actions. If these were not *coherent* with his words, we should hardly

say that the words expressed a wish at all. And in fact, if instead of saying "I wish Polly were here," he says "Oh that Polly were here" or "Would that Polly were here", then his words are not really being used correctly unless they express a wish. (For these modes of speech are the conventional modes of wishing. "I wish . . ." in the first person is really another such mode.)

It is not easy to say what this *coherence* means; but one can imagine a man saying "I do wish you could clear out" with a certain look and tone: and on another occasion saying: "I do wish you would stay" with the same look and tone. But the context may, of course, be much wider: what for a time seems like a welcome may suddenly be seen to be ironical or faithless. "He doesn't mean what he says": not that what he says, he offers as a description of what he is feeling and looking, but that what he says, provides us with a description of what he feels—or pretends to feel.

Suppose then that the other expressions do cohere with the words used. What is the connection between his feeling and Polly's coming? This connection is highly variable: in its very simplest and most definite terms we might say: The connection is that if Polly came he would *welcome* her. Here the first expression ("Oh that Polly would come") connects with an expression he would use if Polly were to come: (Oh good: here comes Polly). There is then a symbolic connection: "Polly's coming" (or some equivalent) occurs in two expressions of feeling: the one of a wish, the other of having had what one had wished for. And in both, "Polly's coming" has its perfectly ordinary meaning: the meaning that it has in the simple factual statement "Polly is coming". So that in uttering a wish, a man makes use of language in its ordinary descriptive sense.

How do I know what I long for before I get it? "If I have learned to talk, then I know" (W. I. 441). In expressing a wish I make use of a description, although the expression of a wish is not the same thing as a description. This account of expression in language is new to me. We are used to thinking of *certain descriptions* as emotive—they convey a feeling about the thing they describe—and of other descriptions as not being emotive. If a man says: "I wish that silly child would come" he is using an emotive expression; if he says: "I wish Polly would come," then his words are not emotive. (Of course, to some people "Polly" itself is emotive.) This account presupposes that a feeling has an object—and remarks on the way in which the attitude towards that object is conveyed. What Wittgenstein asks us to notice is *how the object gets there.* It is not the cause, nor the effect of the wish: the word "Polly" gets there as part of the expression of the wish. So that any word or phrase which describes what a man may wish for, may be used expressively (or as part of an expression). Thus "maintaining the present rate of death-duties" is certainly

not an emotive phrase: but it can be used expressively since it is something that an old man may wish they wouldn't.

So that sometimes a man sees a familiar shape and says: "Here comes Polly." Seeing this shape or hearing a certain voice, prompts him to say it. But at other times, prompted by nothing that he sees or hears, he says "If only Polly were here!" What prompts him? An image, a memory, a difficulty, an emptiness. And these two different uses of language are both fundamental: and of course "Polly is here" must have the *same* meaning in both contexts—otherwise how would Polly's coming be *a fulfilment* of the wish? In wishing, as in describing, we are using a language we have learned. A child learns to name his mother when she is present and to wish for her when she is absent.

I suppose, then, that a man who says "I wish that Polly were here" or "Oh that Polly were here", or "How lovely if Polly would come" is *not describing* but *expressing* what he feels (although he makes use of someone's name or description). Of course his very words provide *us* with a description of what he feels, since they are that part of the expression which distinguishes it from all the man's other feelings. We say: "He is feeling 'Oh that Polly would come' " or "He wishes for Polly". We describe wishes and other conscious feelings by reference to their objects and mode: a wish for Polly, a fear of illness, a hope of an increase of salary. And these objects are the objects named in the linguistic expression of the feeling.

I now have to make three apparently complicating admissions:

(1) A man does sometimes describe his own feelings to himself.
(2) A man may seem not to know what he wishes for and *to try* and *find out* by describing his feelings to himself and using these descriptions to make an *inference* or guess as to what he wishes for.
(3) Other people may claim to be in a better position than he is, to tell him what he really wishes for or hopes for or fears.

(1) Sometimes a man seems to describe his feelings to himself. Is not "I wish Polly would come" sometimes used as a description? I think it is evident that it is (in the present tense) always the expression of a wish. It expresses a wish in a sense in which my remark that he wishes for Polly is not an expression of a wish or of any other feeling. If we *do* take it as a description then it is a description of the same thing that we describe when we say that he wishes for Polly. And of course the description is framed in the same way: if a man is to describe his own wishes he must do so by reference to the words he did use or would use in expressing his wish. (I am not saying that a man who describes his own wish is led to do so by just the same observations as may lead other people to describe his wish.) As

Wittgenstein remarks (II. ix) a man who says that he is in pain is not always thought to be complaining of his pain. He says that he is in pain *to help the doctor*: and I dare say it is possible that he himself might have some sort of use for his own statement. (Cf. "I have a pain in my shoulder", "I have been complaining of my shoulder".) And of course there is no doubt that a man can describe his own *past* feelings without expressing any feeling at all: just as a man can ask with regard to a past decision: "What reason had I for taking that decision?" without there being any possibility of affecting that decision now.

(2) In some cases, then, the most important thing about "I wish Polly were here" is that it is *his* expression which provides *us* with a valuable description of his feeling. No doubt there are situations in which the man himself makes use of a descriptive statement of his own feelings: but surely he does not use it in order to learn what his feelings are? Yet there seem to be cases where this happens, where a man seems to be trying to discover what sort of feeling he has in order to know what to feel next. I am thinking of cases where a man seems at first not to know what he wishes for and to find out by introspection. A man may ask himself: "Is it Polly or is it Peggy that I want? I feel that Polly is prettier but Peggy is kinder, Polly is livelier but Peggy is safer". And then having assembled the data he goes on to draw the conclusion: "It's Polly I want." Now this last is certainly the expression of a feeling and I should not be inclined to call it the conclusion of an argument at all. What he does is to make a choice not an inference. Sometimes we feel: the choice was *really* already made and he is casting about for reasons *to defend it with*. But would the situation be so very different if the choice were not already made? Suppose it was not made when he began: only when his so-called argument is completed. Still, I feel, the choice is not an inference. This may be seen if we ask: Would he have been content to let somebody else draw the conclusion for him? Children do sometimes try this: but how often they then choose the thing they are told they do *not* want. So that I am not inclined to think that in such a case a man is using his expressions of his feelings as descriptive statements would be used. But I am not sure that a man *never* could use one of his own expressions as a descriptive statement.

(3) What I have been saying so far, has been about conscious wishes. If I ask myself whether I wish for Polly or for Peggy, I am asking about conscious wishes. For whatever the decision, it is the expression of a wish—hence of a conscious wish. But we must also look at the situation where someone else tries to tell me what I want or what I really want, what I wish or what I *really* wish. I think we often use "really wish" in a way which implies that what a man *says* he wishes is only his apparent wish: he *says* he wishes for a higher

paid job but we say what he really wishes for is to get away from his mother's tender care. And we do not always imply by this that he does *not* want a higher paid job, or that he *wishes* to leave home but decides not to say so.

What are parents talking about when they tell children: "We know what you really wish for"? And what are psycho-analysts doing when they tell parents: "We know what you really wish for"? What are *unconscious wishes*?

Well, we might say a young man had an unconscious wish to get away from his father if he was behaving in a way which might have been calculated to secure this end. (He always finds something against a job near home: but jobs away from home have always got a lot to be said for them); and so on. Of course, we should not call this wish unconscious if he could be induced to admit it in confidence. It is rather where he cannot be induced to admit it in confidence, and in fact denies it in all sincerity, that we begin to ask: Why on earth does he not even admit it to himself? And I think we should still think: he must be lying when he denies this wish—unless we could begin to show that this applying for jobs away from home was connected in a definite way with certain other symptoms: strains and sufferings, dreams and images, random mistakes and associations. Then we begin to think there is something odd: he really does not and cannot admit to himself that he wants to leave home. Yet we may still say: "He really does wish it" or "He wishes it unconsciously".

To say that a man unconsciously wishes for something (or loves or hates something) is apparently to do more than describe what he feels. The feelings (or the expression of conscious feelings) are simply *part of the evidence* for the existence of an unconscious wish. In ascribing an unconscious wish we (as it were) assign an object to actual feelings which we admit is not an object in the original sense. We may say a young man wishes for Polly if his feeling is expressed in some reference to Polly. Why should we say: "But unconsciously he wishes for his mother"—even when he would indignantly repudiate such a wish?

Can we say a man wishes for his mother when he does not say so and could not conscientiously say so? How do we come to say this?

There is, first, the obvious connection between wishes and desire, Unrest, Unbefriedigung. No one who wishes for Polly is quite content to do without her. And of course there is a familiar cycle of events connected with desire and discontent: if the object is attained then satisfaction commonly follows. If Polly comes, one expects to see Polly's welcome. In ascribing an unconscious wish we are pointing to what we take to be symptoms of desire: not only wishes but also likings and dislikings and choices and decisions. And we are

hazarding a guess that satisfaction of all these unsatisfiednesses together, would be obtainable in some particular way which is not itself the object of any (conscious) wish. To ascribe an unconscious wish is *not* simply to describe a feeling by reference to the object named in its verbal expression: it is not in fact to do this at all. It is to try to trace a causal connection between a man's conduct and feeling. The object of an unconscious wish is what we think would satisfy a number of different conscious feelings, not all of them wishes. Just as what we say a man *needs* is what we think would produce a certain pacification or satisfaction in his life. Of course, a man may not in the least know what he needs: he may not want it, he may want to avoid it. And certainly a man may seem not to know what (people say) he unconsciously wishes: and if he knows about it he may actively dislike and repudiate it.

I have argued that what we may call the object of an unconscious wish is not an object in the same sense as the object of a conscious wish: for the object of a conscious wish is what a man says he wishes for: the object of an unconscious wish is something we think would be good for him. But evidently that is not a complete account of the matter. We think of a man who has an unconscious wish as having a kind of *wish*: not a kind of *need*. Clearly we think of the object of the unconscious wish as something which the man would name to us if——. If he did not for some reason prevent himself from saying it? Or perhaps we think that he does name the object to us but only obliquely in some kind of code language. *Some* needs are rather like this. It is true that a man may be hungry and not admit it: we may insist that he is hungry although he denies it. And this may imply that if only he had not a strong motive to ignore the pangs, then he would indeed admit that he felt hungry. But most needs are not at all like this: a man's need of calcium or of vitamin C is not something which we *could* learn about simply from what he says about his feelings. The unconscious *wish* is more like a wish than like a need: if there were no conscious wishes there would still be needs but there would be no unconscious wishes. There is an analogy drawn between the conscious and the unconscious wish.

Animals and infants do not wish: or (perhaps one should say) there is no difference between their wishings and their wantings. But the wants of infants and animals are also thought of by analogy with our own expressed wishes and wants. The desires of animals would look altogether different if we could altogether overlook the analogy between what they do and what we say and do. The desires of infants would look altogether different if we could altogether overlook the analogy between what they now do and what we expect them to say and do in a few months' or a few years' time. Just as we could not pity *dolls* unless we could also pity human

beings and animals; so we could not understand the desires of animals unless we could express and interpret human wishes and wants. When the cock calls the hens by crowing, we do not think that *the noise sets the hens in motion*: we think of the hens as being moved by desire (W.I. 493). The whole notion of purposive behaviour, of behaviour motivated by animal desire, or by unconscious human wishes, is a figurative one. What gives us the idea of aiming or desiring, is what happens when we express a wish or a feeling by naming its object.

King's College, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND EMPIRICAL

J. W. N. WATKINS

I

One of the most serious pre-occupations of post-medieval philosophy has been to distinguish those kinds of assertion which are either true or false from those which are neither true nor false. A solution to this problem would be of the highest importance. It would indicate in what areas rational inquiry has some hope of success and in what areas it is doomed to frustration. It would tell us, for example, whether it is worth trying to *think* about the possible mistakenness of our moral principles, or whether such thinking is bound to be ineffective since no truth or falsity attaches to them.

I confess that what led me to scrutinize one influential answer—the logical empiricist's answer—to this problem was the baleful influence which it seemed to me to have exerted on moral and political philosophy; and one thing which is, to my mind, important about the amendment I shall propose to that answer is that it makes possible a more fruitful kind of moral and political philosophy. But having declared my interest I shall say no more about ethics in this paper.

The logical empiricist's contention that the only kinds of true-or-false assertions, the only kinds of genuine statements, are analytic and empirical statements is not arbitrary. It arose out of criticism of Kant's answer to this problem. Kant's answer, as everyone knows, was: analytic *a priori*, synthetic *a posteriori*, and synthetic *a priori* propositions. There is no need to rehearse here the objections which have been lodged against the idea of synthetic *a priori* propositions. I will only mention that metaphysicians like Parmenides, Plato, Spinoza and Bradley who did believe in this kind of proposition were committed to and, indeed, explicitly maintained the thesis that, whereas we can only have testable and revisable opinions about the world of appearances, we can have incorrigible knowledge of the realities which those appearances obscure (rather as a telepathist might claim that he had a shadowy view of someone's face but unerring insight into the thoughts behind it). I shall maintain against the empiricist that we can have reasonable but untestable metaphysical opinions and against the *a priori*-minded metaphysician that such opinions are *less* reliable than well tested scientific theories.

In Kant's terminology, "analytic/synthetic" is an exhaustive classification: every statement is either verbally true and factually

uninformative, or informative and not verbally true. In recent discussions of this classification *analytic* has received all the attention. As a residuary legatee, *synthetic* has been left waiting outside the logician's office until the exact extent of *analytic's* legacy has been determined. But at the same time, the disappearance of the synthetic *a priori* has made it natural to characterize synthetic statements not only negatively as non-analytic, but also positively as empirical statements. For all that remains of Kant's trichotomy is analytic truths and synthetic *a posteriori*, or empirically grounded, statements. It is rather as if *synthetic* had been bequeathed both a specific legacy and the residue of the estate; but then the executors discovered that after paying the two legacies no residue remained. Thus the "analytic/synthetic" dichotomy has been regarded simultaneously as a necessarily exhaustive classification of statements and as a positive (one might say positivist) criterion for checking the credentials of sentences purporting to express genuine statements. It is this combination of restrictiveness and exhaustiveness which has made logical empiricism seem both tough and inexorable.

I shall challenge the empiricist's version of the "analytic/synthetic" dichotomy by drawing attention to a precise class of influential doctrines which inhabit a no-man's-land between analytic and empirical statements. Later, in section IV, paragraph (3), I shall prove that these doctrines are not analytic. My concern is an unempirical sub-division of *synthetic*. Consequently, my argument can proceed independently of any doubts, however justified by the kind of consideration which Professor Quine has raised, about the precision and applicability of the notion of analyticity. For my purpose it is enough to say that an analytic statement is a statement which is compatible with every synthetic statement and whose denial is self-contradictory. If a synthetic *a priori* statement is a *necessarily true* factual statement, then my argument has nothing to say about such statements. But if by "synthetic *a priori* doctrine" were meant a factual doctrine which may animate empirical investigations but whose truth *or falsity* is logically independent of empirical findings, then this is the kind of doctrine whose existence I shall try to establish. My argument will also proceed independently of any assumptions about prescriptive utterances.

The doctrines I have in mind have this peculiarity. They are universal statements which may be confirmed in the sense of being instantiated. Sometimes, indeed, the recognition of a very few instances would be regarded as a triumphant vindication of the doctrine. On the other hand they are in principle irrefutable. Unlike the statements of *a priori* metaphysics, they describe a realm which is not altogether beyond experience but connected with experience in an asymmetrical way, a realm of which we may catch glimpses

which inconclusively confirm these descriptions of it, but a realm which we cannot explore sufficiently to refute descriptions of it.

A familiar kind of confirmable but irrefutable statement is a statement that a house, say, is *haunted*. A ghost-watcher who witnesses no strange occurrences does not thereby refute such a statement, for a haunting presence is often invisible. On the other hand, a ghost-watcher who has eerie sensations, hears rustling noises and thinks he sees a moving shape, does thereby confirm such a statement, though not conclusively, of course, since there are plausible alternative explanations of his experiences. Since this asymmetrical confirmability-cum-irrefutability is one of several features shared by haunted-house statements and the kind of metaphysical doctrines I have in mind, I shall call the latter *haunted-universe* doctrines. Determinism is an example: it alleges that all the seeming irregularities and spontaneities in the world are haunted by an omnipresent system of strict necessitation, a system of which science has given us numerous confirming glimpses. No evidence can refute this doctrine. Seeming exceptions, seemingly lawless events, can always be regarded in the way in which Spinoza regarded miracles, as evidence only of our scientific ignorance: the ghostly laws governing apparent counter-examples exist, but undetected.

In this paper I shall confine myself to the technical problem of defining the form, the logical structure, of such doctrines, which I regard as true-or-false and as proper subjects for rational investigation. Since I am using them to drive a wedge into the "analytic/empirical" dichotomy, since I regard them as unempirical despite their confirmability, my first job must be to provide an acceptable criterion for *empirical* and then to inquire whether confirmable (or instantial) but irrefutable statements are empirical or not.

II

It is generally agreed that an empirical statement is one which "makes an observable difference," puts some restriction on the domain of possible observation-statements. It is also generally agreed that an empirical statement need not *by itself* entail any observation-statement since many scientific hypotheses are what Dr. J. O. Wisdom calls non-instantial, that is, some or all of their predicates denote unobservable properties, and to test them we have to combine them with further information and deduce observable conclusions from the combination of premisses. In view of this, Professor A. J. Ayer, in the first edition of *Language, Truth and Logic*, defined a hypothesis as empirical (or, in his terminology, weakly verifiable) "if some observation-statement can be deduced

from it in conjunction with certain other premisses, without being deducible from those other premisses alone."

But in the Introduction to his second edition he pointed out that this criterion lets through all statements whatever. Consider two sentence-frames, "( )" and "If ( ) then *O*" (where *O* stands for any observation-statement, such as "This is white"). We can take any utterly unempirical or nonsensical sentence—Ayer's example was "The Absolute is lazy"—and insert it between both pairs of brackets. Our two premisses will now jointly entail an observation-statement not entailed by either premiss alone. Thus *any* sentence can be made to satisfy Ayer's earlier criterion.

Clearly, the statement whose empirical status is in question must not be allowed to recur among the premisses with which it is combined when being examined for empirical content. Ayer's revised criterion prevents this recurrence. The criterion offered below is merely a re-formulation of Ayer's. I have followed Ayer here both because I think his criterion works and because, in advancing counter-examples to the empiricist's twofold classification of genuine statements, I want to employ a criterion of *empirical* which has been developed within the empiricist tradition.

Bearing in mind the hierarchical character of scientific systems, we can construct the following hierarchical scheme for empirical statements. (Throughout this paper I shall replace the clumsy formula "*p* in conjunction with *q* entails *r* which is not entailed by *q* alone" by "*p* in conjunction with *q* gives rise to *r*" and sometimes simply by "*p* gives rise to *r*.")

A statement is empirical if it is an observation-statement, for instance "This is black." Observation-statements are practically verifiable/falsifiable by observations.

An instantial or, as Professor J. H. Woodger calls it, a zero-level hypothesis, like "All ravens are black," and all of whose predicates describe observable properties, is empirical if it, in conjunction with observation-statements, gives rise to further observation-statements. Thus "All ravens are black" in conjunction with "This is a raven" gives rise to "This is black."

A non-instantial hypothesis, or system of hypotheses, like Newton's three laws, which cannot be directly tested, is empirical if it, in conjunction with empirical instantial hypotheses, gives rise to further empirical instantial hypotheses.

The idea behind this hierarchy is very simple. Observation-statements are the primary empirical statements. Instantial hypotheses are empirical only if they directly give rise to observation-statements, and non-instantial hypotheses only if they indirectly give rise to observation-statements. An instantial "hypothesis" is unempirical if

it in conjunction with any observation-statements is compatible with all other observation-statements, and a non-instantial system is unempirical if it in conjunction with any empirical instantial hypotheses is compatible with all the observation-statements with which those instantial hypotheses alone are compatible.

In short, a statement is unempirical if it makes no observable difference. I do not think anyone could reasonably claim that this is too severe. Let us now see how this applies to theories which are confirmable in the sense of being instantial, but irrefutable.

That a statement *is* empirical if it is instantial, and that a scientific hypothesis is empirically confirmed by observations of numerous satisfying instances of it, is still, I think, a widespread belief, although the grave difficulties or "paradoxes" which this conception of empirical confirmation involves have been plainly pointed out.[1] How they arise can be shown in the following way. Each of the following propositions seems intuitively acceptable:

(1) Observations of black ravens confirm "All ravens are black." (Generally, instances satisfying the antecedent and consequent of a universal conditional confirm it.)

(2) Observations of black shoes, white swans, etc., are neutral to "All ravens are black." (Instances not satisfying the antecedent of a universal conditional are neutral to it.)

(3) If observations confirm one formulation of a hypothesis they confirm any logically equivalent formulation. (This is Professor Hempel's "equivalence condition.")

But analysis shows that the three propositions are not mutually compatible: one of them has to go. This is because "All ravens are black" is equivalent to "All non-black things are non-ravens" and to "Everything is no raven or black," so that, by Hempel's equivalence condition, "This white thing is a swan" and "This is no raven" and "This is black" all instantiate "All ravens are black."[2] Since no one, I take it, is prepared to deny proposition (3) there are only two ways out of this *imbroglio*: deny the instantiation-theory of confirmation implicit in proposition (1); or deny the possibility of things constituting purely neutral evidence assumed in proposition (2).

The first course was taken over twenty years ago by Professor Karl Popper in his *Logik der Forschung* (now translated under the title *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*). All conceivable objects can be

[1] See especially C. G. Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation," *Mind*, January and April, 1945, on which this paragraph is based.

[2] The same point can be made by treating a hypothesis truth-functionally, so that "$p \supset q$" is confirmed not only by "$p.q$" but also by "$\bar{p}.q$" and by "$\bar{p}.\bar{q}$." On this see D. Pears, "Hypotheticals," *Analysis*, January 1950.

exhaustively classified as: (1) non-ravens and black ravens, and (2) non-black ravens. The number of objects in class (1), all of which instantiate "All ravens are black," is obviously much (perhaps infinitely) larger than the number of possible objects in class (2), all of which would falsify "All ravens are black." Seeing that every empirical hypothesis is instantiated by a vast mass of irrelevant evidence and refutable by a small but vital amount of possible counter-evidence, Popper interpreted the confirmation of a testable hypothesis in terms of persistent but unsuccessful attempts to falsify it and not in terms of success in finding instantiating evidence. For Popper, a confirmed hypothesis is a hypothesis which has "proved its mettle" by withstanding severe tests. Certain allegedly empirical but unfalsifiable types of statement have been cited against his falsifiability-criterion of empirical science but, as we shall see, these "counter-examples" transpire to be unempirical. Here, as in many other places, I am a convinced Popperian. But I should be begging my present question if I adopted this criterion at the outset. My question is: Is a confirmable but irrefutable hypothesis empirical? And the answer entailed by Popper's criterion is that an irrefutable hypothesis is not confirmable. I shall therefore consider a theory of confirmation on which the idea of a confirmable but irrefutable hypothesis does make sense, namely, an instantiation-theory.

The second course was taken subsequently by Professor Hempel (op. cit.). Hempel retained the instantiation-theory of confirmation and dispensed instead with the idea that observation-reports about, say, white swans and black shoes, are irrelevant to "All ravens are black." It is a mistake, he said, to suppose that "Every P is a Q" asserts something only about objects having the property P—it asserts something about every object whatever, namely, that they all lack P or possess Q (op. cit., p. 18). Since "there is no object which is not implicitly 'referred to' by a hypothesis of this type" it follows that any object whatever *will* provide either confirming or disconfirming evidence, and *no* object will provide purely neutral evidence, for such a hypothesis.

Hempel claimed that the old instantiation-theory of confirmation could be made to work if it were suitably refined. If his claim is correct it means that an irrefutable hypothesis which has been confirmed *is* an empirically grounded hypothesis; and this would mean that the peculiar doctrines I have in mind are not, after all, unempirical. Hempel's revised instantiation-theory of empirical confirmation therefore represents a challenge to my thesis which I must now try to meet.

The chief factor in his revision is his introduction of the idea of the *development* of a hypothesis H for a finite class of objects C. "The development of H for C," he writes, "states what H would

assert if there existed exclusively those objects which are elements of *C*" (op. cit., p. 109). Thus the development of "All ravens are black" for a class of objects *a*, *b*, *c* is: "If *a* is a raven *a* is black, if *b* is a raven *b* is black, if *c* is a raven *c* is black." Hempel now defines direct confirmation as follows: "An observation report *B* directly confirms a hypothesis *H* if *B* entails the development of *H* for the class of those objects which are mentioned in *B*." Thus the observation-report "*a* is a raven and black, *b* is no raven and black, *c* is no raven and not black" directly confirms "All ravens are black." An observation-report directly disconfirms a hypothesis if it directly confirms the denial of the hypothesis.

It was already clear, before Hempel discovered the "paradoxes of confirmation," that what matters, when you are investigating how well the evidence confirms some universal hypothesis, is not so much the existence of pro-instances as the non-existence of counter-instances. If, in the course of investigating the theory that all swans are white, you go to the keeper of a swannery, the question to ask him is not (*a*) "How many white swans have you seen?" but (*b*) "Have you ever seen a swan which was not white?" It was already clear that a highly favourable answer to question (*a*) ("I've seen hundreds of thousands of white swans") carries very little weight so long as question (*b*) (to which the reply might be, "Yes, we did have a black swan here some years ago") remains unanswered. To Hempel belongs the high credit of showing that the existence of pro-instances is even more trivial and irrelevant to the confirmation of a universal hypothesis than we already supposed. It is his equivalence-condition which generates the "paradoxes of confirmation"; the equivalence-condition tells us that if we are looking for pro-instances we can turn an (*a*)-type question into an (*a'*)-type question, like "How many things have you seen which were white or not swans?" (a question to which the puzzled swannery-keeper, after scratching his head, might reply, "Why, millions upon millions, I reckon.")

But Hempel seems to have been strangely unimpressed by his own simple but devastating discovery that *every* universal empirical hypothesis is *automatically* instantiated by millions upon millions of objects. Since answers to (*a'*)-type questions (questions which merely enquire about the existence of instantiating evidence) are *bound* to be hugely favourable—even to a hypothesis which has been empirically falsified and even to both of two contrary hypotheses—one might have expected Hempel to infer that the "confirmation" which (*a'*)-type answers provide is utterly spurious, and that it is only answers to (*b*)-type questions (questions which probe for counter-evidence, questions asked in the course of *testing* a hypothesis) which may genuinely confirm a hypothesis. One might have expected him to agree that the confirming value of (*a'*)-type answers compared

to the confirming value of (*b*)-type answers is like the purchasing value of those paper *reichsmarks* which proliferated at a fantastic rate during the German inflation compared with the purchasing value of golden *reichsmarks*. In short, one might have expected him to adopt, with a conviction intensified by his own discovery, the view already advanced by Popper that failure, despite severe tests, to find counter-evidence, and not success in finding instantiating evidence, is the only thing which genuinely confirms a universal hypothesis.

But, alas, Hempel preferred to try to patch up the old instantiation-theory of confirmation. The criticism to which Hempel the author of a revised instantiation-theory is exposed is precisely the criticism one would have expected to come from Hempel the discoverer of the "paradoxes of confirmation"; namely, that his instantiation-criterion allows hypotheses to be massively confirmed (and their negations to be massively disconfirmed) by utterly irrelevant observation-statements.

Let our hypothesis be "All ravens are black" and let our observation-statements be "This swan is white" and "This shoe is black"; and assume that the properties of being a raven and being a swan and being a shoe are mutually exclusive. The development of our hypothesis for any two objects is "This is no raven or black and this is no raven or black." From our two observation-statements we can derive "This is no raven and this is black." Therefore our observation-statements entail the development of, and so directly confirm, our hypothesis.

Hempel admits that such a result is counter-intuitive, but assures us that the appearance of a paradox here "is not objectively founded; it is a psychological illusion"(op. cit., p. 18); for such a hypothesis says something about every object in the universe, and what it says is borne out by the two objects, the swan and the shoe, mentioned in our observation-statements.

But the common-sense conviction that these observation-statements *are* irrelevant to this hypothesis, far from being an illusion, can be proved very simply to be correct. For these observation-reports could be replaced by contradictory or contrary observation-reports, and these too would "directly confirm" the same hypothesis. From "This swan is not white" and "This shoe is not black," we can derive "This is no raven and this is no raven"; and from "This swan is black" and "This shoe is white" we can derive "This is black and this is no raven." Both these derivations entail "This is no raven or black and this is no raven or black," and so directly confirm our hypothesis.

A complementary situation arises in connection with disconfirmation. The negation of "All ravens are black" is "At least one non-black raven exists." The development of such a purely existential hypothesis for any two objects is, according to Hempel (op. cit., p. 109), the

disjunction, "This is a non-black raven and/or this is a non-black raven." This development is contradicted by "This swan is white" plus "This shoe is black" and also by all pairs of observation-statements made up of the contradictories and contraries of this pair.

We thus have the outrageous situation where a mass of evidence confirms a universal hypothesis and disconfirms its existential denial although a mass of flatly *conflicting* evidence would *equally* confirm the hypothesis and disconfirm its denial. The conclusion must be that the colossal inflation of instantiating evidence generated by Hempel's unquestionable equivalence-condition is utterly irrelevant for the genuine confirmation of a universal hypothesis. Since an empirical universal hypothesis is instantiated by every object whatever except those objects whose existence it prohibits, it follows that, for its empirical confirmation, instantiation counts for nothing and that only attempted dis-instantiation, attempted falsification, matters. Thus the instantial but unfalsifiable doctines I shall introduce later are "confirmable" only in a spurious way and are not open to genuine confirmation or disconfirmation.

Popper's theory of confirmation does not allow a hypothesis to be confirmed by irrelevant evidence, by evidence which could be replaced by flatly conflicting but equally confirming evidence, because according to it a confirming observation-report will describe the favourable outcome of some *test*. If the outcome had been significantly different, it would have been unfavourable to the hypothesis.[1] Hempel, however, rejects Popper's falsifiability-measure of the empirical content and simplicity and testability of scientific hypotheses for other reasons. I shall now consider Hempel's dismissal of Popper's criterion, partly to show that it was a wrongful dismissal, but mainly to prepare the way for a consideration of those non-analytic and unfalsifiable doctrines, to show the unempirical character of which is my main concern.

Hempel writes: "Popper's proposal to limit scientific hypotheses to the form of (relatively) falsifiable sentences [i.e. sentences contradictable by a *revocable* observation-report] involves a very severe limitation of the possible forms of scientific hypotheses; in particular it rules out all purely existential hypotheses as well as most hypotheses whose formulation requires both universal and existential quantification" (op. cit., pp. 119–120).

I will consider the case of universally-cum-existentially quantified hypotheses in section III. As far as purely existential statements are

[1] For a proposed measure of confirmation see his "Degree of Confirmation," *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, v. 18, 1954. He comments on p. 144: "The three cases—support, undermining, independence—are easily seen to be exhaustive and exclusive on this definition."

concerned, we can at once agree that they are meaningful, unfalsifiable and verifiable. Do they overthrow Popper's falsifiability-criterion of empirical science? Now one of Popper's reasons for not equating that criterion with a criterion of meaningfulness was this. The negation of a statement is presumably as meaningful as the statement it negates (if we can understand *s* and *not* we can presumably understand *not-s*). Scientific hypotheses can be put in the form of negative existential statements ("There does not exist a non-black raven," "There does not exist a perpetual motion machine," etc.). The negation of a negative existential statement is, of course, a purely existential statement. A purely existential hypothesis is untestable and unscientific. Therefore, the class of scientific statements is a sub-class of the class of meaningful statements (op. cit., sects. 4 and 15).

To illustrate Popper's thesis about the asymmetry between scientific negative existential statements and unscientific purely existential statements, compare "There does not exist a metal which, on being heated, fails to expand" with its purely existential denial. The first puts a limitation on the entire universe and can be tested throughout the universe. The second introduces an ingredient into some unspecified corner of the universe and cannot be tested at all.

The fact that purely existential statements can logically contradict scientific hypotheses is compatible with the claim that they play no role in the refutation of scientific theories because what counts as a refutation in science is never the bare assertion that a thing prohibited by the hypothesis exists. The very least that will be required is the assertion that some identifiable object exists within some *circumscribed* space-time region, for instance that an object of such-and-such a description is at the top left-hand corner of the slide under my microscope. I call such statements "circumscribed existential statements." Statements which locate some identifiable object within some circumscribed region are refutable, at least in principle. Popper requires of "basic" statements in science that they should, moreover, be inter-subjectively testable in practice (op. cit., sect. 28). For the actual overthrow of a scientific theory he requires the acceptance of an incompatible, well tested, low-order *generalization*—of what I may call a trustworthy recipe for reproducing counter-evidence.

But while purely existential statements play no role in scientific refutations, they may be connected with scientific theories in other ways. First, a purely existential statement may be joined to a universal theory in order to give it existential import. Being a component of an empirical theory does not, however, entail that the component is itself empirical—for instance, the mathematics of a

physical theory is not empirical. Indeed, a number of philosophers from Duhem to Quine have held that *all* the components of a testable system are individually unempirical because "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body" (W. V. O. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, p. 41).

> "If the predicted phenomenon is not produced" [writes Duhem], "not only is the proposition questioned at fault, but so is the whole theoretical scaffolding used by the physicist. The only thing the experiment teaches us is that among the propositions used to predict the phenomenon, there is at least one error; but where this error lies is just what it does not tell us" (*The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory*, p. 185).

Or, in Quine's most recent formulation,

> "Statements are tied to the testimony of the senses only in a systematic or holistic way which defies any statement-by-statement distribution of sensory certificates" (*Mind*, October 1953, p. 434).

(This is, of course, the ground for Quine's repudiation of the divisibility of statements into analytic or synthetic.) But whether we go the whole way with the Duhem-Quine school or not, there can be no doubt that an individual component of an empirical system *may* itself be unempirical. I shall shortly give reasons for regarding all purely existential components as unempirical.

Another way in which a purely existential statement may be related to an empirical theory is as a logical consequence. For instance, from an empirical theory about evolution in conjunction with circumscribed existential statements about men and apes, the uncircumscribed existential statement "The 'Missing Link' exists" may be deduced. But the logical consequences of empirical statements need not be empirical—the empirical statement p entails the tautology *p or not-p*.

In an attempt to falsify his falsifiability-criterion of science Popper looked for counter-examples: in particular, for any purely existential hypotheses advanced during the history of science. But he found that the only candidates proved, on closer examination, to be existential components of a testable universal theory.[1] And his criterion applies to scientific *theories*, not to the several components of such theories, many of which are analytic or otherwise untestable. Neither he, nor so far as I know anyone else, has succeeded in unearthing a historical example of a full-fledged free-standing

[1] Op. cit., sect. 15. His example was, "There exists an element of the atomic number 72."

scientific theory with a purely existential and unfalsifiable character. Hempel contents himself with the purely existential allegation that purely existential scientific hypotheses do exist—an unscientific mode of rebuttal!

But my problem is not whether confirmable but unfalsifiable statements, of which purely existential statements are a species, ever figure as scientific hypotheses or as experimental refutations of them, but whether they are empirical; and does not the fact that these statements are verifiable by experience mean that they are empirical? If purely existential statements are meaningful negations of meaningful statements, are they not also empirical negations of empirical statements? I have given a reason which endorses the presumption that a statement and its negation have the same status so far as their meaningfulness is concerned. I will now give reasons which dispel this presumption so far as their empirical status is concerned.

It is logicians (and, as Professor Popper has reminded me, theologians) who deal in purely existential statements. Those existential statements to which we are accustomed in daily life and which are not expressions of some metaphysical faith are, I think, invariably circumscribed, either explicitly or contextually. Your worst expectations might be aroused on hearing a feminine voice cry out, "There's a man in my room!" But no expectations are legitimately aroused by the tenseless, uncircumscribed statement, "A man exists." Let there be a space-time region which I can exhaustively explore. This supposition, in conjunction with the statement that a mermaid exists within that region, entails that there is a probability of 1 that I shall observe a mermaid if I explore the region exhaustively. Now let the region be expanded so that I can only explore a random sample of one-tenth of it. This supposition, in conjunction with the statement that a mermaid exists within the region, entails that there is a probability of 0.1 that I shall observe a mermaid if I explore what I can of the region. As the circumscribed region expands, the observational expectations legitimately aroused by a circumscribed existential statement diminish. When the boundaries are removed, the observational expectations legitimately aroused by a statement alleging the existence of a thing within an uncircumscribed and infinite space-time region are precisely nil.

Thus a purely existential statement can make no observable difference, is compatible with every conceivable finite set of observation-statements, and is therefore unempirical. People who incline to this view when thinking of unverified statements like "Mermaids exist" may feel uneasy when they turn to verified statements like "Caelocanths exist"; yet the empirical or unempirical status of a statement cannot depend on contingent facts. Two considerations

may help to dispel uneasiness about verified existential statements. First, an existential statement which is grammatically uncircumscribed is, ordinarily, tacitly circumscribed by its context. A person who declares "Caelocanths exist" to someone who had supposed them extinct, intends something like, "Caelocanths are swimming in the ocean today." Secondly, observations give rise to circumscribed existential statements. When we observe something we observe it in some sort of spatial relation to ourselves at some moment of time. There would be no promotion for the coastguard who confined his telephone-reports to gnomic utterances like "Ships in distress exist!" A verified uncircumscribed existential statement is properly regarded as a weak entailment of the circumscribed existential statement(s) to which observation(s) originally gave rise; and an entailment of an empirical statement may be too weak to be empirical without being so weak as to be analytic. The only way to discover whether it is empirical or not is to discover whether it could have any observational implications. And purely existential statements cannot.

Another kind of unempirical existential statement is that which alleges the existence of something abstract without indicating how to discover it and which is compatible with persistent failure to discover it. An example (which I owe to Mr. Gellner) is, "There exists a solution to this problem." Another example is, "There exists a law of nature governing this phenomenon." Of course, such statements may be consequences of a wider theory, and this theory may be testable. But they themselves are compatible with all experience and therefore unempirical. Suppose that a man, in the search for a cure for some so far incurable disease, suffers disappointment after disappointment. If he loses hope and abandons the search his attitude is one of common-sense realism. He has, in effect, investigated and refuted the empirical hypothesis that a cure exists which is discoverable after, say, three years' hard research. But if he never loses hope, if he persists in the face of unremitting disappointment, then he displays a genuinely metaphysical temper. That a cure exists has become for him as much an irrefutable article of faith as the belief of certain Christians in a Second Coming. The pig-headedness induced by a certain metaphysical inebriation is sometimes more scientifically fruitful than sober acquiescence in the "lessons" of experience.

Thus existential statements, which looked hostile to my contention that confirmable but irrefutable statements are unempirical, turn out to be friendly. I will now return to the more interesting kind of metaphysical statement.

If it is granted that purely existential statements are unempirical, it follows that a universal hypothesis for which satisfying instances might be found but against which counter-instances could

never be found is also unempirical. For in considering the empirical or unempirical status of purely existential statements we found that their verifiability, their conclusive confirmability, was outweighed by their unfalsifiability; so that the inconclusive confirmability of this hypothesis will certainly be outweighed by its unfalsifiability.

Moreover, if we consider how a hypothesis could be confirmable but irrefutable, it will be clear that such a hypothesis could not satisfy the criterion for *empirical* which I proposed at the beginning of this section. Such a hypothesis would have to give rise to statements alleging the existence of some observable state of affairs in some *un*specified space-time region; then, if that state of affairs is observed the hypothesis will be confirmed, whereas if it is not observed the hypothesis will not be refuted. But a hypothesis which, however combined with other information, only entails the occurrence of something in some unspecified region, makes no observable difference for space- and time-bound observers. In short, a hypothesis which gives rise only to purely existential statements will be confirmed whenever one of these is verified; but since its purely existential consequences are unfalsifiable, it is compatible with every conceivable finite set of observation-statements and is therefore unempirical.

The structure of such confirmable but unfalsifiable statements is straightforward—it has actually been exhibited by Hempel (though his purpose was the opposite of mine: he wanted to show that they are empirical statements wrongly ruled out by Popper's falsifiability-criterion of empirical science).

III

We must now consider statements of the form "For all . . . there exists some . . .", for instance, "Everybody has a mother," "There's no smoke without fire," "Evil-doing never goes unpunished." These statements have both universal and existential quantification and may be called "all-and-some" statements. (Their symbolic form is "$(x)\ (Ey)R(x,y)$".) They entitle us to infer from a particular instance of the universally quantified variable (this person, this smoke, this evil-doing) to the existence of a related instance of the existentially quantified variable (some mother, some fire, some punishment).

I shall show later that if a statement of this form specifies the relation between its variables with a certain rigour it is a falsifiable and empirical statement. But Hempel is concerned with statements of this form which are ruled out by Popper's criterion for being *un*falsifiable. He wants to show that these unfalsifiable statements are nevertheless empirical and may belong within science. Perhaps he (wrongly) regards them as empirical because he (rightly) regards

them as meaningful—and in the empiricist tradition he equates being meaningful with being empirical. But I hope to show that "all-and-some" statements, like purely existential statements, teach us that being meaningful must not be identified with being empirical. Consider the example with which Hempel works (it is an admirable example of an unfalsifiable hypothesis). He writes: "The hypothesis 'Every substance is soluble in some solvent'—symbolically '(x) (Ey) Soluble (x,y)'—is neither entailed by, nor incompatible with, any observation-report, no matter how many cases of solubility or non-solubility of particular substances in particular solvents the report may list" (op. cit., p. 113). Hempel nevertheless holds that such a hypothesis is empirical since it is "capable of being confirmed or disconfirmed by suitable observation-reports." There is, of course, no difficulty about confirming this hypothesis in the sense of instantiating it: it will be confirmed each time a substance is observed to dissolve. Hempel does not describe in his articles how it could be *dis*confirmed. Let us see whether it could be.

For Hempel, it will be remembered, an observation-report directly disconfirms a hypothesis if it entails the development of the denial of the hypothesis. The denial of "Every substance is soluble" (H) is "An insoluble substance exists" (*not-H*). The development of *not-H* for objects $a, b, \ldots n$ is: "a is insoluble or b is insoluble . . . or n is insoluble." But no observation-report could entail this development; for whereas the fact that something has been observed to dissolve does entail that it is soluble, the fact that something has not yet been observed to dissolve does not *entail* that it is insoluble —a solvent for it may be found tomorrow. Thus H cannot be directly disconfirmed.

But Hempel has suggested to me in a letter that a further step can be taken. We can regard the development of *not-H* as a finite disjunction of *hypotheses* ("a is insoluble," etc.) each of which can in turn be developed for a finite class of possible solvents ("a is insoluble in $b, c, \ldots n$," etc.). An observation-report which entails the development of any one of these alternative, low-level hypotheses directly confirms a statement which, in turn, directly confirms *not-H*. Thus such an observation-report indirectly (if I may expand Hempel's terminology) disconfirms H. But the old difficulty re-appears here.[1] The fact that a has not yet been observed to dissolve in c does not entail that a is insoluble in c. (If I observe a lump of sugar to fail to dissolve in a glass of water, I must not infer that sugar is insoluble in water.) Thus no observation-report can entail that a is insoluble in c, or directly confirm that a is insoluble in everything, or indirectly disconfirm H. And we shall be launched on an infinite regress if we try once more to repair the damage by treating "a is insoluble in c"

[1] Mr. J. Agassi has shown me how to strengthen my argument here.

as a hypothesis, direct confirmation of which would indirectly confirm "*a* is insoluble" and, at two removes, disconfirm *H*; for "*a* was not observed to dissolve in *c'*, *c''*, *c'''*" does not entail that *a* is insoluble in *c'*, *c''*, *c'''*, and so does not entail the development of "*a* is insoluble in *c*" for *c'*, *c''* and *c'''*. However often we develop the developments of "An insoluble substance exists" we shall never succeed in closing the open, unrestricted character of the predicate "insoluble," a predicate which can never be entailed by a finite number of singular observation-statements.

Thus on Hempel's instantiation-theory of confirmation, "Every substance has a solvent" turns out to be confirmable but not disconfirmable. And this is precisely what I should have expected. For *H* entails that, for any particular substance, there exists a solvent *somewhere*, so that if we do discover a solvent we do confirm, whereas if we do not discover a solvent we do not rebut, *H*. This instantial doctrine is compatible with every conceivable finite set of observation-statements and is therefore unempirical.

"All-and-some" statements may, as I have said, constitute falsifiable hypotheses. When is this so? Why do we regard "Everybody has a mother" as a reliable empirical hypothesis and "Everybody has a soul-mate" as a myth? (I use the word "myth" advisedly, for it is typical of myths that they are easy to confirm but practically or logically impossible to test.) My answer here draws on what I said in connection with existential statements. "All-and-some" statements are empirical if they give rise to circumscribed existential statements of a falsifiable kind; otherwise not. "Everybody has a mother such that he has been joined to her only by an umbilical cord" gives us directions for locating any particular person's mother, and thereby lays itself open to falsification. We might trace someone's biography back to his beginnings and find that he had never been joined by an umbilical cord to anyone but had started life in a test-tube. "Everybody has a soul-mate *somewhere*" gives me no directions for locating my soul-mate and would not be falsified by my failure to find her. An "all-and-some" statement is unempirical if it can only give rise to purely existential statements about instances of its existentially quantified variable. Professor Urmson has recently given renewed currency to the idea that Popper's falsifiability-criterion of empirical science (Urmson follows tradition in wrongly calling it a criterion of significance) is overthrown by the fact that we can "easily construct a statement which is neither conclusively falsifiable nor conclusively verifiable by making it contain both the unverifiable 'all' and the unfalsifiable 'some'" (*Philosophical Analysis*, p. 113). The boot is on the other foot. It is unfalsifiable "all-and-some" statements which are properly set aside as unempirical by Popper's criterion.

A hypothesis which postulates an empirically testable relation between instances of two variables may be given the form of an ordinary universal scientific hypothesis by re-formulating it as a hypothesis which ascribes a relational property to instances of one universally quantified variable. Thus "Everybody has a mother" may be re-formulated as, "Everybody is mothered." Henceforth, I shall, for convenience, confine the name "all-and-some" to unempirical statements of this form.

The negation of an "all-and-some" statement is unfalsifiable because what it negates is unverifiable, and unverifiable because what it negates is unfalsifiable.[1]

IV

There are, so far as I can see, four possible ways in which a logical empiricist might try to defend the "analytic/empirical" dichotomy against these counter-examples. (1) He might declare "all-and-some" statements to be *meaningless*. (2) He might describe them as methodological *prescriptions* disguised as ontological descriptions. (3) He might maintain that an "all-and-some" statement is really a disguised definition, an *analytic* stipulation that two predicates (e.g. "substance" and "soluble") which in ordinary language have different applications are henceforth to have the same application. (4) He might weaken his criterion of *empirical* until it covers "all-and-some" statements. I will consider these defensive moves in turn.

(1) During the last few pages the empiricist-minded philosopher may have found it hard to contain his impatience. "I grant," he might say, "that you have successfully defended Popper's falsifiability-criterion by showing that the kinds of unfalsifiable statements which have been cited against it are in fact unempirical. But your very success here is ruinous to your main thesis. You are trying to establish the existence of *significant* counter-examples to the "analytic/empirical" dichotomy. But in showing that these unfalsifiable statements make no observable difference you demonstrate their vacuity and meaninglessness. Waste no more time on them." Thus Mr. Stuart Hampshire characterizes what he calls "multiply general sentences" (which bear a family resemblance to "all-and-some" sentences) as "meaningless" in an "artificially restricted but now familiar and useful sense."[2]

[1] The negation can be expressed symbolically either by "$(Ex)\ \overline{(Ey)R(x,y)}$" (e.g. "Something exists such that nothing exists in which it is soluble"), or by "$(Ex)\ (y)\overline{R(x,y)}$" (e.g. "Something exists which is insoluble in everything").

[2] *Analysis*, March 1950, p. 76. "A multiply general sentence," he says, "is so constructed that no singular statement can be formulated which entails or is compatible with it." A sentence of this type "involves the double [or treble]

The charge that "all-and-some" statements are meaningless (and also the claim that they are prescriptive or analytic) can be rebutted by emphasizing their logical continuity with other statements which are undoubtedly meaningful (and neither prescriptive nor analytic). Consider the following series:

(i) Circumscribed existential statements which locate some easily identified object within some easily explored region, and which are both falsifiable and verifiable.

(ii) Universal scientific hypotheses which are falsifiable but not verifiable.

(iii) Purely existential statements which are unfalsifiable but verifiable.

(iv) "All-and-some" statements which are unfalsifiable and unverifiable.

An instance of (iii) can always be turned into an instance of (i) by circumscribing the region to which it applies, and an instance of (iv) can always be turned into an instance of (ii) by further specifying the relation between its variables so as to make the relation testable. Thus purely existential statements are weak entailments of circumscribed existential statements, and "all-and-some" statements are weak entailments of scientific hypotheses. "All-and-some" statements give rise to purely existential statements which are negations of scientific hypotheses. Consequently, a logical empiricist who resorted to the *ad hoc* tactic of singling out "all-and-some" statements as pseudo or meaningless would be committed to the strange view that a bogus statement can give rise to, and be entailed by, and be incompatible with, genuine statements.

(2) As an informal but realistic account of the way "all-and-some" doctrines operate in intellectual life, there is much to be said for the prescription-interpretation. One may catch the force of a research-worker's adherence to determinism better by regarding it as a resolve to look for causal connections rather than as a belief that they exist. But since these doctrines are entailed by scientific hypotheses, to characterize them formally as prescriptions would clearly be to commit the naturalistic fallacy. If factual statements cannot

occurrence of the sign of unrestricted generality, the second being implicit or half-concealed." He says that such sentences "have played an important part in philosophical arguments" and mentions determinism as an example. "All-and-some" statements differ from the sentences he describes in having existential as well as universal quantification and in giving rise to purely existential assertions. My attention was drawn to Mr. Hampshire's article by Mr. R. M. Hare and Mr. E. A. Gellner who, with Professor A. J. Ayer and Mr. J. Watling, have greatly helped me to clarify my ideas.

entail prescriptions, "all-and-some" statements cannot be prescriptions.

(3) That "all-and-some" statements are analytic may be suggested by their compatibility with all observation-statements. But it is a mistake to suppose (as, for instance, Mr. Warnock appears to suppose in his discussion of the "all-and-some" doctrine "Every event has a cause"[1]) that such compatibility entails complete vacuousness. "All-and-some" statements are neither vacuous nor analytic because they are *not* compatible with all scientific hypotheses. Thus although "Every substance has a solvent" is compatible with "Gold has never been observed to dissolve" it is not compatible with the falsifiable hypothesis "Gold is insoluble." Haunted-universe doctrines (as I call the more arresting and influential examples of "all-and-some" doctrines) can function as *regulative* principles in scientific research precisely because they are incompatible with, and forbid the construction of, certain hypotheses. A principle which forbade nothing would regulate nothing. Such metaphysical principles lie, not beyond the combined "analytic/empirical" area, but between its constituent areas. They are synthetic and an omniscient mind would know which are true and which are false.

(4) The logical empiricist may, if he wishes, weaken his criterion of empirical meaningfulness until, by allowing statements which are compatible with every observation-statement, it ceases to be threatened by the kind of counter-example which I have been examining. If he does this, logical empiricism, which began with such a bang, will have evaporated without a whimper.

V

In this paper I have confined myself to a formal account of the structure and status of one kind of metaphysical principle. To bring the idea of haunted-universe doctrines to life and to show its philosophical, methodological and ethical importance, a good deal more needs to be said. First, the idea needs historical illustration; and the history of thought is very rich in illustrations: the mechanistic world-view of Hobbes, Descartes, Boyle and Newton is one powerful example, and the wave or field world-view of Faraday is another. Secondly, the role of haunted-universe doctrines as principles regulating the formation of scientific theories needs a proper examination. Thirdly, what light does their existence throw on the character of philosophical problems and on the problem-solving activities of classical philosophers? Fourthly, what light does it throw on moral

[1] *Logic and Language* II, p. 107.

and political philosophy? Finally, since influential haunted-universe doctrines are neither demonstrable nor testable, it becomes urgent to investigate the ways in which they can be rationally supported and criticized. I shall try to deal with these matters on another occasion.

The London School of Economics and Political Science,
The University of London.

THE LORDS' DEBATE ON HANGING JULY 1956

INTERPRETATION AND COMMENT

W. B. GALLIE

THE House of Lords debate of July last on the Death Penalty Abolition Bill[1] may prove to have been a landmark in British constitutional and legal history; certainly it was of the greatest interest as a specimen of current moral thinking and moral conflicts on the death penalty; and it is in this latter light that I shall discuss it here. Socialists and radicals might of course complain that a predominantly Conservative House of Lords could not be representative of current thinking; and they might contrast the voting for the second reading of Mr. Silverman's Bill in the Lords—Contents 95, Non-contents 238—with the votes that had previously been recorded in the Commons. But it is generally agreed that in the House of Lords it is the speeches not the votes that matter; and when regarded in this way the debate might perhaps be claimed as a success for the Abolitionists. They obtained intelligent and eloquent support from all sections of the House—from all three political parties; from the judicial as well as the episcopal bench; from noblemen in business as well as noblemen on the land; from former ministers of the crown and from leaders of the various professions. In fairness one must add that retentionist speakers were hardly less representative of different spheres of public life, except that very few of them hailed from Scotland and that the ablest of them drew almost exclusively on their experiences of government, of the Home Office and of the law-courts. In general, however, it was this variety in the background and informed experience of the participants that made the debate so worthy of study, not from the legal[2] or political point of view, but from that of moral philosophy.

Because my treatment of the subject is somewhat unusual—to some it may appear flippant, to others simply a facile application of ideas first developed in another field—I think it is proper to explain briefly how my main views arose. After reading the first twenty odd pages of the debate I recognized that it possessed a strangely dra-

[1] All references to this debate are to Hansard, Vol. 198, Nos. 114–115, 9th–10th July, 1956.

[2] In an important speech in which he urged his fellow peers not to give too much attention to what his fellow judges might say regarding the death penalty, Lord Keith of Avonholm remarked: "Might I add that I do not regard this as a legal issue at all. . . . The question is primarily a social question." No. 114, pp. 644–5.

matic interest; not because of any doubt and excitement as to its outcome, but because, quite irrespective of the known outcome, the successive speeches seemed to be building up in my mind a new picture or interpretation of public thinking, and of the nature of its conflicts, over capital punishment and indeed over punishment in general. This was a picture of the *logical personae* of the debate, or an interpretation of the arrangement and mutual relevancies, as well as the relative strengths and weaknesses, of the main arguments involved; and its effect was to show that here was no straight fight, nor yet a three-cornered fight, but a much more complicated affair whose outlines eventually became clear to me as follows:

The new interpretation. In respect of their moral principles or standpoints, participants in the debate may be divided into two main groups, which I call "Public Utilitarians" and "Active Advocates." The former group is made up of public men whose attitudes and beliefs regarding capital punishment are dominated, as those of responsible public men must be, by considerations of the "general weal," which turn out to be largely considerations regarding the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Thus members of my first class are Utilitarian in a very wide, almost formal, sense in which to regard a question from the Utilitarian standpoint means to regard it as a question of public concern. But Utilitarianism in this sense can evidently be coloured-in, so to speak, in a great number of different shades; so that at any one time on any one moral issue different sections of the "Public Utilitarian" body may present sharply different colours—may be sharply opposed one to another despite their common generic point of view. On the present issue these oppositions can be explained largely by the conflicting and competing appeals of members of my second main group, viz. "Active Advocates."

These divide into three sub-groups which I label for convenience "Draconians," "Tolstoyans" and "Spinozists." Each of these sub-groups has its own peculiar and passionately held moral standpoint regarding capital punishment; and the aim of each sub-group is to win and hold as many as possible of the great body of Public Utilitarians to a view of "what the general weal requires" regarding capital punishment, which will accord with its own peculiar—Draconian or Tolstoyan or Spinozist—standpoint. But the debate did not consist simply of successive attempts by spokesmen of the different sub-groups to make converts among the Public Utilitarian majority. On the contrary, most of the speakers were themselves Public Utilitarians, bent on explaining to their fellow Utilitarians (of somewhat different shade) why they have come to favour a Draconian or a Tolstoyan or a Spinozist colouring-in of their general attitude to the question of capital punishment. To see how and why this happens,

however, we must first know something of the peculiar moral standpoint of each of our three active sub-groups.

The *Draconian* standpoint is voiced by a small and dwindling group of Active Advocates; but it retains an enormously powerful semi-conscious backing not only from the mass of people but from the most sophisticated of us when caught off our rationalist or humanitarian guards. The fundamental Draconian tenets are, first, that appropriate punishment of legal offences, including capital punishment for most cases familiarly classified as murder, is a moral *right* possessed by society; and second, that in the event of any opposition to that punitive right every member of society has a paramount duty to assist the proper officers to implement it. Various rationalizations of these tenets have of course been offered by lawyers and philosophers; perhaps the most persuasive being that punishment in general is a morally justifiable because universally acceptable substitute for the natural claim of individuals to take vengeance on a wrong-doer. Punishment, on this view, is therefore a moral surrogate for the almost instinctive belief that a wrong must be "made-up" or "paid-up" in appropriate, which usually means in some sense *equal*, measure: and this basic belief is easily expanded into a general philosophy of justice, or general moral philosophy. It is important to recognize, however, that the Draconian moral standpoint does not depend, or indeed draw great support from, such sophisticated justification. To most Draconians their standpoint is axiomatic—something not to be questioned, something without which their characteristic thinking (or judging) on criminal matters could not proceed at all. That some (otherwise sane and perhaps even virtuous) people do question their tenets is for the Draconians, therefore, just one of those dreadful things—a dreadful incapacity to see the obvious truth. In this respect Draconians are, like the other sub-groups to be considered, "intuitionists": they simply cannot be argued with.

The Tolstoyan[1] standpoint is likewise voiced by a small group of

[1] A terminological point: Why "Tolstoyan" rather than "Christian pacificist" or simply "Christian"? As to the latter, my answer is that no single, consistent, currently acceptable account of Christian teaching relevant to the subject of capital punishment can be established. (No part of the House of Lords debate was less edifying than when opposing speakers took to bandying Bible texts—at about the intellectual level of a fourth form debate in a school staffed by uneducated masters.) As to the former, I have three reasons for preferring the term Tolstoyan. (1) Tolstoy, probably the most influential pacificist moralist of the last hundred years, based his doctrine largely, to be sure, on his own interpretations of the Gospels, but also on at least one non-Christian source, viz. Lao-Tsu. (2) Tolstoy's influence has, particularly through the teaching of Gandhi and his disciples, been greater in non-Christian than in Christian countries. (3) The fact that Tolstoy was equally eminent as a novelist and as an "active advocate" indicates an important feature of the

Active Advocates, whose main tenet is most easily introduced as a total opposition to the Draconian tenets as stated above. But on what grounds do Tolstoyans reject the Draconian view of punishment, and in particular capital punishment for murderers, as at once a right and duty of society? They do so, in respect of capital punishment anyhow, because of their recognition (as they claim) of a "continuous humanity," running through all men, from saint to criminal, from genius to imbecile: a kind of spiritualized family bond to deny which is to destroy the foundations of all higher, e.g. Christian, morality. Yet such a denial, Tolstoyans maintain, does not simply result from, it is the express aim or purpose of, the institution of capital punishment. That punishment is not simply the sudden terrifying termination of a life, nor yet the deliberate termination of a life in virtue of terrible wrongs done to one (or more) of his fellows by the criminal. By every relevant feature of the institution, the criminal is made to feel that he is being pushed out—that he is being outlawed—out of society, out of life, because he is not fit to exist. Because it is thus a sheer denial of "continuous humanity," Tolstoyans regard capital punishment as a graver crime than the crime of murder which it is meant to make good and to deter.

As with the Draconians' fundamental "intuition,"[1] so with the Tolstoyans': it might be generalized and articulated into a comprehensive moral system; but its force and efficacy do not depend upon such sophisticated defence. The Tolstoyan standpoint is essentially one of protest against what it regards as a crucial evil. To moralists (including moral philosophers) of a markedly intellectual stamp, this may suggest that Tolstoyans are superficial people, carried away by emotion on a particular issue. But to think like this

Tolstoyan standpoint; viz. the sense of "continuous humanity" on which it ultimately rests is something which the great novelists from Scott and Dickens, through the Russians, to Robert Musil, have illuminated far more effectively than even the ablest preachers or psychologists or penal reformers have succeeded in doing.

[1] A characteristic statement, indicating an attitude that is logically exactly parallel to, although practically in direct opposition to, the Draconian standpoint, may be quoted from Tolstoy's writings:

"I understand that under the influence of momentary irritation, hatred, revenge, or loss of consciousness of his humanity, a man may kill another in his own defence or in defence of a friend; or that under the influence of patriotic mass-hypnotism and while exposing himself to death he may take part in collective murder in war. But that men in full control of their human attributes can quietly and deliberately admit the necessity of killing a fellow man, and can oblige others to perform that action so contrary to human nature, I never can understand. Nor did I understand it then when I was living my limited egotistical life in 1866, and so, strange as it may have been, I undertook the man's defence with some hope of success." (From a letter of Tolstoy's, written in 1908 to his biographer Birukov. Reprinted in the World's Classics Edition "Essays and Recollections," p. 59.)

is to betray a sad philistinism—as well as pharisaism—in moral matters. Almost all great moral reformers have concentrated their energy on one or a few supreme issues; and it is largely for this reason that they make their impact, as Tolstoyans certainly have done over the last half century, upon the main Utilitarian body of opinion.

I use the term *Spinozist*— fully aware that it is in some ways inapt and perhaps even misleading—to signify a third "active" moral standpoint, which is, I believe, coming to be held by a rapidly growing number of responsible people today. To the Spinozist in my sense, the one reliable growing-point of Public Utilitarian morality lies in our opportunity to settle issues, decide on plans, apportion rewards and punishments, etc., always and only in the light of the best available, i.e. the most scientific, methods and evidence. Here, for the Spinozist, lies the one road to general, including moral, improvement in human affairs; and to expedite improvement along this road is therefore the principal aim of enlightened human endeavour. On the particular issue of capital punishment Spinozists ask (*a*) for convincing evidence that this punishment fulfils its purposes, whatever these can be agreed to be; and (*b*) for satisfactory criteria for deciding upon which sorts of persons accused and found guilty of murder capital punishment is to count as an appropriate punishment.

As I use the term, Spinozists begin from the moral beliefs and practices of current public Utilitarian morality; but very soon their moral reformers' passion leads them into conflicts with current Utilitarian thinking. With regard to punishment, and in particular capital punishment, two of their theses seem particularly paradoxical. The first results from the Spinozist's scientific commitment to look for sufficient causes of all human action: given the appropriate antecedents a criminal act follows as inevitably or predictably, the Spinozist maintains, as every moral or morally neutral act follows from *its* appropriate antecedents. The second thesis results from his commitment to continuity: this leads him to expect —what the investigations of psychologists and psychiatrists are thought by some to confirm—that we all have something of the madman and the criminal in us, and that madmen and criminals have something—sparks or traces—of responsible and rational humanity in them. Acceptance of these two theses involves, Spinozists maintain, drastic revision of our ideas of the purposes of punishment, and of the efficiency (for any coherent purposes) of every stage in the judicial and executive processes that terminate in a hanging.

Such are the main *logical personae* of the debate: we have still to see the main points of contact and mutual support, as well as the obvious points of conflict, between them. And first I want to show

how the standpoint of each of the active sub-groups can be reflected in different Public Utilitarian attitudes.

Over the last hundred or so years informed Public Utilitarian opinion in this country has shown a noticeable movement away from predominantly Draconian ideas on capital punishment. No one will dispute that in the previous legal history of this country, the Draconian standpoint had been accepted practically without question as a necessary element within that Public Utilitarian morality which seeks to safeguard "general welfare." In other words, traditional ideas of general welfare involved reference to the ideas of effort, merit, desert—and their contraries terminating in punishment; and punishment has traditionally been regarded as, *inter alia*, a necessary agency for keeping the above positive moral ideas alive. There is, therefore, no difficulty in seeing how Draconian ideas have "activated" Public Utilitarian morality in the past, and have contributed to its authoritative character. For this reason it is very natural for Draconians to regard their own standpoint on capital punishment as an essential manifestation, or a necessary consequence, of "public morality as a whole." Let it be challenged, they feel, and morality as a whole will collapse.

It can hardly be maintained, however, that *current* Public Utilitarian morality *as a whole* shows this Draconian colouring. There is something slightly anomalous, to most modern judgments, about a man who adheres to the Draconian standpoint regarding capital punishment, while he displays a Tolstoyan tenderness and Spinozistic width of vision on such questions as, say, child and youth welfare, the care of the mentally deranged, and humanitarian assistance for distant peoples or recently conquered foes. This is not to say that the Draconian is wrong, or is inconsistent on his own premisses: still less that he is insincere. All it points to is the fact that the Draconian standpoint regarding capital punishment has today lost its traditionally unquestioned place within Public Utilitarian morality. What place it has in that morality has now to be fought for, day by day, against new intruders. More specifically, whereas in the past Public Utilitarian morality "went Draconian" whenever questions regarding capital punishment were raised, most Draconians are today on the defensive, and tend to move rapidly, when debating, from their own distinctive standpoint to some kind of Utilitarian argument for the retention of capital punishment.[1]

[1] It is remarkable that among the more persuasive and informed speakers only the two Archbishops, both of whom voted for a second reading of the Silverman Bill, clearly affirmed that the primary purpose of all punishment is retribution. The Lord Chancellor cited with approval the Archbishop of Canterbury's evidence on this point to the Royal Commission; but thereafter based his case on the allegedly unique deterrent effect of the death penalty.

Now let us turn to the relations between Public Utilitarianism and our two other Active Advocates' standpoints. Clearly neither the Tolstoyan nor the Spinozist standpoint enjoys a traditional influence upon public thinking on the matter of punishment; on the contrary, both are by traditional standards heterodox, if not simply absurd. It is difficult to imagine a community, or for that matter a free association or a family, run on strictly Tolstoyan principles. It is hardly easier to imagine a community that would be willing to wait, for the settlement of all its practical (including judicial) problems, upon the formation of the relevant scientific opinions—especially if these were to involve acceptance of the paradoxical Spinozist theses mentioned above. To say this does not mean, however, that Tolstoyan and Spinozist ideas on capital punishment, as on other issues, are entirely nebulous: it simply points to the special way in which their influence upon Public Utilitarianism comes to be felt. They are both in the nature of continuous moral protests, and of continuous moral exhortations towards certain radical lines of reform. And that Tolstoyan and Spinozist advocates have in this way exercised a remarkable influence on current Public Utilitarian thinking is made abundantly clear by the debate we are considering.[1] They have influenced the views of the Utilitarian majority both as to the ends of punishment and as to the appropriate means of attaining those ends; and to this extent they have changed our conception of "the kind of society we want" and of the ways we want that society—and the road towards it—sustained.

It should now be clear why the debate we are considering is not a straight fight, nor yet a three-cornered fight. It is, rather, a fight—or continuous mêlée—to gain and hold the support of the majority;

[1] Two impressive speeches, of predominantly Public Utilitarian character may be cited to show how strong is the influence of "Tolstoyan" ideas on even the coolest heads. From the Bishop of Manchester's carefully argued Abolitionist speech I cite: "It is unnatural, it seems to me, to ask a man in cold blood to kill one of his fellows, no matter how deserving of death that man or woman may be" (No. 115, p. 717). And from Lord Salisbury's closing (Retentionist) speech for the government: ". . . the taking of life by the community is a terrible decision. Therefore I should not feel justified in supporting capital punishment merely on the grounds that the murderer was not fit to live."

As examples of the influence of "Spinozist" ideas in quarters where one might not expect them, I would refer to the speeches of the Bishops of Exeter and Chichester (No. 114, p. 627 and No. 115, p. 692) and of the Archbishop of Canterbury (No. 115, p. 748), who combined his defence of the primarily retributionist character of all punishment, including capital punishment, with the admission that "the present system . . . is too clumsy to continue as it is in an age where scientific accuracy is a primary requirement."

The nearest approach to "pure Tolstoyan" speeches were those of Lord Wise and Lord Darwen: to "pure Spinozism" the speeches of Lord Raglan and the Earl of Haddington.

and within this mêlée we have distinguished (*a*) three groups of Active Advocates and, (*b*) such Public Utilitarians as are, with greater or lesser strength of conviction, committed temporarily to advance the claims of some one group (or conceivably of two temporarily allied groups) of Active Advocates. To these we should add (*c*) those Public Utilitarians (by no means necessarily insensitive to moral appeals) who remain neutral as between the three active groups and whose votes in the debate are therefore decided by political or administrative considerations.

Results of the Interpretation.—My proposed interpretation enables us to understand the *kind* of debate that is before us, and thus to begin to understand what is happening, because we now understand what *can* happen, in it.

The present debate is of a kind in which no party can reasonably expect to prove or establish itself as right, and its opponents wrong: in fact, since the issue is one upon which there is no generally acknowledged authority—as there is in other departments of practical life—the words "right" and "wrong" can have here no single univocal meaning. (They may of course retain consistent formal meanings *within* or *from* the moral standpoints we have labelled Public Utilitarian, Draconian, Tolstoyan and Spinozist; and they may share and display a common generic function as slogans and war-cries exchanged *between* spokesmen of these different "contestant" points of view.) Why does—why must—this kind of situation obtain? Roughly because, so long as it exists, punishment is always liable to be regarded from three quite different points of view, from which divergent moral attitudes are liable to be formed: the point of view of society as a whole, the point of view of the person wronged (or his near connections), and the point of view of the wrong-doer. This, to be sure, is not a sufficient explanation of the present contest between our three groups of Active Advocates: still less does it explain fully the complicated role of the main body of Public Utilitarians in the present debate. But it does help us to see why a fundamental and head-on conflict of moral standpoints is to be expected in it; and at the same time why the great majority of the participants should be Public Utilitarians. Between almost any Utilitarians there is always the possibility of persuasion: whereas between the different groups of Active Advocates this possibility is ruled out—aside from phenomenal personal conversions. Most arguments in this debate, therefore, tend to be advanced on Utilitarian grounds which can be rationally compared and between which deliberate and conscientious choices can be made; but it cannot be too often emphasized that different sections of the Public Utilitarian body (under the leadership or inspiration of fundamentally opposed groups of Active Advocates) will inevitably approach and be prepared to weight

different arguments very differently because of their variously coloured views of "what the general weal requires."

In the second place our interpretation makes it clear that current moral divisions over capital punishment cannot be explained in terms of the traditionally accepted aims of punishment, i.e. retribution, reformation and deterrence. For it is perfectly possible that, in *some* reasonable sense of each of these terms, each of my groups of Active Advocates might affirm that *some* weight must be given to all three aims; and further, it seems to me quite likely, again in *some* sense of the three traditional aims, that many Public Utilitarians would affirm that almost *equal* weight should be given to each. The patent fact is, however, that very different senses are given to these aims by different groups of Active Advocates and by their Public Utilitarian supporters. Thus, e.g., for Draconians and many Public Utilitarians deterrence tends to mean the last moment inhibiting of some violent or dangerous impulse (usually in a habitual criminal or wrong-doer): but to the Tolstoyan or the Spinozist and their Utilitarian allies the most effective deterrent may be regarded as operating at all times throughout society as a whole—in the form of more humane manners and conditions of life—so that the abolition of the death penalty itself is claimed as a potential deterrent anyhow for certain types of potential murderer. And it could similarly be shown that the ideas of reformation and of retribution have somewhat different meanings for our three "active" sub-groups and hence for different sections of Public Utilitarian opinion.[1]

Thirdly, and more positively, our interpretation enables us to appreciate the broad strategic picture presented by the different sides and alignments of the debate. Evidently, in any debate that terminates in a simple two-fold division—here between Contents and Non-contents—Tolstoyans and Spinozists will vote together against the Draconians. But in view of the smallness of all three Active Advocate sub-groups, how they vote will be of slight importance: what matters is the direction in which they succeed in drawing the main Utilitarian body. Now from this point of view perhaps the most important feature of the present debate is the apparent convergence and mutual re-enforcement of a number of Spinozist arguments and a number of Tolstoyan protests and appeals. To the Tolstoyan the man or woman condemned for murder is, first and foremost, a fellow-soul: to the Spinozist he or she is primarily a specimen—of that human material whose activities can be better harmonized and sufferings somewhat mitigated only through a

[1] It might perhaps be thought that Tolstoyans can have little or no use for the idea of retribution; but of one—and in many people a highly efficacious —form of retribution Tolstoyans cannot have too much, viz. lifelong remorse, fortifying the resolve never to repeat certain grave wrongs or crimes.

conscientious application of scientific methods and standards to all human affairs. For the Tolstoyan our paramount duty is to see the criminal's humanity: for the Spinozist it is to understand it—or what has happened to it: for both, appropriate moral action can follow only upon such seeing or understanding, and to treat the criminal simply as an enemy—an *eliminandum*—implies a decision, or habit or instinct, *not* to understand him. Finally—and here the Tolstoyan and Spinozist standpoints begin to take practical public Utilitarian shape—society must be induced to *deal* with its criminals not as enemies or excrescences, but as diseased or stunted members of the common human body.

In this convergence of standpoints lies the present growing strength of the Abolitionist cause. Is that strength reliable or precarious? At best, I suggest, it requires to be made good in a number of ways that are still insufficiently recognized: at worst, it contains certain weaknesses, a skilful and ruthless attack upon which might easily result in the crumbling of the Abolitionist alliance. Here I will mention only two very general sources of weakness, leaving more detailed points for separate discussion below. First, the two "activating" elements in the Abolitionist alliance have been brought together simply by their common (though very differently grounded) opposition to the Draconians and their allies; and the striking differences in origins as between Tolstoyans and Spinozists are more than matched by the differences that may well appear if Spinozist aims should become progressively realized. (A Tolstoyan in a scientific Brave New World would be far from happy.) And similar acute differences are bound to hold between Tolstoyans and Public Utilitarians of a Spinozist colouring. Secondly, the Spinozist's commitment to determinism, even if only as an heuristic principle, may well seem to many Tolstoyans (as well as to many Public Utilitarians) utterly incompatible with the view of man's moral nature upon which their case against capital punishment depends. These difficulties are real and deep and could easily be exploited by skilful Retentionist attacks. I wish here to say only one further—and no doubt to some readers quite outrageous—thing about them. They are differences that can be removed *only* by philosophy. Here are issues upon which, for once in a world, not only can philosophy be of some practical use, but is the only thing that can be of any use. What is required, on the first issue, is an account of the ways (or the senses) in which two or more moral movements (in this case the Tolstoyan and the Spinozist) can be said (*a*) to be alike *moral*, although independent in respect of both motives and aims, and (*b*) to be thus independent and yet show an *affinity* one with another, so that it is possible for their aims to converge. But clearly this is a philosophical enterprise upon which almost no serious work has

been done. What is required on the second issue is evidently a reconsideration of the free will/responsibility and responsibility/predictability puzzles: and a reconsideration of very different character from those currently offered by our "higher lexicographers."

Let us now turn to the Retentionists. Here again I shall confine myself to their most general positions of strength and weakness, leaving particular points of attack and defence for later treatment. As we have already remarked, Retentionists, even when favouring the Draconian standpoint, seem eager to move away from it as quickly as possible on to more popular Utilitarian ground. (Hence the concentration of so much of the debate upon the question of the deterrent-value of the death penalty.) Perhaps this is, temporarily, sound tactics: but in the long run it is likely to weaken the general case for retaining capital punishment. Why? First, because moderate Utilitarian Retentionists sit, metaphorically, cheek by jowl with modern Utilitarian Abolitionists, and these two centre sections of the main Utilitarian body have far more in common than either has with the extreme Draconian, or, e.g., extreme Tolstoyan standpoint. Hence a large number of Retentionists—including some of their ablest and most convincing spokesmen—are liable to be swayed by their Abolitionist neighbours, and may well begin to weaken or to change sides; in fact some of them would appear to be moderate Abolitionists in principle, held back by the anxious hope "Not in *our* time, oh Lord."[1]

But a second and potentially far greater danger threatens the Retentionist camp. This is that, in order to express a Draconian-style *wish* for retention in a Utilitarian guise, Retentionists will slide into a defence of the death-penalty as a kind of "euthanasia for the good of the rest of us." The motives behind insidious argument, of which there are plenty of examples in the debate,[2] and which are liable to draw support from humane objections to literal life-imprisonment, can perhaps be set out as follows: (I) On Draconian principles a murderer deserves to be hung. But (II) these principles are unfortunately not as popular as they used to be. On the other hand, (III) without Draconian re-enforcement, Utilitarian defences of the death penalty are liable to weaken. (IV) In this situation it is tempting to reverse the traditional position, and to supply Utilitarian arguments to render acceptable the principle enunciated at (I) above. (V) Let us therefore substitute for "He is not fit to live," "He is not worth keeping alive"; i.e. let practical considerations of cost, time and effort, etc., be introduced to make

[1] See, e.g., the speech of Lord Waverley, No. 115, p. 758, in particular paragraph 4.

[2] See the speeches of, e.g., Lords Webb-Johnson (No. 114, p. 622), Teviot (No. 115, p. 769) and Teynham (No. 115, p. 769).

the death penalty appear a sound business proposition. Any extended use of this argument would (one hopes) sway many Utilitarian Retentionists to join the Abolitionist ranks.

Crucial Points in the Debate.—The above seem to me the main points of strength and weakness, resulting from recent movements within their own ranks, of the two sides in the debate. I now wish to consider a number of more specific issues on which the fight was actually joined in the Lords' debate.

(I) *"The scintilla of doubt."*—A traditional Abolitionist argument has been that, the death penalty being irrevocable, the dangers of a miscarriage of justice are here incomparably great. On this score Abolitionists (particularly those arguing from our Spinozist standpoint) have recently pressed Retentionists very hard:[1] but it seems worth urging that they should have here pressed harder still in view of the almost incredible feebleness of the Retentionist defence.

As Retentionist spokesmen I choose the Lord Chancellor and Lord Waverley. The former was content to repeat, with regard to the possibility of an innocent man's being hanged, that no "mistake has been, or is remotely likely to be, made."[2] With regard to the Home Secretary's power of reprieve and the examination of evidence that precedes his decision, he concluded that "if after this examination there is a scintilla of doubt as to the rightness of the conviction, the convicted man is invariably reprieved."[3] Two questions are here involved: first as to the factual correctness of the conviction, viz. was the man convicted really the culprit? Secondly, there is the question whether the conditions of the crime—in particular the psychological condition of the culprit—were such as to justify a capital conviction? On the former question, in view of one highly problematic recent conviction and execution, the Lord Chancellor's remarks seem astounding. Not quite so astounding, however, as certain facts disclosed by Lord Waverley on the second question. Lord Astor had cited the case of Rivett,[4] who was hanged after being declared insane by the medical officers of two prisons, and Lord Waverley undertook to correct the false impression which this case was likely to produce. In fact, he said,[5] Rivett had been declared insane by *three* prison medical officers, but the medical inquiry ordered by the Home Secretary after his conviction "found no trace of any mental disorder or of organic disease in the brain" of the prisoner. Thereupon the three medical officers withdrew their opinion that Rivett was suffering from schizophrenia, and the Home Secretary, his mind free from "any scintilla of doubt," allowed the

[1] Particularly effective speeches on this score were made by Lord Brabazon of Tara, No. 114, p. 606, and Lord Astor, No. 115, p. 701.

[2] No. 114, p. 586.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] No. 115, p. 702.

[5] No. 115, p. 757.

execution to go forward. One can only ask: Did the Home Secretary —does Lord Waverley—feel altogether happy about such a conflict of medical evidence, even if one side eventually withdrew? One can only ask: Did these highly intelligent and conscientious men believe that a medical verdict in this kind ot case can be as clear, as simple and as certain as medical evidence of a fractured shin-bone or an attack of measles?

A more general point can perhaps usefully be made regarding both the above questions. No one will deny that in the very great majority of criminal cases in this country the accused is never convicted of murder unless there is practical certainty of his guilt—*on the evidence presented.* But that evidence has been built up, inevitably, on the basis of a certain amount of initial common-sense selection. Inevitably, given the practical exigencies of the law: but at the same time this initial selection provides the possibility of a completely erroneous (no matter how careful and conscientious) final judgment. Historical research, which on this issue offers us an exact logical parallel, also offers us many examples of judgments which, *on the evidence which was initially regarded as relevant,* seemed inescapable, but which, in the light of initially neglected or missing evidence, proved later to be entirely erroneous. Now without in any way wishing to weaken public trust in police and judicial procedures, Abolitionists could very usefully see that this point is made clear in informed and responsible circles.

(II) "*Abolitionist Sentimentality.*"—Retentionists advance three lines of criticism under this head. They ask: (*a*) Is not much Abolitionist feeling caused by the actual physical methods of execution, which might certainly be improved? And if this were done, would not many Abolitionist protesters fall away?[1] (*b*) Does not the Abolitionists' concern for some dozen or so capital sentences and executions every year betray a sentimental lack of proportion, in view of the vastly larger number of deaths of innocent people, e.g. from road accidents, which improved legislation could no doubt greatly reduce?[2] (*c*) Are not many Abolitionists moved by a vague, shallow belief that Abolition is "progressive," and that whatever is progressive must be right?[3] Each of these criticisms can be made effectively against some Abolitionists, but it may be doubted whether they do much to weaken the general Abolitionist cause.

(*a*) This question in particular is relevant only to the weaker brethren or hangers-on: it will hardly touch the Abolitionist who has been profoundly impressed by either Tolstoyan or Spinozist protests, and who is convinced, by either teaching, that murder is the kind of

[1] See, e.g., Lord Webb-Johnson (No. 114, p. 625, paragraph 2).
[2] See, e.g., Earl of Winterton as cited below.
[3] See, e.g., Lord Tweedsmuir (No. 114, p. 673).

crime which elimination of the criminal simply cannot eliminate from society. (*b*) This Retentionist criticism is apt to boomerang. Consider the following sentence from Earl Winterton when trying to establish the "intense illogicality of British moral reasoning" on this issue. "Intense emotion has been displayed . . . over the fact that each year some twelve or fourteen persons (who, quite frankly, both for their own sake and that of the public, are probably better put out of this world, in any event) have been hanged."[1] Up to this word "hanged" one can hardly fail to feel some sympathy with the Earl's remarks. Had the twelve or so persons been, for instance, chronic drunkards drowned annually because of lack of special life-saving apparatus on our beaches, one might feel he was perfectly right. But at the word "hanged" I think most people's feelings will receive a jolt. And not because of the physically revolting details of the act of hanging; but because "the deliberate taking of life by the community is a terrible decision," not something to be joked about, not even something to be compared with other deaths by accidental or natural causes. (*c*) The third question applies in particular to Spinozists and their Utilitarian allies, in so far as they fail to think through the practical consequences and costs of their progressive protests and programmes. A number of Abolitionist speeches in the debate mentioned the project of a new kind of penal institution—work upon which has apparently been postponed in view of national economy cuts;[2] and other speeches[3] mentioned some remarkable experiments in the treatment of pathological murderers that are going forward in the more civilized countries of Europe. Nevertheless there seems to be a weak point here in even the most sincere and strenuous Abolitionist thinking. Or rather, it may turn out that the Abolitionist case will only be made a strong and convincing *practical* case when its adherents as a whole confess to, and agree to work for, the somewhat revolutionary idea of the treatment of crime, including murder, as mainly a *social* evil or failure, a cause of *social* shame, to be gradually removed by appropriate social action.[4]

[1] No. 115, p. 734.

[2] E.g. Lord Templewood (No. 115, p. 709).

[3] E.g. Lord Pethwick-Lawrence (No. 114, p. 593).

[4] The nearest approach to a statement of this thesis in the debate came from Lord Craigmyle, No. 114, p. 768.

Crime can be regarded as a social *failure* only on the view that effective moral standards are in the first instance social and have to be "internalized" in individuals through appropriate social pressures and appeals. When these fail, crime is likely to result. This way of thinking—whose theoretical foundations we owe to the nearly simultaneous and quite independent discoveries of Freud, Durkheim, G. H. Mead and Hägerström—is now largely accepted by social workers, though quite clearly *not* by most judges and most Conservative women.

Some Abolitionist Fallacies.—The question of the deterrent effect of capital punishment, and especially the lack of statistical evidence of its uniquely deterrent effect, naturally bulked large in Abolitionist speeches. The details of this question have been much discussed, and I shall therefore confine my remarks to the broadest logical and moral principles involved.

So-called statistical arguments naturally appeal to Abolitionists of Spinozist leanings. But as used in the debate these arguments proved to be of very doubtful value. (*a*) Although careful Abolitionists emphasize that the available relevant figures are neutral, and simply *fail to provide clear confirmation* of the natural Retentionist belief in the uniquely deterrent value of capital punishment, it is difficult not to move from this negative position to the suggestion that the figures therefore are "against" the Retentionists. (*b*) It is well known, however, that the figures available are extremely unsatisfactory, and that their neutrality (or failure to confirm Retentionist expectations) might be due to a wide variety of causes. There are far too few of them to admit of any statistical inferences, in the strict sense: they admit in almost all cases of a wide variety of causal interpretations: they contain no break-downs of different *types* of murder, in relation to break-downs of relatively comparable crimes. This does not mean, of course, that Abolitionists cannot fairly refer to the experiences of other pioneer Abolitionist countries and states. But they should in fairness—and in the interest of their cause—be ready to admit that certain types of murder might well be expected to show an increase for a number of years following abolition: adding the rider that the natural expectation seems, anyhow in some Abolitionist countries, most happily *not* to have been realized.

A more serious Abolitionist fallacy in this connection is the following. If the statistics are neutral, it is argued,[1] they must be taken to support the Abolitionist case, since all the moral arguments are on that side. But this is simply to *beg* the moral question. Retentionists will naturally retort that they have a moral case also, and not simply a Draconian case. They can advance genuine and important moral claims, which favour retention of the death penalty for *some* types of murder anyhow, in terms of the proper safety of the police and of good relations between police and the general public.

Finally, on this head, it may be questioned whether Abolitionists are either wise or brave in relying so much upon "statistics." After all, the pioneer Abolitionist countries had no statistical umbrella to shelter under when they first "took the plunge." They took it on humanitarian principles, and on a very variegated (and of course

[1] E.g. by Lord Craigmyle (No. 115, p. 766) and by Lord Russell of Liverpool (No. 114, p. 670).

inconclusive) mass of evidence which suggested that the experiment of Abolition was worth trying. That is the spirit in which Abolitionism deserves to succeed, or at least to be given a fair trial; and that is the way, it seems to me, in which it ought, therefore, to be presented. And to show that this suggestion is not entirely impractical, I should like to end these comments with a tip (which I think no Retentionists will consider unfair) to Abolitionist propagandists. Some years ago there appeared a very amusing book, by a distinguished European scholar, entitled "The English, are they human?" Now suppose a second book with the title altered to ". . . are they *humane?*" Well, humane-ness is probably not an over-all trait in any individual or people: we all have some "un-humanized" spots somewhere. And the English are, in general, a very humane people. But, on the evidence available regarding capital punishment, one could only conclude that—in comparison with their north-west European neighbours in respect of principle, and of their Scottish neighbours in respect of practice—the answer must be "No" or at least "Not very." But the English are also highly sensitive to injustice, and especially to any injustice to themselves. Therefore, let the above inescapable verdict be widely advertised by Abolitionists: and even if in the short term it should add to their unpopularity, in the long run it may well prove a winner.

Queen's University of Belfast.

MORAL FACTS

PETER REMNANT

An important part of ethics consists in the attempt to find a theoretical framework for the sincere moral discourse of ordinary people; to present, if possible, a consistent account of the ways in which such terms as "good," "right," "duty," "obligation" are used in moral contexts. It is surprising that it should ever have been thought possible to account for such utterances as expressions of emotion. For the most part nothing could be less like the sighs, groans, shouts, and chuckles with which we normally express emotion than are our assertions about right and wrong, good and bad; these are usually the outcome of careful consideration and they are almost invariably expressed in cognitive terms. That is, we describe ourselves as "thinking out what we ought to do," "coming to a conclusion as to what is right," "knowing the difference between right and wrong," "recognizing our obligations," "seeing our duty." When we do employ "emotive" words in these contexts it is almost always for the purpose of expressing anger or remorse or disgust with regard to our own moral lapses or those of others. Moral utterances, in short, have all the appearance of being statements of fact, and statements, moreover, which cannot be made in other than moral terms.

It is to the credit of so-called "intuitionists" that they have attempted to give full weight to these features of moral expressions. In what follows, however, I intend to criticize certain characteristics of intuitionist ethical theories, and to indicate thereby some of the difficulties which must be met by any system of ethics which attempts to account for the cognitive character of moral discourse.

I

It appears to be a rather widely held opinion, both among philosophers and thoughtful laymen, that there are certain self-evident moral principles which are in some sense objective and are binding upon the actions of all moral agents. It is sometimes maintained that the discoveries of anthropologists indicate that men have at all times and in all parts of the world shown a more or less clear recognition of the same principles. Furthermore, although these principles are frequently likened to the law of the land, they appear to be regarded by many philosophers as existing in their own right independent of the decree of any law-giver, human or divine. They are sometimes described collectively as "the moral law" or, particularly by legal writers, as "the natural law"; alternatively, in view of the alleged fact that they come to be recognized by anyone

who exercises his own understanding, they are spoken of as "the dictates of reason." Sir David Ross, for example, speaks of a set of self-evident propositions which attribute prima facie rightness to certain sorts of acts; he continues:

> The moral order expressed in these propositions is just as much a part of the fundamental nature of the universe (and, we may add, of any possible universe in which there were moral agents at all) as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic.[1]

Now to all of this the obvious complaint must be made that the notion of an objective moral law, of a law without a law-giver, is not at all clear. Nor are the explanatory analogies which have been offered particularly helpful. "The precepts of the natural [moral] law," St. Thomas explains, "are to the practical reason what the first principles of science are to the theoretical reason."[2] In many ways they are, but the analogy breaks down at the point where we most need its assistance; in contrast to scientific laws which are very general descriptions of certain features of natural processes, moral principles appear to be prescriptions to the effect that under certain circumstances we ought to behave in certain ways. Scientific laws derive their validity from their conformity with the facts they describe, but moral principles, like juridical laws and commands, appear to describe nothing at all.

On an alternative view which has been popular among philosophers in recent years, there exists an important analogy between moral principles and truths of pure mathematics. It has been maintained that there is a fundamental similarity in the ways in which we come to know these two kinds of truths:

> If we now turn to ask how we come to know these fundamental moral principles, the answer is that it is the same way in which we come to know the axioms of mathematics. Both alike seem to be both synthetic and *a priori*. . . .[3]

Neither moral nor mathematical truths are discovered in the way in which ordinary scientific truths are discovered: by the observation of natural processes, that is, and by the invention and experimental confirmation of abstract descriptions of those processes. Mathematical principles, it is maintained, come to be known by a very excellent method of discovery which dispenses with the empirical procedures of the natural sciences and proceeds by means of pure reasoning. Together with the fact that mathematical truths can be discovered

[1] Sir David Ross, *The Right and the Good*, pp. 29–30. For the meaning of "prima facie" as used here cf. ibid., p. 28.

[2] S.T. 1a–2ae, XCIV, 2.

[3] Ross, *The Foundations of Ethics*, p. 320. Cf. H. A. Prichard, *Moral Obligation*, p. 8: "This apprehension [that such and such an action ought to be done by us] is immediate, in precisely the sense in which a mathematical apprehension is immediate. . . ."

in this way goes the fact that when discovered they are known with complete certainty. Now if we observe by introspection the way in which we apprehend moral principles we shall find, it is alleged, that it very closely resembles the way in which we apprehend the truth of mathematical principles. Must we not therefore credit our moral intuitions with the same degree of certainty that we attribute to our mathematical ones?

> In our confidence that these [moral] propositions are true there is involved the same trust in our reason that is involved in our confidence in mathematics; and we should have no justification for trusting it in the latter sphere and distrusting it in the former.[1]

Those who rely upon this analogy between morals and mathematics appear to have ignored the widely-held doctrine that the truths of mathematics are knowable *a priori* and with complete certainty simply because they are all analytic.

> Pure mathematics consists of tautologies, analogous to "men are men," but usually more complicated. To know that a mathematical proposition is correct, we do not have to study the world, but only the meanings of the symbols. . . . A mathematical equation asserts that two groups of symbols have the same meaning. . . .[2]

It might be objected to this that whatever may be the case with regard to arithmetic and algebra the propositions of geometry are obviously not tautologies. However, they are all logically deducible from a set of axioms, and they can be represented as tautologies by the simple expedient of treating the set of axioms as definitions of the terms in the propositions in question. This account of the matter obviously invites the objection that the axioms at least must be self-evident or synthetic *a priori*; however, this would be denied by those who accept the theory of mathematics which we are now discussing. According to this theory we must in the first place make clear to ourselves whether we are speaking of a *pure* or an *interpreted* axiom system; if the former, then the truth or falsity of the axioms is not in question, but only whether they are logically consistent with one another and what can be deduced from them. If, on the other hand, we are speaking of an interpreted system in which the axioms and propositions have been turned by appropriate definitions into factual statements about relations between physical points, lines, areas, and so on, then the truth or falsity of these statements can be established only by the experimental procedures of the

[1] Ross, *The Right and the Good*, p. 30.

[2] Lord Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, p. 155. It is perhaps more precise to say that mathematical expressions are first so employed by us that they are not exposed to empirical refutation, and that they subsequently become tautologies if and when the terms in them are defined in accordance with the ways they have been used.

natural sciences. "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain they do not refer to reality."[1]

Let us suppose, however, as most ethical intuitionists have done, that this account of the nature of mathematics is completely mistaken; let us suppose that Pythagoras' theorem and "7 + 5 = 12" are laws of nature of very great generality which can be discovered intuitively without the aid of observation or experiment, and whose falsification cannot even be imagined. Discovery of these laws consists, presumably, in recognizing that between terms of certain kinds certain relations *necessarily* hold and would hold in any universe in which such terms were to be found. The kind of necessity which we must suppose to be involved is not simply logical necessity or entailment, but some sort of natural or ontological necessity. If, then, we assume that this is an accurate account of the nature of mathematics and of the way in which mathematical truths come to be known we must next inquire how it assists us to understand the nature of moral principles.

Now it may be said that this theory about the nature of mathematical principles assists us to this extent, that, if it is correct it proves that there can be *a priori* knowledge of some synthetic principles—and if of some why not of others?

> Mathematics is one grand demonstration of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge, in other words of insight into necessary connexions, as opposed to experience of found connexions. And there is no reason why moral relations (i.e. the relations between types of conduct and rightness or wrongness, arising from their nature in other respects) should not be knowable just as much as spatial or numerical relations.[2]

However, there appears to be a fundamental difference between moral and mathematical principles which, unless it can be shown to be merely apparent, greatly reduces the force of any suggested analogy between them. This difference has already been referred to; it consists in the fact that whereas mathematical principles, upon our present interpretation of them, are plainly *descriptive*, moral principles appear to be *prescriptive*; that is, it is an essential feature of moral principles that they are "commandments" which direct us to behave in certain ways under certain circumstances. But a demonstration that we have *a priori* insight into the presence of necessary relations among certain natural or theoretical entities does not cast much light upon the possibility of knowing *a priori* that we ought to behave or refrain from behaving in certain ways. In fact, if moral principles are essentially rules of conduct it is hardly appropriate to speak of them as being either true or false, and, *a fortiori*,

[1] A. Einstein, *Sidelights on Relativity*, p. 28.
[2] Ross, *Kant's Ethical Theory*, p. 42.

as being self-evidently true; what it is to know a rule of conduct *a priori* is not easy to imagine, but it does appear clear that it is not knowledge of "necessary synthetic connexions between different elements in reality."[1]

Intuitionists have sought to meet this difficulty either by denying that moral principles are prescriptions or by claiming that although some moral principles are prescriptions these follow deductively from descriptive principles which are synthetic *a priori*. In either case it has been maintained that the fundamental principles of morals are both self-evident and descriptive. There is, it has been maintained, a simple and indefinable property, called "rightness," which necessarily belongs to certain sorts of acts, or there is a simple property called "goodness" which is possessed by certain kinds of situation; moral obligations are simply obligations to perform acts of these kinds or to bring situations of these kinds into existence.

What is meant, presumably, when it is said that a property is simple and indefinable is that no statement attributing that property to something can be explicated by restatement in terms of other and simpler properties, but only by pointing out instances of the property in question. If, for example, anyone does not know what is meant when someone is said to be an uncle it can be explained that he is the brother of a parent; but if someone does not know what is meant when it is said that something is blue we can explain only with the aid of coloured samples. Similarly "yellow and good, we say, are not complex: they are notions of that simple kind, out of which definitions are composed and with which the power of further defining ceases."[2] Like the other simple properties with which we are familiar, "moral" properties are directly apprehended in the acts or situations to which they belong. However, the degree of difference between apprehending a moral property and apprehending a sensible quality has sometimes been slurred over. In the first place, it is obvious that moral properties are not perceived by any of the special senses; it would appear that they are discerned by the mind when we contemplate an actual or possible act or situation. In the second place, there appears to be an important difference between the relations which hold among most of the natural properties of a thing or process and those which hold between the natural properties of an act or situation and its moral property. Since Hume it has been rather generally agreed that although there are certain regular ways in which groups of natural properties occur together there is no necessity in this and that what we sometimes call "causal necessity" is, in fact, nothing but the regularity with which certain properties do tend to co-exist. Whether this doctrine is correct or not is at the moment beside the point—we are, in fact,

[1] Ross, loc. cit.

[2] G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, p. 8.

entertaining a theory about the nature of mathematics which entails that mathematical properties are an exception to it. What we must notice is that this doctrine does not apply to the relation between natural and moral properties. The fact that an act of a certain kind is right is a *necessary* consequence of its being an act of just that kind, in a sense of "necessary" which is stronger than that of causal necessity. Although it is conceivable that there could be two objects which were completely alike with respect to all but one of their natural properties and differed with respect, say, to colour, it is impossible that two acts should be exactly alike in every respect except that one should be right and the other wrong. (There is an important qualification to this point which will be made in a moment.) Thus, when we recognize that an act of a certain kind has such and such a moral property we know immediately and with complete certainty that every other instance of that kind of act has the same moral property;

> we see the predicate, though not included in the definition of the subject, to belong necessarily to anything which satisfies that definition. . . . We see first, for instance, that a particular imagined act, as being productive of pleasure to another, has a claim on us, and it is a very short and inevitable step from this to seeing that *any* act, as possessing the same constitutive character, must have the same character of *prima facie* rightness.[1]

It might be supposed from what has been said that the necessary relation which is alleged to hold between certain natural properties and moral properties is simply the relationship of entailment, and that anything which possesses such and such properties is necessarily right (or good) simply because the expression "is right" (or "is good") means the same as "possesses such and such natural properties." This, however, will not do. It amounts to maintaining that to say that an act is right or a situation good is simply to say that it possesses such and such natural properties; but moral statements are certainly not simple factual statements about natural properties. As has already been said, they are either statements about how we ought to behave or the logical grounds of such statements; statements to the effect that an act or situation has such and such natural properties only entail statements about how we ought to behave when conjoined with some moral principle, and therefore cannot themselves be moral principles. It appears then that we must follow Professor Moore in saying that although the relation between natural and moral properties is not simply a causal one it is also not a relation of entailment, but is an instance of that sort of necessary relation upon which the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge depends.

What has been said about moral properties must be qualified, at this point, in a way which has been indicated by Sir David Ross in

[1] Ross, *Foundations of Ethics*, p. 320.

his adoption of the expression "prima facie rightness." That is, we cannot say, for example, that the act of keeping a promise can be recognized to be unconditionally right—it is quite obvious that there are many cases in which a more pressing obligation overrules the keeping of a more or less trivial promise and, in general, that there are few kinds of act, if any, the performance of which might not under some circumstances be similarly overruled by a more pressing obligation. It is in view of such facts as these that Ross speaks of kinds of acts as *prima facie right* and speaks of any particular act as *right* only when it is that act which in view of all the particular circumstances ought to be done. Now it might be objected that in saying this much we have given up entirely the doctrine that moral properties belong to certain kinds of acts and can be known intuitively to belong to them whatever the particular circumstances may be; the most that we can claim, it might be said, is that a particular act, contemplated in the light of all the circumstances surrounding it, can sometimes be seen to possess a moral property. The objection, however, rests on a misunderstanding of Ross's position; to say that acts of a certain kind are prima facie right is not, on his view, to say that particular acts of that kind tend in most cases to be right, but apparently that every act of that kind possesses the unique property of prima facie rightness. Since acts of other kinds also possess this property, sometimes to a higher degree than do instances of the first kind of act, it is conceivable that circumstances may be such that it would be wrong to perform an act of the first kind to the exclusion of an act of some other kind. But it does not follow from this that the act of the first kind did not possess the moral property in question. It may be added that since, according to Ross, the comparative prima facie rightness of two or more kinds of acts cannot be conclusively established we can never know with complete certainty which of a set of alternative courses of action is right, even though we can know with complete certainty that certain of them are prima facie right. "Our judgments about our actual duty in concrete situations have none of that certainty that attaches to our recognition of the general principles of duty."[1]

Let us summarize the theory which has just been outlined: when we speak of moral principles we are referring either to descriptive principles which state that certain kinds of actions or situations necessarily possess certain simple moral properties, or to the rules of conduct which these descriptive principles entail. These principles are capable of being discovered in much the same way that we discover axioms of mathematics, by what Ross calls "intuitive induction"; this consists, first, in recognizing that a particular act of a certain kind possesses a certain moral property, and, second, in

[1] Ross, *The Right and the Good*, p. 30.

recognizing that every act of that kind necessarily possesses that property. Finally, from the fact that a certain act is the most right—possesses the greatest amount of prima facie rightness—of a number of possible courses of action it follows logically that we ought to perform that act; in general, our duties are created by the moral properties possessed by the acts open to us or by the situations we are capable of bringing about.

II

Having stated the theory we must now consider an objection to it. This objection concerns the apparently unquestionable assertion that, from the fact that one of a number of possible alternative courses of action is the most right, it follows logically that we ought to carry out that course of action. (It will be clear that precisely the same type of objection could be raised against a theory stated in terms of the simple property "goodness." For the sake of brevity we shall phrase the objection only in terms of the alleged simple property "rightness.") Now it is quite true that the expression "is right" is frequently used in ordinary speech as synonymous with the expression "is what ought to be done," and where this is the case it is plain that any sentence of the form "x is right" entails a sentence of the form "x is what ought to be done." However, the present objection arises from the fact that the term "right" has been, as it were, detached from its ordinary logical connections and employed in a special and precise sense as the name of a simple and rather extraordinary property. This is not necessarily to say that the term has been given a *new* meaning; it may be claimed that it has simply been purged of looseness and ambiguity and its fundamental meaning revealed. But by doing so we have made it clear that when, speaking precisely, we refer to the rightness of an act we are uttering a descriptive statement. Now statements about what ought to be done are *prescriptive*; hence, if we claim that "x possesses the simple property rightness" entails "x ought to be done," we cannot defend this claim by pointing to the synonymity in ordinary usage of "is right" and "is what ought to be done." Nor, since rightness is a simple property, can we defend this claim by saying that "A ought to be done" is related to "A is right" in any way analogous to the way in which "B is male" is related to "B is a brother." In fact, given any such sentence as "A possesses the property x," if we stipulate that x is simple we preclude the possibility of deducing from such a sentence anything less trivial than "A has some property" or "Something is x."

A rather fanciful analogy may help to make this point clear. Suppose it were discovered that there is a simple and indefinable property, which we may call "uncle-ness," which is frequently, or even invariably, possessed by the brothers of parents. We might

then tidy up our use of the word "uncle" by determining to use it always and only to refer to this simple property; to say that someone was an uncle would now be to say that he possessed the simple property in question. Now although, in the old loose sense of "uncle," being an uncle would entail being a brother, and although it might very well be the case that in the new precise sense of the term anyone who was an uncle would *as a matter of fact* be a brother, it would not be the case that being an uncle, in the new sense, would *entail* being a brother. By making the word "uncle" denote a simple property we should have detached it from all its old implications. For precisely this reason naming a simple property "rightness" will not confer upon statements which predicate that property of acts the entailment-power which the term "rightness" carries with it in some or all of the uses which are ordinarily made of it.

It may be objected that we have ignored an important difference between "rightness" and "uncle-ness"—namely, that the latter stands for a natural property whereas the former stands for a moral property. However, so long as it is maintained that the property in question is simple it does not appear to make any difference whether we call it moral or not. If it is simple then it is indefinable and if it is indefinable then we cannot deduce from a statement that some act possesses it anything at all about how we ought to behave. We cannot deduce any statement of this sort, that is, unless we are also provided with some general moral principle to the effect that we ought to perform any act which possesses this property; just as we could not deduce from the fact that someone possessed uncle-ness the fact that he was a brother, unless we also knew that only brothers possessed uncle-ness. But to consider postulating some such general moral principle would be particularly unsatisfactory; it will be recalled that the notion of simple moral properties was itself introduced to avoid the unpromising suggestion that the foundations of morals consisted in a set of synthetic *a priori* rules of conduct. Now, however, it seems that simple moral properties will only perform the function for which they were introduced if they are buttressed with at least one synthetic *a priori prescriptive* principle.

It might, however, be argued that this final point rests on a misunderstanding; that although there are simple moral properties it is a mistake to speak of them as if they were, or could even be conceived to be, the logical grounds for prescriptive statements, and that what we ought to say is simply that these properties when detected by us cause us to feel approval or obligation. Just as redness engenders rage in bulls so rightness engenders obligation-feelings in moral agents. We might, in line with this, make the notion of a moral property more intelligible by saying that it is a "power," possessed by certain kinds of acts, to produce feelings of obligation in us. On

this view what we have called "recognizing the rightness of an act" would consist in having a feeling of obligation whenever we contemplated that act. However, even if we set aside the possible objection that to speak of feelings of approval or obligation is actually to speak of tentative moral judgments rather than of feelings in the strict sense, the suggested modifications are not particularly helpful. Even if it is true that someone or everyone feels approval or obligation with regard to certain situations or upon considering acts of certain kinds it does not follow that such feelings are appropriate or that any action ought to follow upon them. "To say of someone that he has a feeling of obligation is not the same as to say that he has an obligation."[1]

We must conclude therefore that although intuitionists deserve praise for the care with which they have studied the forms of ordinary moral discourse and in particular for the emphasis they have placed on the cognitive character of such discourse, nevertheless the theoretical account which they have given of moral knowledge does not appear to have contributed anything in the way of clarification or explanation.

University of British Columbia,
Vancouver.

[1] R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals*, p. 166.

J. S. MILL'S "PROOF" OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

R. F. ATKINSON

In Chapter 4 of his essay *Utilitarianism*, "Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is susceptible," J. S. Mill undertakes to *prove*, in some sense of that term, the principle of utility. It has very commonly been argued that in the course of this "proof" Mill commits two very obvious fallacies. The *first* is the naturalistic fallacy (the fallacy of holding that a value judgment follows deductively from a purely factual statement) which he is held to commit when he argues that since "the only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner . . . the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it."[1] Here Mill appears to hold that "X is desirable (=fit or worthy to be desired)"—a value judgment—follows deductively from "People desire x"—a factual statement. And the *second* is the fallacy of composition (i.e. an illicit transition from a statement about each several member of a collection to a statement about the collection as a whole) which seems to be involved in Mill's argument that since "each person's happiness is a good to that person . . . the general happiness (is), therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons."[2]

Attempts to defend Mill against these criticisms are considerably less common, but James Seth attempted to do so in 1908[3] and, more recently, Professor E. W. Hall[4] and Dr. D. D. Raphael[5] have done the same. I propose in the first part of this paper to consider the alternative interpretations offered by these writers, in particular those offered by Raphael as the most recent of them, of the passages quoted above; and in the second part to try and evaluate the alternative interpretation suggested by Seth and Hall of Mill's

[1] *Mill's Utilitarianism*, etc., ed. Plamenatz (Blackwell, 1949), p. 198. All page references to Mill are to this edition. I shall refer to the paragraphs of Chapter 4, which contains Mill's supposed proof, by number—there are only 12 of them. The above quotation is from paragraph 3.

[2] Ibid.

[3] "The Alleged Fallacies in Mill's Utilitarianism," *Phil. Review*, Vol. XVII, No. 5, September 1908.

[4] "The 'Proof' of Utility in Bentham and Mill," *Ethics*, Vol. LX, No. 1, October 1949.

[5] "Fallacies in and about Mill's Utilitarianism," *Philosophy*, Vol. XXX, No. 115, October 1955.

argument as a whole. I hope to be able to show that whilst the alternative interpretation of the whole argument is plausible and legitimate it is not, as his defenders claim or, at least, imply, much more favourable to Mill's reputation as a moral philosopher than the usual one.

I.

I think it beyond doubt that the passages quoted, taken by themselves, may very reasonably be supposed to contain the fallacies they are commonly alleged to contain. Mr. Weldon is surely unique in thinking it so obvious as to need no argument that Mill's admittedly "much-criticized" words in the first passage are "perfectly correct."[1] But, as Mill's defenders point out, these passages do not stand alone and must be interpreted in the light of their context.

If this be done, it is argued, it becomes apparent that Mill is not, as the common criticisms assume, offering a strict (=deductive) proof of the principle of utility. That is to say, he is *not* arguing that *if* anything is desired *then* it is desirable *and* that happiness is desired *therefore* it is desirable. He repeatedly and emphatically states that a strict proof is impossible. Further, it is maintained, Mill does not think, as the criticisms also assume, that the passages against which they are directed contain a full statement of the sort of proof which he is offering. The paragraph in question is clearly preliminary. It is significant that it concludes with the very modest point that "happiness has made out its title as *one* of the ends of conduct." All that Mill is there trying to do is to present certain preliminary considerations which, though falling short of strict proof, are, he thinks, nevertheless capable, when taken in conjunction with other considerations yet to come, of determining the intellect to assent to the principle of utility. Accordingly the points made in the disputed passages are regarded as rather trivial ones. Raphael interprets them as follows: 1. "That the idea of the desirable arises from the experience of desire in the *sort* of way ('in *like* manner'), but not in the *same* way, that the idea of the visible arises from the experience of seeing," (op. cit., p. 348); i.e. "that we talk of the 'desirable' as a result of having desires," (p. 349). 2. That—here Raphael relies on a letter of 13th June, 1868—"since *happiness* is at any rate one of the objects of desire, *it* is desirable or good, and that this applies to the happiness of all since *everyone* desires his own happiness" (p. 350). Raphael admits that he is not completely satisfied that the wording of the second passage will bear this innocuous interpretation—I am not sure that the wording of the letter will either—though he appears to think that it is consistent with the general tenor of the argument of chapter 4.

[1] *The Vocabulary of Politics* (Pelican Philosophy Series, 1953), pp. 176–7.

Whilst, of course, agreeing that the passages quoted from paragraph 3 should be interpreted in the light of their context, I am unable to feel sure that Raphael's interpretations are correct, or that it is compatible with any plausible interpretation of the trend of Mill's argument to regard the points made as such trivial ones. For (1) an apparent inference from the desired to the desirable occurs again in paragraph 9 (p. 202)—a paragraph which cannot be dismissed as merely preliminary, but which must, on any interpretation, be recognized as central to such "proof" as Mill is presenting. It is true that paragraph 9 will, as I shall show below, bear a different and more favourable construction, of which a very charitable reader might recognize the foreshadowing in paragraph 3: but it is also true that in the very next paragraph—No. 10—Mill explicitly identifies desiring a thing with thinking it pleasant and thinking it pleasant with thinking it desirable—which is exactly the fallacy commonly attributed to him. And (2) the second of the passages quoted *must*, again on any interpretation, be regarded as an important step in Mill's argument. For it is the only place, so far as I can see, where he makes the crucial step from the desiredness or desirableness of the agent's own happiness, which he repeatedly insists is *not* regarded by Utilitarians as the criterion of right conduct, to the desiredness or desirableness of the *general* happiness, which is.

In spite of my doubts about the adequacy of the above interpretations of particular passages, I have a good deal of sympathy with the onslaught on the common interpretation of Mill's argument as a whole. Any alternative interpretation which does not involve attributing to Mill the commission of obvious fallacies has for that reason alone much to commend it. In the next part of this paper I shall consider a suggested alternative which has at least as much support in what Mill actually writes as the usual one and which is, in my opinion, the only serious alternative to it.

II

This alternative interpretation is, as I have said, suggested by Seth and Hall in the articles referred to above, and up to a point worked out by them. Raphael does not himself offer an interpretation of the argument as a whole, although he makes certain observations about the character of it upon which I shall comment in due course.

If it is to be properly evaluated, the argument attributed to Mill by this interpretation must be carefully stated and considered in the light of what he says he is trying to prove.

In the introductory chapter of his essay Mill undertakes to prove, in such a manner as the case admits, the utilitarian formula. This is given on page 169 as:

(*a*) "Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness."

He explains that the happiness here referred to is the general happiness, not merely the agent's own. The proposition supposedly proved in chapter 4 is, however, a different one, namely:

(*b*) "Happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end."

There are several indications that Mill regards these two propositions as equivalent—which they plainly are not. Nevertheless, it is true that a proof of (*b*) would amount to a proof of (*a*), provided it could be granted that:

(*c*) "Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote things desirable as ends."

For (*c*), taken in conjunction with (*b*), entails (*a*). And (*c*) might be granted on the ground that it is analytic. This is indeed to beg a disputed question in favour of the teleologists, but for the present purpose it is convenient and, I think, legitimate to do so.

It should be noted that if (*a*) and (*b*) are related in the way described the happiness referred to in (*b*) must be, as it is in (*a*), the *general* happiness. And, also, that "desirable" as it occurs in (*b*) must be taken in a normative sense, as meaning "fit (or worthy) to be desired" and not, for instance, "capable of being desired." Despite the apparent comparison of it with "visible" and "audible" (i.e. "capable of being seen" and "capable of being heard") in paragraph 3 Mill clearly does not in chapter 4 understand the word in the latter sense. He is not there trying to prove that the general happiness can be desired. He thinks that he has already shown this in chapter 3.

The "proof" of the principle of utility appears to be given in paragraphs 9 and 10 of chapter 4. In paragraph 9 Mill claims that *if* human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a means to happiness or a part of it, *then* "we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable." And in paragraph 10 he claims that the antecedent of this conditional is true. Paragraphs 1–3 contain observations about the sort of proof which is being offered, 4–8 make certain preliminary points which tend to support the claim that the antecedent is true, and paragraph 11, the penultimate paragraph of the chapter, is designed to answer a possible objection to it. The short last paragraph simply repeats that the principle of utility is proved if the antecedent is true. "Whether it be so or not" being "left to the consideration of the thoughtful reader."

The first question to ask of this "proof" is whether the conditional upon which it depends is valid. For brevity it may be formulated thus: "*If* happiness *alone* can be desired *then* happiness *alone* is

desirable." I have italicized the word "alone" in its two occurrences because its inclusion makes a crucial difference between this conditional and the obviously invalid conditional—"*If* happiness is (or can be) desired *then* happiness is desirable"—on which Mill's "proof" has been commonly supposed to depend. The conditional upon which the "proof" depends according to the present interpretation seems to be valid *provided that something is desirable*. The truth of this proviso is the presupposition of the whole argument of *Utilitarianism*, in which the question asked is not *whether* there be a criterion of right and wrong but *what* is that criterion.

The grounds for holding the conditional valid are these: That to say that anything is desirable implies that it is capable of being desired. Hence if anything can be shown to be not capable of being desired it follows that it is not desirable. Now the antecedent of Mill's conditional states that nothing is capable of being desired except happiness, whence it follows that if anything is desirable at all that thing must be happiness. Consequently, if the antecedent be true, Mill has proved, and proved strictly, that happiness alone is desirable.

It will be observed that the above interpretation has the merit of regarding the much criticized paragraph 3 as merely preliminary to the main "proof," and does not involve charging Mill with the commission of the naturalistic fallacy. On the other hand, though Hall somewhat surprisingly does not appear to notice it, it is open to the objection brought against the usual interpretation, namely, that it represents Mill as offering that strict proof which he has declared to be impossible. The force of this objection can, however, in my opinion, be exaggerated. It is true that Mill does seem explicitly to rule out any strict (=deductive) proof of the principle of utility. "Strict" is not in fact his own word—*pace* Hall who misquotes the first sentence of chapter 4 as asserting that a *strict* proof is impossible where questions of ultimate ends are concerned. But, of course, Mill does say that proof "in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term" or "direct proof" or "proof by reasoning" is impossible (p. 166 and p. 198). And it is at least natural to conclude from these remarks that the sort of proof which is appropriate to questions of ultimate ends, proof in the "larger meaning of the word," cannot be deductive, even though Mill also says that the considerations he thinks "capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine (of utility)" are "equivalent to proof." Nevertheless, when Mill actually gives his "proof," it does not, as Raphael suggests (op. cit., p. 346), consist simply in stating clearly the view to be proved and then meeting possible objections to it. Quite the contrary. Mill, as I have tried to show, presents his argument in deductive form, affirming a conditional and then claiming

that the antecedent is true. Raphael has, I think, very fairly described the procedure adopted to establish the antecedent. But granted the antecedent, Mill's claim seems to me clearly to be that the consequent follows deductively. Whether this can be squared with his frequent and insistent disavowal of the possibility of "what is commonly understood by proof" on questions of ultimate ends I am not sure. One should not be too ready to jump to the conclusion that Mill is inconsistent, but his defenders should not refuse even to contemplate this as an hypothesis. It is, however, possible—and the main passage (on p. 166) in which Mill disclaims the intention of offering a proof in the ordinary sense of the word will perhaps just bear this interpretation—that he is primarily concerned to insist, not that one cannot prove that happiness alone is desirable for its own sake by deductive argument, but simply that one cannot show this in the same sort of way as that in which one shows that e.g. listening to music is desirable—that is, by showing that it tends to promote that which is desirable for its own sake, namely, happiness. To say that happiness is the *ultimate* end is *eo ipso* to rule out the possibility of showing *in this way* that it is. But it is not necessarily to exclude the possibility of showing that it is by deductive argument.

The second and, in view of the affirmative answer to the first, crucial question to ask of Mill's "proof" is whether the antecedent —"Happiness alone can be desired"—is true. Mill begins by claiming that people certainly do desire happiness—this is perhaps the main point that the unhappily phrased paragraph 3 is intended to make. No one would wish to dispute that they do desire their own happiness and, since it is desirable if possible to avoid attributing to Mill the commission of the fallacy of composition in the second part of paragraph 3, it must be assumed that it is their own and not the general happiness that he has in mind when he makes this point.

Let it be granted, then, that people desire their own happiness. The next step, as Mill explains in paragraph 4, is to show that they never desire anything else. He admits, of course, that they do desire things which, "in common language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness" (p. 199). Some, for instance, desire virtue. (By this he must be supposed to mean not merely that they desire that others should be virtuous, but that they desire that they themselves should be virtuous, i.e. desire to acquire a settled disposition to perform those actions which tend to promote the general happiness.) In order to meet this difficulty Mill argues that the desire for virtue is not, appearances notwithstanding, distinct from the desire for happiness. For if virtue is desired it must be desired either as a means or as an end, either as a means to or as an ingredient in happiness. And he goes on explicitly to state that the same may be

said of the desires for money, power, and fame. It begins to look as if there is no desire of which this could not be said, as if Mill is prepared to call anything whatever that is desired either a means to or a part of happiness—a suspicion which is confirmed by paragraph 10. There Mill at first claims that the question whether people desire anything other than pleasure[1] is a "question of fact and experience, dependent, like all similar questions, upon evidence." He goes on: "It can only be determined by practised self-consciousness and self-observation, assisted by observation of others. I believe that these sources of experience, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact: . . .[2] and that to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and *metaphysical* impossibility" (p. 202, my italics).

It should not escape notice that the proposition "happiness alone is desired" undergoes a change of logical status in the course of the above argument. To begin with, by appealing to experience and observation, Mill appears to regard it as synthetic. The appeal to observation is appropriate only when it is a question of establishing the truth of a synthetic proposition, a proposition whose contradictory is logically possible. But at the conclusion of his argument Mill is to be found affirming that it is logically ("metaphysically") impossible to deny that happiness alone is desired. This is, in effect, to regard the proposition as analytic, as true in virtue of the definitions of its terms, quite irrespective of observation. So to change one's view about the logical status of a proposition is not, it is true, necessarily reprehensible. A proposition which at first sight seems to be synthetic may very well upon examination turn out to be analytic. Nevertheless it must be said that Mill's reference to observation and experience does tend to obscure the fact that his considered view is that the proposition in question is analytic. And this fact has, as will appear below, an important bearing on the cogency of his argument.

[1] It is of minor importance that whereas he before spoke of happiness Mill now speaks of pleasure, for "by happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure" (p. 169).

[2] I have omitted from this quotation the clause "that to think of an object as desirable (except for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing." Here Mill unquestionably expresses the view commonly attributed to him that "x is desired (=thought pleasant)" *entails* "x is desirable," as he also does on p. 226 *note* by saying that "happiness" and "desirable" are synonymous. It is very difficult to accommodate *everything* Mill says in a consistent interpretation.

Mill's contention is, then, in the end, that it is analytic that everybody desires his own happiness. The conditional upon which Mill's "proof" depends is valid. Its antecedent, understood as Mill understands it, is true because analytic. Does it then follow that the principle of utility has been proved, that the general happiness has been shown to be the one thing desirable as an end?

Clearly it does not. For, *first*, Mill has shown only that the agent's own happiness and not the general happiness is the one thing desirable as an end. He has not shown, what he undertook to show and supposes himself to have shown, that an action's tendency to promote the general happiness is the criterion of its rightness or wrongness. He has not even shown that a man who makes his own happiness his ultimate end, as he believes all men (logically) must, will in fact be led to perform those actions which tend to promote the general happiness. He may well have held, as many moral philosophers have, that the course of life which best promotes personal happiness is also the course of life which best promotes the general happiness. His discussion of the desire for virtue (cf. p. 201 especially) suggests that he thought that a prudent man would desire to be virtuous—i.e. aim at the general happiness—in the first instance as a means to personal happiness, although in due course he might come to desire it for itself—i.e. as a part of happiness. This view, of course, assumes that being virtuous *is* a means to personal happiness —a proposition which is perhaps broadly true in a well-ordered society, but which is certainly neither obviously nor universally true. If Mill's argument depends on the truth of this distinctly disputable proposition it clearly falls far short of being in any sense a *proof* of the principle of utility. And, moreover, such an argument would hardly yield the conclusion that conduciveness to the general happiness is the *criterion* of right and wrong. At best it would show that this is a property common to all right actions—the criterion proper being conduciveness to personal happiness. And this Mill repeatedly insists is not the utilitarian view.

James Seth, in the paper referred to above, gives a similar interpretation of Mill's argument, allowing or rather insisting that all it shows is that personal happiness is the only thing desirable as an end. He does not, however, appear to think that this is a ground for complaining that Mill's performance falls seriously short of his promises. Without criticism he reports that Mill, having proved that personal pleasure is the only thing desirable or good, "seems to think that it follows that the good, and therefore the ethical criterion, is the general happiness, or the greatest happiness, not of the individual, but of the greatest number of individuals" (op. cit., p. 479). The ground for this conclusion, admittedly not made explicit by Mill, is alleged to be that "since pleasure is the Good, the

greater pleasure must, as such, be better than the less, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number (if not of all sentient beings) must therefore be better than the greatest happiness of the individual or of any number of individuals less than the total number. He assumes, as a matter of common sense, what Sidgwick represents as the result of an application of the principle of impartiality or equality, namely, that . . . each ought to count for one and no one for more than one" (ibid.). Seth further contends, a little later on, that the apparent contradiction between egoistic *psychological* hedonism and altruistic *ethical* hedonism is resolved by Mill's doctrine of sympathy.

This may or may not be a fair statement of what Mill had in mind when he wrote the passages in question. But, in any event, Seth does not sufficiently stress the fact that the implicit premises by which Mill is supposed to effect the transition from egoism to altruism are themselves moral principles. Hence, to employ them in the course of a proof of the principle of utility is inconsistent with regarding that as the *ultimate* moral criterion. The whole difficulty about proving the principle of utility, as Mill recognizes but Seth forgets, arises from this very fact that it is presented as the ultimate principle of morality. Seth defends Mill against the common criticisms, but only at the cost of attributing to him a line of argument which he clearly repudiates. Perhaps Mill ought to have taken this line, as Sidgwick did after him, and recognized certain principles as self-evident intuitions. But that he did not is surely beyond dispute.

And, *secondly*, quite apart from the above deficiency Mill's supposed proof is open to another fatal objection. Remember that, given his terminology it is analytic that everybody desires only happiness. It is not, of course, analytic in ordinary speech, as Mill in effect admits when he allows that people desire things which are in common language distinct from happiness. But, if it is *analytic* that everybody desires only happiness, it follows that tending to promote happiness cannot be the criterion of right and wrong, that happiness cannot be the *one thing* desirable as an end (or, more exactly, that there is no point in saying that it is the one thing desirable as an end), for happiness is not in the relevant sense one thing. Two men who both desire happiness do not necessarily desire to bring about the same state of affairs, or even two compatible states of affairs. They desire the same thing only in the sense in which Francis I and the Emperor Charles V desired the same thing when they both desired Milan—and were prepared to fight each other for it.[1] It is an odd criterion of right and wrong from which

[1] Cf. *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Abbott (6th ed.), p. 116. I am indebted to Professor A. E. Teale for drawing my attention to this interesting and, I believe, conclusive passage.

it follows that any action which tends to bring about whatever any agent may desire is right, from which it follows that both parties to every quarrel may be right.

The above interpretation may very well be, I think on the whole that it is, closer to what Mill meant than the usual one. But I am not primarily concerned to recommend one interpretation above the other. What I am concerned to do is to combat the suggestion that Mill's supposed proof can be represented, not merely in a different, but in a much more favourable light than that in which it is usually represented. I have no wish to deny that Mill was a considerable moral philosopher whose writings merit serious and sympathetic study. But I am sure that in chapter 4 of *Utilitarianism* he was writing much below his best.

University College of North Staffordshire.

DISCUSSION

THINKING AND MACHINES

Professor A. D. Ritchie's remarks (*Philosophy*, January 1957, p. 65) cannot go without some reply, since otherwise they would only have the effect of increasing the already considerable confusion on the subject of Cybernetics.

If I had claimed that *existing* computers or other machinery were capable of thinking in exactly the same way as human beings, then I could see some point in Professor Ritchie's objections; as it is I can see only a deal of misunderstanding. His argument, if I may summarize it, is that machines are constructed and do what they are made to do, hence they cannot think, only the persons who made them can do this. In particular, he says:—

> A machine does not deal with unforeseen situations and if it does something not predicted (in principle) it is said to have broken down.

Then, to put his argument broadly again, he says that machines do not "choose" or "decide," and the only point of saying this, is presumably to try and establish the fact that they not only do not, but cannot *in principle*, make decisions. This is surely false.

What has happened is that Professor Ritchie has taken the words "machine" and "machinelike" in a narrow sense, a sense which makes the answer to the question, "*could* machines be made to think?" trivially no. This hardly deals with the problem which is somewhat more complicated.

Certainly machines are constructed, and certainly they do what they are designed to do. It is exactly the same, though, with human beings. Humans are constructed by a complex biological process, and do precisely what it is built into them to do. What Professor Ritchie does not appear to realize is that it is possible to build machines that can *learn*. This means precisely machines that can deal with unforeseen situations, machines that have the facilities for generalizing, and so on, built into them, rather than being wholly fixed in advance, in such a way that they can only behave in accordance with all the foreseen contingencies.

Such learning machines are designed specifically to deal with new circumstances, and are able to formulate the generalizations that are appropriate to them. This is precisely what has been called elsewhere an inductive machine, and it seems to depend on classification, recognition, counting and generalization; all activities that can be reproduced in the machine. Such a learning machine can play chess and will not need to have every situation accounted for specifically in advance, so that if we have overlooked any particular state of the board, this will no more hinder the machine chess-player than it would have the human chess-player. It is precisely this sort of elasticity that behavioural artefacts needed; *without it*, they would be subject to all the criticisms that Professor Ritchie makes. But we should make it clear that it was precisely this elasticity that the work of McCulloch and Pitts, von Neumann, Uttley, and many others, was designed to supply. This has now been achieved.

There is nothing in any of the anecdotes that Professor Ritchie tells that have any bearing on the questions that I myself discussed, and my condemnation of him—the same as for Dr. Mays—is that what he says is irrelevant to the question of whether or not we can say machines *could* think. Why, incidentally, should it be impossible to build a machine that winks at a girl

and *means* it? Why should it not be possible for a machine to stop in the middle of its game and take its opponent to the local practitioner ("back to the works for a thorough overhaul")? This only sounds ludicrous if you think in the narrow terms of existing machinery—say any existing general purpose digital computer.

Let it be made quite clear that if you choose to deny that a machine or a robot can behave like a human in all respects, the burden of proof lies with the person so arguing. I myself have been content to point out that the question tends to be meaningless anyway, or at best to have very little meaning. The upshot is usually that the question is simply decided by choice of the meaning of the words "machine" and "think." Some interesting and debatable facts do, however, emerge from such discussions.

Many people have assumed that automata cannot—could not—paint, or draw, or write poetry. The reason for this assumption is that while we may agree that robots may be made to go through the motions, they will not have the appropriate accompanying feelings. But why not? Who is to say that we cannot, in principle, build a machine that has the same emotions that humans have? It so happens that very little attention has yet been given to machines that "have emotion," although some work is gradually developing along these lines, in psychological circles. Cybernetics, to be useful to psychology, must produce machines that have emotional difficulties and the like. It is doubtless also true that the sort of emotions that humans go through are closely related to the materials used in their construction, and we do not know enough yet to construct a robot from colloidal protoplasm, but would anyone care to assert that a construction in such terms was impossible?

It will perhaps be of interest to mention that we know how to construct machines that have motivational systems that work selectively, in the same way as they do in the human, to reinforce certain stimulus-response relations and abolish or prevent others. Such finite automata are capable of exhibiting, at least in principle, all the behaviour that human beings are capable of exhibiting. This is in keeping with the suggestion that machines *could* be poets or creative artists. It is equally true that we do not yet know exactly how humans achieve these ends, but this is no ground for denying its possibility, indeed there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that it *is* possible.

As far as making decisions is concerned, there is certainly a sense in which even existing digital computers make them, and if it be objected that the machine only does what it is programmed to do, then the answer is again that the same condition holds for humans. They, too, do what they are programmed to do. The fact that human programming may be complex and derived from many different sources is nothing to the point.

If still it is felt that humans can perform certain activities that machines cannot, let us have the details. There is an appropriate sense in which, as Turing said, in giving the details you are in fact describing the mechanism that we may then build.

The basic and most fundamental error in Professor Ritchie's note remains his belief that machines are incapable of dealing with unforeseen situations. Such a statement shows clearly how completely he has missed the whole point of current work in the field of Cybernetics. At the same time I should lay emphasis on the point that I made in my original article, that the question of machines thinking can easily be reduced to meaninglessness, and the appropriate way of treating such matters is to carry through empirical projects to see what can in fact be done. Guesses and interpretations, that are based on vague preconceptions, from either side of the dispute, are not especially helpful.

F. H. GEORGE.

NEW BOOKS

The Phenomenology of Moral Experience. MAURICE MANDELBAUM. (The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois. 1955. Pp. 338.)

This is an important and valuable book; neither startlingly revolutionary nor disturbingly profound, its merits are of a more modest kind. Professor Mandelbaum discusses some well-worn themes, but he has an eye for the essential and he illuminates some important areas in moral philosophy that have recently been left obscure. Philosophers have all too often neglected the virtues and vices, to which Mandelbaum devotes a chapter, and they have all too often discussed moral conflicts with a tool no finer than the blunt dichotomy of disputes about facts and disputes about values. It is, of course, often admitted that moral disputes are a blend of fact and value, but equally often the bearing of this fact on the nature of moral judgement has been overlooked and little attempt is made to analyse the blend. Mandelbaum prefaces his chapter on the resolution of moral controversies with some fifty pages of analysis of their nature and sources.

There are two main theses, a thesis about method which is expounded and very ably argued in the first chapter, and a thesis about the nature of moral judgements. To a large extent the first is independent of the second; one might agree that Mandelbaum has hit on the right method without agreeing with the conclusions to which it leads him. The methodological thesis is that, whatever other approaches a moral philosopher may adopt, the dominant approach must be phenomenological. But we must use the analysis of experience, not to discover the content of moral laws or eternal norms, but to discover the structure that all genuine moral judgements have in common. Rival approaches are not condemned; indeed, some of the best arguments are devoted to showing that psychology, so far from being irrelevant, is an essential part of ethics; but each approach, when used alone, is seen to have some fatal defect. The rival approaches discussed are the metaphysical, psychological, sociological and that version of phenomenology that seeks to discover the content or truth of moral judgements. It is surprising that the fashionable linguistic approach is not accorded separate status, a point on which I shall comment later.

Moral judgements are then divided into three main types, the direct judgement, which is always that of an agent to the effect that he ought to do something, the removed moral judgement, which is that of a spectator (or of the agent in retrospect) to the effect that a certain action was right or wrong, and the judgement of moral worth, the worth of a person or some characteristic of a person. What Mandelbaum seeks to discover is the characteristic (be it quality, relation or structure) common to all moral judgements of each type. After dispatching various familiar rival hypotheses with arguments that are always fair and often acute, he runs his quarry to earth and finds it to lie in the fact that a direct moral judgement is always a response to an objective demand that the situation before me should be completed in just this and no other way. Direct moral judgements are made, and only made when I apprehend a situation as being somehow incomplete and requiring a certain action on my part to complete it. This fittingness of response is what is meant by "right" and also by "good"; for Mandelbaum repudiates, I think unwisely, the distinction which others have drawn between these terms.

He repudiates also the idea of a special, non-natural fittingness; moral fittingness is a variety of a generic fittingness that cannot be defined but which we are expected to recognize with the help of examples; and it would, I think,

be disingenuous to suggest that there is anything opaque in this concept. Understanding the equation between fittingness and rightness is, however, another matter. If phenomenology is to be the test, a reader must be allowed to examine this question in the light of his own moral experience and I find, for my part, that what is meant by "I ought to do this" is more clear than what is meant by "this is fitting." This is not to say that nothing more can be said about direct moral judgements, and I should agree that such a judgement is always to the effect that I ought to respond to this situation in this way. But is the demand always objective? Mandelbaum passes from "objective" to "external" (the demand is always seen as arising from the facts and not from my own nature), and from this to the statement that all demands are altruistic. Both these points seem more contentious.

The analogy used to explain and defend the idea of fittingness is, I think, unfortunate. It is aesthetic; a figure, for example a circle with a gap in it, demands to be completed in just this way and no other. But it is certainly unusual to try to defend the objectivity of moral judgement by an appeal to the far more doubtful case of aesthetic judgement and the theory is inadequate as a theory of art. Aesthetic value has not the simplicity which the example of the circle presupposes. We might (especially if we were not philosophers) agree that there was just one right completion of a simple figure, but the attempt to apply this theory to more complex works of art breaks down. We should have to condemn, for example, the interrupted cadence in music as inartisitic, since it consists precisely in deliberate avoidance of the "perfect" cadence that the listener naturally expects; and the same would have to be said of Wagner's strings of unresolved discords and of Homer's starting the Odyssey in the middle. Any attempt to complicate the theory (for example by saying that it was fitting to disappoint the listener's expectations at just this point) would, I think, soon trivialize it. For we should have to ask why it should be just here and not elsewhere that some unusual or arresting chord is fitting; and the answer would have to be that its coming just here pleases or in some other way moves the listener. And to say this would be to rest the analysis in the end, not on what is fitting, but on what moves us.

The inadequacy of the equation between rightness and fittingness detracts hardly at all from the merits of the subsequent analysis. And this seems, at first sight, surprising; for is it not the corner-stone of the whole? The reason lies in the fact that the question "What is rightness?" is less important than is commonly supposed. The real interest lies in the structure of the different types of moral judgement and in their relations to each other. With these questions Mandelbaum deals at length with lucidity and penetration.

In terms of familiar controversies, his thesis is deontological, cognitive and objective, but he understands the plausibility of the opposing positions and tries to harmonize his thesis with what of truth they contain. This leads to shades of grey which I find far more convincing than the familiar blacks and whites. For example, he will have nothing to do with special, non-natural properties and this gives his theory several advantages. He is able to meet the point that one person can see no moral issue at all in a situation which seems morally charged to another without appealing to the question-begging concept of moral blindness; and he is able to treat virtues and vices as natural, psychological traits of individuals which are good or bad because they are connected in complex and subtle ways with the fact that a person does what is right or what is wrong. He thus avoids the treatment of virtues as special entities—he rightly dislikes the current word "values"—which add their quota to the total value of a person or an action. The rightness of an action is not to be assessed by the summation of valuable and the subtraction of disvaluable ingredients

with, perhaps, an incalculable amount thrown in for the organic value of the whole. It is an all-or-nothing attribute belonging to an action because it, and it alone was fitting. This is not to say that rightness is not dependent on many factors; it may depend on some special relationship in which the agent stands or on his being a person of a certain sort. (An insensitive person does not act wrongly in doing what would be wrong if done by a more sympathetic person capable of seeing what the insensitive person did not see.)

It is impossible in a short review to do justice to all Mandelbaum's arguments, especially as they are often more complicated and subtle than they appear at first; but one general criticism remains to be made. Is there such a thing as phenomenology at all? Granted that Mandelbaum is right in insisting that the first task of a moral philosopher is not to examine the content of moral judgements or to erect eternal standards, but to elucidate what it is to make a moral judgement; is this a task for phenomenology?

I mentioned earlier the surprising fact that Mandelbaum does not notice a separate "linguistic" approach and I suspect that the (unconscious) reason is that the linguistic and the phenomenological approaches are identical. A few words will suffice to make this clear. The New Way of Words is but Locke's New Way of Ideas in a new and more becoming dress. To talk about the Idea of Justice or the "experience of thinking something just" are ways of talking about the meaning of the word "just" and its cognates, ways that can, but need not mislead.

Mandelbaum distinguishes the content of a moral judgement from its structure and emphasizes structural phenomenology. In the same way linguistic philosophers distinguish the things denoted by a word from the ways in which it is used and emphasize the philosophical importance of the latter. Are not these different versions of the same distinction? We can list the virtues and we can say what it is to be a virtue. The phenomenologist embarks on the latter task by reflecting on the part played by virtue-concepts in moral judgement; the linguistic philosopher reflects on the part played by virtue-words in moral speech. And, if this is not philology, it is phenomenology with "statement" substituted for "judgement" and "word" for "concept".

This thesis has been denied on the ground that thought is not always expressed in words, and this is true; as Professor Price has shown, concepts manifest themselves in all sorts of ways. But always in some way or other; and since, in the case of an abstract subject such as ethics, words are overwhelmingly the most important, it is not here a serious error to identify moral judgements with their linguistic form. (To call this form always a "statement" would be to beg other questions.) If this thesis is correct, it remains to demonstrate the superiority of the linguistic dress. Phenomenology seems to me to suffer from three grave defects.

(i) There can be no such thing as a *description* of *pure* experience. If to make a moral judgement is to "have an experience," the experience is had, and that is all. To describe it is to use the appropriate words, just as to describe the experience of seeing something blue is to say "I saw something blue." There is no way of getting behind the barrier of words to the pure experience; and no need of a way; for language is not a barrier. All language is discursive, and therefore leaves us with the feeling that something has been left unsaid; but this feeling is an illusion.

(ii) Phenomenology tends to reduce to psychology. Mandelbaum distinguishes the two on the grounds that the first is purely descriptive, the second classificatory and diagnostic. And it is true that we can describe what goes on in a man's mind when he is trying to solve a moral problem without going into the sort of story that would interest a psychologist. For example, he might both

give his reasons for subscribing to a fund for disabled soldiers and describe the moral struggle between compassion and the selfishness that prompted him to keep his cash. He certainly would not need to, and probably could not tell the psychologist's story according to which his action was "really" due to a subconscious fear of castration. Thus far description and diagnosis can be kept distinct; indeed they must be kept distinct; for the diagnosis of something is not a diagnosis unless that thing can be described in non-diagnostic terms. But the language of the agent is, nevertheless, certainly classificatory and probably also diagnostic to some degree. He says that the temptation to keep his cash was strong, or that, while he usually resists impulsive generosity, the manner of this particular appeal carried him away. Both these are diagnostic statements; but without statements of this sort there could be no full phenomenological account of a moral struggle, or, I am inclined to think, any phenomenological account at all. For statements of this sort are the stuff of which descriptions of moral experience are made.

In so far as phenomenology is introspective psychology it is necessarily private. Experience cannot literally be shared; but it can be communicated; and words are the main medium of communication. Hence, when two people compare notes, they will be partly concerned to describe their experience to each other in words which they both understand in the same way and partly concerned to iron out misunderstandings due to discrepancies in their uses. The description of experience is not a philosophical task and no philosopher of my acquaintance can, or would claim to be able to do it as well as a Stendhal, a Tolstoy or a Proust. Their competence lies in explaining the meaning of moral words and to do this is not to try to present us with an account of the relation between words and facts or things; rather it is to offer an analysis of some treacherous word in terms of other words or to say what such and such a statement in moral language entails or excludes; and the adequacy of such analyses and arguments is a matter of public fact. Not perhaps entirely, but to a very large degree.

(iii) If we use "judgemental" terminology and talk, for example, about the "experience of obligation" we must say that obligation is something we feel or see. And then, to avoid the unplausible view that to say this is to do a bit of introspective psychology, we seem driven to invoking the whole apparatus of non-natural faculties and objects, an injudicious step against which Mandelbaum expressly warns us. (Did not the philosophy of mathematics oscillate between psychologism and intuitionism in just this way until Frege rescued it?) The analysis of moral words, on the other hand, commits us to neither of these errors. Nor does it commit us in advance to a "cognitive" or an "affective" or any other type of theory.

Whether or not this attempt to explode phenomenology is successful, a philosopher who prefers to think in terms of logical analysis will find it a useful exercise to try to translate Mandelbaum's detailed arguments and conclusions into the medium of his choice. Insight, candour and lucidity are, to a large extent, independent of philosophical clothing.

P. H. NOWELL-SMITH.

Kant's First Critique. An appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. By H. W. CASSIRER. (Allen and Unwin. London 1955. Pp. 367. Price 30s.)

To the title of the book, *Kant's First Critique*, Mr. Cassirer adds the explanatory phrase: An appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. His thesis is that when all is legitimately said by way

of criticism, when all is discounted that ought to be discounted owing to eighteenth-century scientific and logical views, now out-moded, there is yet something that is a permanent contribution to philosophical thinking. What is permanent is that knowledge does contain two elements, distinct and polar, the sense-given, which is empirical, and the mind contribution, which is *a priori*. Further, that knowledge, human knowledge at least, is limited by and to these factors. In carrying out his main theme he proceeds by way of exposition, criticism and emendation and in so doing performs a ruthless operation. Kant is mistaken in his views about Space and Time; mistaken, too, in his views about Mathematics; fails completely in the Metaphysical Deduction which, in any case, is marred by an archaic logic; and misleads in the tendency often shown throughout the work to use psychological language in arguments or analyses which are epistemological in purpose. Finally, the tendency to hypostasize "things in themselves" is erroneous. When Kant does so he is giving way to those very rationalistic tendencies against which the whole book is an argument and he must, accordingly, be reinterpreted. Mr. Cassirer conscientiously and tenaciously holds to his argument throughout his study of the whole of the First Critique, resisting the temptation to copy those who have found their energy exhausted at the end of the Analytic.

A reviewer must necessarily be selective, but he ought to give some indication of what the book contains. This I shall do first. There is one chapter, expository and critical on the Aesthetic; three on Kant's account of the Understanding, including an analysis of the Transcendental Deduction as it is given in the second edition; five chapters on the rest of the Analytic, i.e. the Principles of the Understanding and Phenomena and Noumena; and five chapters on the Dialectic, including one each on the Paralogisms (second edition), the Antinomies and the Proofs of the Existence of God. Let me say at once that whatever views one takes of Kant's philosophy there is no gainsaying the fact that Kant's First Critique, as a single book, is one of the greatest intellectual feats in the whole of literature, and to attempt both to master and adjudge its contents in the way in which Mr. Cassirer has done, is itself a sign of intellectual vigour. The fact that by his excisions and exclusions he has made his task easier detracts little from the magnitude of the performance.

Now to detail, and first a word on the Preface. Mr. Cassirer explains both how he came to write the book and indeed almost each chapter. Towards the end he makes a remark about the present fashionable trends in British philosophy, with which he violently disagrees, to the effect that he is amazed at the uniformity of pattern of philosophizing despite the diverse temperaments of the philosophers themselves and thinks that it is a sign of the tendency towards "conformity at any price," characteristic of the age in which we live. But surely, no school in fact has been more self-critical, and as for the tendency towards conformity, Mr. Cassirer can rest assured that to philosophize at all after the usual British education is just to be a nonconformist and that is the point that he has failed to grasp. It possibly can be grasped only by one brought up on that system of education.

I turn now to Kant's views on Space and Time, which the author considers to be manifestly mistaken. It would not be fair to insist that Kant pointed out that his philosophy was a unified system and that Mr. Cassirer's book was not a correct interpretation of Kant, for the very reason that it is not merely an interpretation, i.e. an explanation of what Kant says, but an appraisal. The only question worth discussing is whether, if Kant's thesis about Space and Time is mistaken, Mr. Cassirer has been successful in his own thesis that, even so, *a priori* categorical thinking is a requisite for *perceptual* knowledge, for it is perceptual knowledge that Mr. Cassirer discusses. Kant's aims in making

Space and Time formal intuitions are complex. First; they are formal and not material, like red; next, they are single, and not manifold like reds; third, they enable him to account for Pure Mathematics, as *a priori* and synthetic; and too, they are the means of bridging pure categorical thinking, which is empty and the material of sense, for the categories as applied to sense are schematized and not pure; finally, being of subjective origin, they enable him to state his conviction that they are in some sense an appearance—things, *quoad nos*, are spatio-temporal. Now Mr. Cassirer admits that they are sense-given, but piecemeal, along with the sensibles, admits, too, that they are formal, presumably on the grounds that we conceptualize them as single wholes, although he thinks that we can make no statements about them. The point that needs more consideration is why Kant thought them of subjective origin. Not certainly for psychological reasons. He thought that they were subjective single formal intuitions and *a priori* because they were a universal and necessary factor in perceptual knowledge and any piecemeal acquiring of them could not satisfy this epistemological demand. He thought, too, that there was a problem about the application of the purely intellectual capacity of the mind, as it was envisaged by him in pure categorical thinking, to the sense-given. Now one test of Mr. Cassirer's views is the schematized category of Extensive Magnitude. Kant's argument succeeds where, I think, Mr. Cassirer's argument fails. On page 133 he writes, "Everything presented to us is bound to exhibit spatial and temporal relations." I cannot myself see that he produces the evidence for the phrase "is bound" whereas I think that Kant did produce reasons for it, namely his admittedly odd view that Space and Time were formal intuitions of subjective origin. In short, I fail to see how, if Space and Time are conceptualized from the fragments given in sense, we can then assert that all objects formed from sensibles should be known *necessarily* to be in a spatio-temporal order. Kant's theory does enable us to say that by a necessary principle we know that a line, if it is to be understood, must be exhibited in a spatio-temporal continuum. I am not convinced that Mr. Cassirer's re-interpretation does enable him to say that. And I am inclined to think that the same point could be made about the Analogies of Experience. Kant, admittedly, in this example uses psychological language, but it is the epistemological point that he is considering. In any case, psychology and epistemology are not exclusive studies and the epistemologist cannot from the nature of the case, exclude all psychological language.

I shall pass over the complete rejection of the Metaphysical Deduction. Mr. Cassirer has distinguished predecessors on this although I prefer the attempt to understand and interpret it made by Professor Paton. Instead, I shall comment on the way in which he thinks that Kant has made a permanent contribution to philosophical thinking. It must be stressed that he confines his account exclusively to the nature of a perceptual object. He writes, p. 34, "Perceptual knowledge is essentially knowledge by description and the main instrument of description is the use of general words." Putting it in another way, there is no understanding by human beings except in so far as they judge, for Kant is right in his view that we lack intellectual intuition, right, too, in his view that the occurrence of sensations is not the acquiring of knowledge. Judging is an act, an act by means of which we objectify. So far this is straight from Kant. But there is a tendency to think then that in judging we are creating objects and this Cassirer repudiates. The function of Understanding is to enable us to know what is there already to be known. There is a tendency, too, to think that the object known by judging is ideal and therefore subjective and not independent. Cassirer's point of view is expressed as follows (p. 45): "We have argued that the very idea of perceptual objects involves that of

percipient subjects. However, this does not—as should be noted—commit us to the view that the existence, or reality of a perceptual object depends on its being perceived. On the contrary, we agree that, so far as the reality of perceptual objects is concerned, the presence of any particular percipient is a matter of indifference and that, to this extent, the objects exist entirely independently." I am not concerned at present to discuss whether this is the same as Kant's Empirical Realism or not. As Cassirer himself points out Kant has a tendency to think of his objects as appearances of a hypostasized thing-in-itself and this he repudiates. He thinks that his own view is a re-statement of Kant which is a form of empirical realism and preferable to that of those modern realists who deny that there are *a priori* factors in perception, preferable because when they face the problem that Kant faced, viz. how to distinguish the subjective from the objective, they proceed as if we had intellectual intuition of the objective and this, Cassirer, with Kant, denies. The alternative is to recognize that the intellect does play a part in perception, namely of cognizing the objective by an intellectual act on the sensibles. As I think that any form of extreme empiricism fails to account for "perceptual objects," I welcome Cassirer's attempt to deal with it by using categorical thinking, but it is, in this book, so mixed up with criticism and exegesis of Kant, and so lacking in detail, that it is hard to assess its permanent value. It would, I think, be a service to philosophers if he would give an independent statement of it.

It is convenient at this stage to refer to the interpretation of Kant's account of Noumena. Mr. Cassirer sympathetically and patiently endeavours to find a way through the problem as to whether and in what sense Kant could be said to be holding that there are Noumena and decides that on the whole Kant did believe in their being but that in this respect he cannot follow him. His whole thesis is to stress the importance of the negative sense of Noumenon and to take the view that Kant's early preoccupation with Rationalism leads him to speak with two voices. Briefly, he holds that there is no contradiction in conceiving a person endowed with Intellectual Intuition who would by thinking create and know the objects thus thought, no contradiction, certainly, but that there is no evidence to support the belief that there is such a being, nor, therefore, that there are any such objects.

Kant, therefore, must be re-interpreted in such a way as to equate the thing-in-itself, which is the "exact equivalent" of the transcendental object with "sensible reality as it would be conceived of from the standpoint of a purely active intellect." It is not "the intelligible cause" nor is it a supersensible reality the existence of which may be taken for granted (p. 289). He links this up with his account of perception. A perceptual object would be, in its hypothetical non-appearance, i.e. as non-phenomenal, such as would be known by a being endowed with intellectual intuition. Kant's doctrine of objects as appearances is thereby, he thinks, saved. Similarly his doctrine of the Self as appearance. But now I think there is a difficulty and a fatal one for Mr. Cassirer's own theory. He holds that the Understanding, in functioning in knowledge through the categories, is not creating, but knowing what is really there, e.g. in knowing through the category of substance it is knowing a relational unity. In this sense he claims to be a Realist. But if this is so it looks as if he himself has endowed the human mind with powers of Intellectual Intuition and I see no way round this difficulty. For if it is knowing a relational unity and not creating one, then this can only be by a flash of insight. If Mr. Cassirer says *per contra* that the Unity may not be real, then it is a fiction, or may be one, and to that extent created.

I shall pass over with slight comment the account of the Principles of Pure

Understanding, not because Mr. Cassirer has not many original things of interest and importance to say, but because he is unsure about many of Kant's arguments and his exposition and emendations are long and involved. He accuses Kant of confusing in his exposition factual propositions and synthetic *a priori* principles, e.g. in the Principle governing Axioms of Intuition "All intuitions are extensive magnitudes" and in the First Analogy "the quantity of Substance cannot be increased or diminished," but I should have thought that a sympathetic study of Kant would have made the criticism unnecessary. Certainly, as Cassirer points out, the principles are "second-order propositions" specifying "the criteria of 'matter-of-fact in general'" (p. 199), but Kant nowhere misleads his readers into supposing that they were anything other than conditions of an "object-in-general," principles of objectivity. I do not think that Kant himself was ever really confused about this, although he expresses himself badly and indeed probably had not the means of expressing himself. There was no terminology like "second-order propositions." The second edition statement of the Principle of Substance was unfortunate, if not a downright mistake, and the fact that everybody seizes on it shows that Kant had driven his main point home. Mr. Cassirer, however, rightly stresses the importance of the theme running throughout the Analogies that without *a priori* conditions of objectivity there is no way of distinguishing the merely subjective from objects considered (known) as such, but the term "subjective" is interpreted in such a way that it makes much of Kant's exposition otiose. It is not that we cannot distinguish subjective from objective succession but that we cannot know objects at all and he considers that Kant is mistaken in using the psychological criteria for determining what is objective (an empirical inquiry) to answer the epistemological question "What is essential to our knowledge of objectivity?" On this point he seems to be right. He is also to be congratulated on the fact that, unlike most commentators who give up the Analogy on Substance on the ground that it is either unintelligible or fails in its purpose, he emends it in such a way that it leads him to the view that in order to account for our perception of material objects an *a priori* category is needed. I commend his treatment of the Principles to those who are interested in the unravelling of a very tangled and crucial part of the First Critique.

In dealing with the Dialectic, Cassirer begins with one or two general points. First, he points out that all the Ideas of Reason are not on the same level. Kant's endeavour to stand by his architectonic forces him to an unnatural linking of Substance, when treated as an Absolute Idea, with that of Rational Psychology. He insists also that, unlike modern philosophic authors, when Kant criticizes Metaphysics he does it from a basis of knowledge and not from ignorance. And on both points he seems to be right. But he considers that Kant's more accurate knowledge of metaphysical authors leads him, despite his criticism, to fall in unguarded moments into the danger of writing as if metaphysical knowledge was still possible; that appearances, whether of the self or material objects, were of entities whose existence, metaphysically speaking, were somehow known to exist. Hence, in accordance with the theme of the whole book, these passages must be re-interpreted or exposed as mistaken: p. 255, "The intelligent self, which is at the root of perceptual experience, does not stand for any reality at all either sensible or non-sensible; and the only status applicable to it is that of a basic condition involved in knowledge, or thought, in general," and any tendency in dealing with the third antinomy to point to a super-sensible realm as if the Self "belonged" to it must be criticized. Here Cassirer rightly, I think, argues that Kant holds that we have no theoretical knowledge through Reason, but that "the ideas of God, freedom

and immortality have an important part to play in the sphere of practice," although he thinks that Kant's attempt to solve the problem of freedom fails. In the Cosmogical section, he considers that Kant is right in his view that "nothing significant can be said about the Universe in its entirety," p. 295. Actually, I think that what Cassirer ought to say is that the word "Universe" has no meaning. The same sort of theme dominates his account of Kant's criticisms of the proofs for the existence of God, p. 328, "Kant's readiness to appeal to the idea of perfect knowledge, by way of contrast with our own, never affords him the slightest temptation to waver in his belief that the notion of an intelligible realm and that of a mind concerned with such a realm must—within the sphere of cognition, at any rate—always remain wholly lacking in significance." Here, two comments may justly be added. Ought not one then to say that the phrase "perfect knowledge" is devoid of significance and ought not one also to insist on the ultimate pointlessness of Kant's "practical reason"? In short, is not Kant but an earlier version of Professor Ayer and, if he is not, ought we not to take some of Kant's statements about the "intelligible realm" more at their face-value? But having said that, I do not wish to deny the tenacity, the restraint and the care with which Mr. Cassirer has attempted to interpret and re-state and, indeed, to save part of Kant's position. But I have serious doubts whether it can be saved along the lines of the re-interpretation given in this book. I have no doubt whatever that Kant, thus mutilated, is not Kant. But on this latter point the author would agree.

J. N. WRIGHT.

David Hume. Writings on Economics. Edited and introduced by E. ROTWEIN, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin. (Edinburgh: T. Nelson and Sons, 1955. Pp. cxi, 224. Price 30s. With portrait.)

We all know that Hume was the author of more than Book I of the *Treatise*. We have simply been bidden to believe that only there is he of interest to the contemporary philosopher: the rest of his writings, so far as they have any value, are to be decently left to other specialists. The present volume is a proof—following many earlier ones—that Hume's economic observations and principles are being duly studied by the economists. The volume deserves a review in these pages, however, because Hume's economic essays are, after all, a part of the programme for the science of man which it was the purpose of the *Treatise* to demand, found and vindicate. We have a chance of understanding his philosophy better when we see how he applies it to a particular area of human concern.

The economic essays are nine of the *Political Discourses*. Eight of them belong to the original edition of 1752; "Of the Jealousy of Trade" was added in the 1760 edition of the *Essays and Treatises* (not, as Professor Rotwein says, in the 1758 edition, though it is bound in with some copies of this as three supplementary pages). These nine essays are here printed from Hume's latest text (1777), obviously with scrupulous care, and major variants in the earlier editions are given. They are supplemented by relevant extracts from Hume's correspondence, the selection, and where necessary translation (from French), of which have been done well. Apart from remarks scattered through the *History of Great Britain*, which could scarcely be torn from their context, we now have within a single volume all that is needed for the direct study of Hume's views on the economic side of man's life, together with comments on them by some of his acquaintances, the most robust of them by James Oswald; and to help us in our study we have a lengthy introduction by an economist.

Nothing could be more convenient. The volume, analytically indexed, supplies a want, and should be in every university library and on many a private shelf.

Although a layman in this field, I have always found the essays a pleasure to read. Each is brief, except "Of the Populousness of the ancient Nations," which displays the large range of Hume's classical scholarship. All are lucid and penetrating, keeping principles close to fact. The temperature is usually cool, with every now and then a touch of warmth coming from Hume's concern for men's weal. Only occasionally is there one of those outrageous exaggerations with which the *Treatise* abounds and to which an imp in him made him always prone.

The main themes are money, the social (especially cultural) boon of advancing beyond a chiefly agricultural economy, and the advantages of international trade. Like Berkeley before him, he tilts at the idea that money is a sort of commodity, and even more firmly than Berkeley insists that the amount of it should be kept adjusted to the amount of the commodities in the market; again and again he presses the point that an increase of money in circulation without any increase of commodities can only result in a raising of all prices. This is one of his arguments against the floating of loans for governmental revenue, on which he writes a jeremiad ("Of public Credit"). Against the supposition that a low interest-rate is the result of an abundance of money, he argues that both these, together with low profits and prices, are collateral effects of booming trade. As for international trade, he is concerned to disprove a common assumption that one nation can prosper only at the expense of the others. The money that flows from a prosperous country in purchases abroad does indeed enrich its neighbours, but the gross result is that these are enabled to buy more and more from it; and if they then begin to produce the goods which it produces and manage to outsell it, it can divert its energies to other products. In the long run, Hume asserts (like the later free-traders), every nation has some specific gifts of raw materials, climate and "genius," the products of which the other nations will desire, and will buy if they are prosperous enough to do so, so that each nation should have a positive interest in the prosperity of the rest. All which Hume clinches in a characteristic utterance: "I shall therefore venture to acknowledge that, not only as a man, but as a British subject, I pray for the flourishing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy, and even France itself." Only the wording here, not the meaning, is puckish. Underlying the whole of his economic reasoning is a social philosophy, sketched in the first two essays, which may be summarized in the proposition that the expansion of non-agricultural production civilizes peoples and government.

Professor Rotwein's long and yet not discursive introduction considers the matter of the essays under the three heads of economic psychology, political economy, and economic philosophy. On the second of these he is on his own ground and writes at most length. If I were to attempt a summary I should bungle it, and if I were to comment I should be impudent. On the first he rightly observes that Hume adduces several motives to work—a desire for activity, avarice as a desire for gain that comes to be a desire for the gain only, not for the enjoyment of its fruits, and a desire for vivid emotion as an escape from boredom; and that he does not reduce these to species of the desire for pleasure. Hume was certainly not a psychological hedonist. A remark on a difference between Hume's notion of sympathy and Adam Smith's (p. ci, note 2) is interesting: for Hume, it is there said, sympathy is evoked by a vivid *idea* of another's emotion, for Smith by an induced emotion, so that the former makes it pure benevolence, the latter a kind of self-pity. Whether the

distinction is just or no I would not say without reading Smith again. Under the third heading Professor Rotwein lacks space enough to write in more than extremely general terms, referring to such matters as the historical and social breadth of Hume's economic vision. At the beginning of the Introduction he properly emphasizes the presence in the essays of the mind that wrote the *Treatise*, and bravely tries to show affinities of doctrine, The entire Introduction is a solid piece of work. I cannot be sure whether it is intended for students of economics or of philosophy; perhaps in parts for the one and in parts for the other, which would be no ground for disparagement. I find it instructive rather than illuminating, but this may be due to a fault in me. Anyhow, I am grateful for it.

In sum, it is good to have a scholarly edition of a group of essays that is not easily accessible outside editions of Hume's collected works, which are all out of print. Besides their intrinsic worth, the *Political Discourses* have the biographical interest of being one of the chief grounds of Hume's quick and extraordinary fame in France. In his autobiography he mentions it with restraint as "the only work of mine that was successful on the first appearance: it was well received at home and abroad." The first person to discuss it was surely Adam Smith, for he read a paper on "Some of Mr. David Hume's Essays on Commerce" to the Literary Society of Glasgow as early as January 1752, the very month of publication.

T. E. Jessop.

The Philosophy of Nature. By Andrew G. Van Melsen. (Duquesne University Press, 1953. Pp. xii+253. Price 35s.)

The main purpose of this book is to demonstrate that there are necessarily two independent but not unrelated aspects of what we may designate (without necessarily approving the description) as the study of nature. On the one hand there is science; on the other there is "the philosophy of nature" which deals with pre-suppositions that science must inevitably make before it can begin. The particular philosophy of nature that is advocated is that of Aristotle, especially the doctrine of hylomorphism. The main pre-suppositions of science which it deals with are the changeability of matter, its invariable qualitative-quantitative aspect, and, above all, its "species-individual structure." The last-named term the author explains as follows: "By the very use of his means of investigation, however, he [the scientist] implicitly of necessity pre-supposes that there are things of the same kind, and that they react in the same way. Only because of this pre-supposition is it correct to use different individual samples for the same purpose. They represent the same specific nature, although they are different individuals." This is said to be "a pre-supposition, so to speak, incarnated in the basic methods of science."

As an exposition of the relevant parts of the Aristotelian philosophy the book is admirable. The conceptions involved, which are not easy for modern thinkers to grasp, are well explained and the whole book maintains a high level of clarity and interest. The author has a wide and generally sound knowledge of modern physical science. If we could share his original point of view it would be difficult not to follow him to his conclusions. It is that point of view, however, that is unacceptable.

The only definition of science that fits recent as well as older science is that it is an attempt to discover the rational inter-relations of our experience. It is not a study of matter, and therefore makes no pre-suppositions about

matter. Its only pre-suppositions are the unquestionability of bare experience and the validity of logical reasoning, and these things are pre-suppositions, according to Dr. van Melsen, of "the philosophy of nature" also, for he says, for instance, "that things have a species-individual structure is taught by common experience." True, he calls it "pre-scientific experience," but there is no such thing. There is no experience that is not now within the range of scientific investigation.

For want of space we can refer specifically to only the chief of the suggested pre-suppositions, namely, the "species-individual structure" of the objects of scientific investigation. That this is not a necessary pre-supposition of science is shown by the fact that there is a scientific study of the universe, which is not only not a sample but *necessarily* not a sample. Dr. van Melsen gives reasons why he does not like to think of the universe as a whole, but the fact is that science does so. Mach, for instance, whose work has had so great an influence on modern physical science, insists on this. "The universe is not *twice* given, with an earth at rest and an earth in motion; but only *once*, with its *relative* motions alone determinable. It is, accordingly, not permitted us to say how things would be if the earth did not rotate. We may interpret the one case that is given us, in different ways." Moreover, predictions made on the assumption of a unique universe have been found to agree with observation. There is no doubt, therefore, that there is a conspicuous branch of science that not only does not pre-suppose the species-individual structure, but expressly rejects it.

Dr. van Melsen's attempt to show that the relativity of simultaneity contained in the Lorentz transformation equations presupposes a more fundamental absolute simultaneity is no more successful. He cites two events, E_I and E_2, whose spatial positions in one co-ordinate system are P_I, P_2, and in another, P'_I, P'_2, and states that the transformation of P_I, P_2 to P'_I, P'_2 "presupposes that *at the same moment* when P_I in System I coincides with P'_I, P_2 necessarily coincides with another place in System II. That means that the same moment of objective time which marks the coincidence of P_I and P_I also marks the coincidence of P_2 and P'_2." But it pre-supposes nothing of the kind. E_I, E_2 are completely represented by (P_I, T_I), (P_2, T_2)in System I and by (P'_I, T'_I), (P'_2, T'_2) in System II, where T_I, T_2 are the times in System I and T'_I, T'_I those in System II. There is no "moment of objective time" which marks the coincidence of P_2 and P'_I. The only "objective" things are the *events*, and the fact that both *events* are representable in the two systems does not mean that the representations are *simultaneous*: if it means anything temporal it means that they are not. But actually the fact has no temporal significance at all.

The relation between science and Aristotelian philosophy seems to be quite different from that suggested by Dr. van Melsen. Both are attempts to understand the inter-relations of experience. Science starts with the simplest and most isolable experiences, which it creates artificially by making experiments, and advances gradually to more complicated ones. Aristotelian philosophy, on the other hand, starts with the most general and comprehensive characteristics of experience and attempts to work down to the details. It is not a necessary basis for science but an alternative method of attempting the same thing. Both are legitimate, of course, but history has shown that science is the more effective for practical problems and provides the greater scope for advance. It necessarily, of course, leaves the most general and difficult problems for future generations, and those who are impatient for their solution must do the best they can with such methods as that of Aristotle, but there is no justification for thinking that what they obtain

will bear any relation to what the scientific process will later reveal, or that science is in any way dependent on such a supplement for its existence or its validity.

HERBERT DINGLE.

An Existentialist Philosophy. By JOHN MACQUARRIE. (S.C.M. Press. Pp. xii and 252. Price 18s.)

The debate over the relation between philosophy and theology bids fair to be interminable, just because the parties to it appear from time to time in fresh guise. Pascal may maintain that the God of the philosophers is not the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; but what happens when Pascal is himself enrolled among the philosophers? The existentialist philosophy is not concerned with a Prime Mover or a First Cause, but with the human predicament and deliverance from it. Its use of terms like "guilt," its description of man as "fallen" and as subject to "anxiety," and its derivation from Kierkegaard, all suggest that we have here a secularized version of Christian theology. That is especially the case with Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, in spite of his reiterated warning that his language is not to be understood in any Christian sense. It is not surprising therefore that Rudolf Bultmann has claimed that Heidegger's philosophy is the most appropriate prolegomenon to theology that our time affords, and uses it freely in his exegesis of the New Testament.

Dr. Macquarrie enters in at this point, to state and examine Bultmann's claim. He shows how all theology depends on some previous understanding of man and his situation, and how Heidegger offers precisely this. His account of the kind of being man is shows that the theologian is justified in his description of man's needs and how they may be met. To be sure it does so much more effectively in the case of the needs than in that of how they may be met. For the standpoint of Heidegger is a purely human one—he would deny that it is humanist, of course. Where Heidegger is strongest is in his description of what he calls "inauthentic existence," man's servitude to his environment and mass-opinion, his preoccupations and care, above all, the anxiety to which he is a prey in a world in which he is not at home. God is absent, and therefore man must be his own saviour, through resolve, obedience to the voice of conscience, and acceptance of inescapable guilt. What gives him courage for this is the challenge of death; this separates him out from the mass and enables him to become an individual person in freedom and responsibility.

Dr. Macquarrie's exposition of Heidegger's thought deserves the highest praise. He has grappled with its immense and numerous difficulties and has come as near as it is possible to presenting a lucid account of a type of thinking that is unusually obscure and depends heavily on nuances in the German language. He is also one of the few writers on Bultmann who have seen just what he is seeking to do, and are not put off at the outset by his use of the term "myth" for elements that are central in the N.T. message. He defends Bultmann's use of existentialism in his *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, while pointing out that what should have remained a servant is sometimes allowed to become a master. Bultmann is insensitive, for example, to the place of fellowship in the N.T., presumably because Heidegger's thought is individualist. Also, the sound emphasis of the existentialist on personal appropriation of the truth leads Bultmann at times to do less than justice to the historical element in Christianity. There again, however, Dr. Macquarrie holds that Bultmann understands what history means for Christian faith better than his critics. His final judgment on Bultmann is that "he has made

the Christian understanding of man intelligible to contemporary philosophical thought on the one hand, while remaining loyal to its source in the New Testament on the other."

Admittedly, Bultmann's terminology frequently makes it easy to err. Thus, when he speaks of faith as bringing with it a change in our self-understanding, it is natural to suppose that he means something purely intellectual. We see ourselves in a new light—is that all there is to it? By no means. As Dr. Macquarrie rightly says, "to have a new understanding of the self, in the sense in which Bultmann and Heidegger use the expression, does not mean to adopt a new philosophy of life, but to undergo a complete re-orientation of the self."

The book is a reliable guide to points of this nature. Dr. Macquarrie's method is to state Heidegger's position, to show how Bultmann uses it for his exposition of the N.T., and then to ask how far the latter is justified in so doing. For example, he takes the concept of *sōma* in Paul, in explaining which Bultmann lays under contribution Heidegger's analysis of man as "being-in-the-world." Bultmann takes *sōma* to stand for "a way of being, and more particularly, a way of being in virtue of which man is in a world." Dr. Macquarrie tests this by applying it to the difficult passage in 1 Cor. xv with its puzzling allusion to a "spiritual body." For our usual understanding of what is meant by a body, this is sheer contradiction. But if we take *sōma* as "being-in-the-world," then the natural body is that way of being in which man identifies himself with his present physical environment and what it offers, the spiritual body that way of being by which he responds to an environment that offers to him again his true self. "On earth he is always more or less estranged from himself, in the life to come he is at one with himself."

Dr. Macquarrie's criticisms of Bultmann gain weight from the trouble he has taken to understand him and do justice to him. Some of these criticisms have been mentioned already. He regrets his extreme historical scepticism, so that little remains of the ministry of Jesus except what looks suspiciously like a simplified existentialism. Bultmann makes too many concessions to a liberalism he has only partly outgrown, as when he dismisses the resurrection of Christ in the usual sense, apparently because it would be a miracle, and miracles just do not happen. He reads into Paul what Heidegger says of conscience, and presents a much reduced version of the N.T. statements on God's love and grace. He is excessively Lutheran in his conception of the Church and the emphasis he places on the preaching of the Word. But, precisely because he is Lutheran, he is at his best when interpreting Paul.

The subject of demythologizing is dealt with, but it falls somewhat apart from the author's main concern. Here the crucial problem is that of the resurrection of Christ. Dr. Macquarrie agrees with Bultmann against those critics who would urge that the resurrection must first be accepted on grounds of historical evidence so that faith in the present power of Christ may become possible. He sees that this is to make faith dependent on an estimate for which few are competent. But he insists that the resurrection must be in some sense "objective-historical," and this, of course, Bultmann would deny. My own sympathies are with Bultmann here. As I see it, the resurrection of Christ is not a historical event in the sense that it is accessible to one who approaches it as he would, say, Caesar's campaign in Gaul; it is accessible only by participation in it, by dying and rising again with Christ. That is not to deny, of course, that it had certain accompaniments and consequences, such as the appearances to the disciples, that belong in the order of historical events. And when Bultmann describes the resurrection as a myth that expresses the significance of the crucifixion, I take it that he has in mind John's presentation

of the cross as, by the spirit in which it was accepted, triumph, glory, and a throne.

Dr. Macquarrie is so patient and sympathetic an interpreter of Heidegger that it seems uncharitable to point out that he is less at home with other existentialists. But neither Jaspers nor Marcel can be described as individualist, as witness the treatment of "communication" in the former and of "intersubjectivity" in the latter. Those who are interested in the general question of the relation between philosophy and theology, will want to ask, as the limits of Dr. Macquarrie's study preclude him from asking, whether Bultmann would not have done better to seek guidance elsewhere. This, indeed, would be my own criticism of him. I am not satisfied that Heidegger's ontology is valid. Does he do more than seek to account for the care, the anxiety, the guilt of which we are so poignantly aware by positing a Care, an Anxiety, and a Guilt in some mysterious region above them? Jaspers would condemn the whole procedure as impermissible. We may not discourse in detached fashion of that which has reality for us only as we are implicated, involved in it with our whole selves. If we want an existentialist ontology, a much more delicate and sensitive one is available in Marcel's Gifford Lectures.

The philosophy of Jaspers seems to me the one that offers most to the theologian today, and its terminology is much more guarded than that of *Sein und Zeit*. Those who would be mislead by hearing that Christ's resurrection is appropriated through a new understanding of our selves might understand at once what is meant by appropriating it through the transformation of our being. The analysis of man that Jaspers offers bears in mind throughout his relation to Transcendence. And Jaspers can teach the theologian how to construct a reasoned argument that conveys what transcends argument, how to make the systems of the past vibrate in the present with what he calls "the appeal of freedom to freedom."

E. L. Allen.

Aristotle's Metaphysics. Translated by John Warrington. Introduction by Sir David Ross. (Everyman's Library No. 1000. Price 7s.)

In this new version Mr. Warrington aims, most courageously, to make the *Metaphysics* comprehensible to the general reader. He has rearranged the traditional order of the fourteen books in order to give the work, as far as this is possible, a recognizable unity of theme and a recognizable continuity of development in argument. Chapter headings, and numerals or letters to mark sections and sub-sections of the argument clarify the progress of the exposition. The translation itself contrives to combine both translation and commentary, interpretations and even summaries of the argument being taken from Sir David Ross's edition of the *Metaphysics* and substituted for a bare translation at very many points. There are frequent footnotes, and in a short introduction Sir David Ross comments on the plan of the work in the light of modern research on the development of Aristotle's thought.

There are several good things about this version. The general arrangement, and the elaborate signposting of the argument serve their purpose well. The translation, despite some positive inaccuracies, achieves its object of "rendering the content of Aristotle's words into reasonably fluent English." But the version would have been more successful in its aim if Warrington had not stuck so closely to Ross, especially for his notes. It is natural that he should make use of Ross's excellent commentary. But he uses it uncritically, sometimes carelessly (e.g. *Anaxagoras* for *Anaximenes*, p. 60, *n.* 1), and certainly too exclusively. Practically all the notes are condensed from Ross's notes

(this should have been made perfectly clear in the preface), and Warrington does not attempt to supplement or correct Ross either by his own observations or those of other scholars. He appears to assume that a commentary intended as a contribution to Greek scholarship is, in condensed form, the most suitable guide for the general reader. The result is that the notes tend to assume a wider knowledge than the general reader is likely to possess, or to provide information which he is not likely to want. For is there any need for such notes as that which explains the translation "a mere wild-goose chase" by giving the Greek, giving a literal rendering of the Greek, pointing out that it is a proverbial phrase and referring to Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroemiographi Graeci*, vol. ii, p. 677? Finally, I suggest that the short bibliography should certainly have included A. E. Taylor's *Aristotle* (a masterpiece of popular exposition) and D. J. Allan's *The Philosophy of Aristotle*.

Although I feel that this version makes insufficient concessions to the general reader, it would be churlish not to end by congratulating both author and publisher on their courage in bringing it out. At its modest price it deserves to do well.

NORMAN GULLEY.

Marx: The Poverty of Philosophy. Lawrence and Wishart (for the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow) 1956.

Marx and Proudhon shared much in common as socialist critics in rebellion against nineteenth-century society. Thus, when Proudhon wrote to Marx in 1846 of his *Philosophie de la misère*, "I await the lash of your criticism" he hardly expected the lash to fall so cuttingly) in a way that was to sever their friendship for ever. Yet as Professor Acton has recently pointed out, Marxist polemics are more often occasioned by the heresies of fellow radicals than by upholders of the established order. The reasons for this particular breach were many. Proudhon's naïve economic theorizing, to which Marx was to refer in a letter as his "clumsy erudition of the self-taught," his general air of mystification which arose from the "infection" of Hegelian terminology, for which Marx admitted his own friendship with Proudhon was partly responsible—these undoubtedly raised Marx's professional ire. But the gulf which separated them went deeper. Proudhon, as a moralist, saw the role of philosophy in relation to social problems, as the demonstration of certain moral verities. This, combined with his ill-digested Hegelianism, led him to produce, in his *Philosophie de la misère*, a metaphysical apparatus which included a mind of humanity or "social genius" in which slumbered the eternal economic categories opposed to each other as "good" and "bad" in a state of contradiction; a Providence which pointed out equality as the goal in which these contradictions were to be reconciled. That this involved him in pseudo-history, Marx was quick to detect and unsparing to criticize. Yet Marx, no less than Proudhon, felt moral indignation at a society wherein human labour power was sold as a market commodity and men, in consequence, were reduced to the status of things. Marx and Engels, however, could not feel that such promptings of their moral sense were as respectable as the "science" of their historical and economic researches. The latter were to be pursued in the belief that they would yield scientific laws of social development, objective in the sense that they did not depend upon human interests and feelings. As Engels wrote in his 1884 Preface, Marx based his communist demands not upon a "contradiction" between an economic fact and "our sense of morality," but "upon the inevitable collapse of the capitalist mode of production which is daily taking place before our eyes." Marx himself writes, on page 140, that there

is no need for the "theoreticians of the proletarian class . . . to seek science in their minds; they have only to take note of what is happening before their eyes and to become its mouthpiece." But here are metaphysical presuppositions every whit as speculative as Proudhon's. The notion of "inevitable" laws of historical development, the naturalistic fallacy which founds norms in the concrete facts of history, the fallacy of "moral futurism" as Professor Popper has called it, which seeks its standards in the predicted future course of events—these raise problems to which neither Marx nor his followers have been able to give satisfactory answers.

Although the polemics of *The Poverty of Philosophy* may often seem remote to many contemporary philosophers, the reissue of this Marxist text may well serve as a reminder that there are philosophical problems presented by economics and history. Compared with the amount of analysis that has been given to scientific explanation, to the role of scientific laws and concepts, or to the general meaning of value, the interest shown in economic or historical explanation, economic laws, or such special applications as the use of "value" in economic theory, has been meagre indeed.

P. J. Bindley.

Logic and Scientific Methods: An Introductory Course. By Herbert L. Searles. (2nd edition. New York, Ronald Press, 1956.)

Should an introductory course in logic cover the traditional syllogistic theory in some detail at the expense of truth-functional logic? Mr. Searles apparently thinks it should, for he excludes truth-functional logic from his text. This is not altogether inexcusable. Indeed it might be said that the scarcity of readable elementary texts in which the main emphasis is placed upon traditional logic and scientific method makes an attempt at such a text all the more welcome. Unfortunately the result of this attempt is disappointing. It is a post-war publication (1st edition, 1948) with a pre-war treatment.

Of the three parts into which the book is divided (Logic and Meaning, Deductive Logic, Scientific Methods) the second and third are likely to prove more valuable to the student than the first. For the second and third parts, although they deal in a not particularly refreshing manner with rather hackneyed topics, have one or two minor merits which the first part lacks. The inclusion under Scientific Methods, for instance, of a chapter on the application of logic to legal thinking comes as a pleasant surprise. It would have been even pleasanter if the chapter had not been so brief and if the references to relevant articles in legal journals had been more up to date. The merits of the second part (Deductive Logic) lie, (*a*) in its treatment of the traditional syllogistic theory which manages to be fairly full while remaining elementary, and (*b*) in its uncomplicated use of the symbolism of the propositional calculus in the chapter on hypothetical, disjunctive and alternative arguments. For a logic text which is unashamedly non-truth-functional this minimal use of modern symbolism is sound policy. The student is thereby made sufficiently familiar with the symbols to be able to read them, while being spared the additional task of absorbing truth-function theory. Part One (Logic and Meaning), on the other hand, leaves one with the feeling that it would have been better added as an appendix, or even omitted altogether. It is hardly calculated to stimulate further interest and in fact reads rather like an amplified glossary, and a not very exact one at that. See, for instance, page 7: "When the premises and the conclusion implied by them are clearly formulated, we have what in the technical language of logic is called a *syllogism.*"

The main purpose of this first section is to acquaint the student with a

number of more or less stock technical terms of logic and at the same time to bring the discussion to bear on the general topic of meaning and definition. In Part Two we are first of all introduced to Categorical propositions and their diagrammatic representation and then to immediate inference, the square of opposition and the Categorical Syllogism. Following this comes a chapter on the Hypothetical and Disjunctive Syllogisms and the Dilemma, a chapter chiefly devoted to relational arguments and, finally, a brief discussion of the various kinds of fallacies. Part Three, beginning with "The aims and spirit of science" proceeds to discuss induction, analogy and the confirmation of hypotheses, and after a condensed exposition of Mill's Methods, skims lightly through probability, penetrates a little more thoroughly into measurement and statistical methods, glances at the application of logic to legal thinking and concludes with a short discussion of fallacies in scientific thinking. The inclusion of problems at the end of each chapter, a reasonably full (though none too exact) glossary and a classified bibliography, deserve mention. Also deserving mention is the entire absence of print from a number of pages following page 214. G. B. KEENE.

The Mysteries. Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks. Edited by JOSEPH CAMPBELL. Vol. 2. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 1956. Pp. xvi, 476. Price 35s.)

This is a book almost impossible to review in any detail. Eranos is a society founded in 1933 which has held annual meetings at Ascona and published the papers read at them in yearbooks. Two years ago a volume of selections from papers read in the years 1937, 1945 and 1946 appeared in English translation. This volume is its sequel, containing 13 papers, 8 from the 1944 meeting and the rest from those of other years, all dealing with aspects of the mystery religions. There is a wealth of references and annotations and a large number of plates and text figures. The best known of the contributors is C. G. Jung whose article on Transformation Symbolism in the Mass contains an interesting suggestion of parallels of the Mass amongst the Aztecs and, to some degree, in Mithraism. As Jung points out, at the time of early Christianity the pagan world was full of the type of speculations that formed the background of Gnosticism. The Church, however, had a true sense of their dangers and Gnosticism died out, not from lack of teachers but from lack of listeners. Hugo Rahner's article on the Christian Mystery and the Pagan Mysteries is particularly informing and traces very clearly differences as well as similarities. Julius Baum's paper on the Symbolic Representations of the Eucharist shows that the Eucharistic Communion was treated quite differently from the heavenly banquet and feast of the dead. Walter F. Otto has a very interesting paper upon the meaning of the Eleusinian Mysteries and other papers deal with the mystery cults of the Kabeiroi of Thebes, that of Osiris, the Orphic mysteries and those of Iran, of the Ka'ba at Mecca, and the Serpent.

The fact that the Eranos group have been able to survive the dislocation of the War and maintain their meetings, that they are able to extend their publications by English translations and to publish these volumes of selections from their proceedings indicates that though the number of scholars interested in mysticism is comparatively small, there is in Eranos a company able to continue these intricate studies and to add greatly to our knowledge of the hidden secrets of the past. For this we can be grateful. One may add that all the papers except Jung's, which was translated by R. F. C. Hull, are translated by Ralph Manheim who deserves our thanks, and that it is creditable indeed that the publishers should be able to print and issue a book like this for so

reasonable a price. It is to be hoped that further selections may appear in English, and that our Universities and libraries may help in making them accessible to readers.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

East and West: Some Reflections. By RADHAKRISHNAN. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 1955. Pp. 140. Price 6s.) (Beatty Memorial Lectures: First Series.)

We have here, with numerous annotations, the substance of three lectures delivered by Dr. Radhakrishnan at McGill University, Montreal, in October 1954. The first gives an historical survey of Indian and other Asian cultures, the second does the same for the history of European civilization, drawing attention to Indian and other Oriental influences (sometimes, indeed, overstressing them), and the third draws the others together in discussing technology in the modern world, communism and democracy, and the future of religion. The author places his hopes for mankind in the growth of a world religion based largely on Buddhism and Christianity but declining precise dogmatic formulations, proclaiming the widest tolerance, and in no danger of conflicting with the progress of science. We certainly need to abandon all vestiges of European parochialism, and the religious ideal envisaged (not for the first time) is an interesting and in some ways an inspiring one, though it is difficult to see how it could work out.

Unfortunately there is no elaboration or serious discussion of outstanding problems. Further, the historical surveys, though they contain interesting observations and references, are snippety in the extreme. The following paragraph is simply a particularly bad example: "Albert Einstein, who just passed [*sic*] away, changed our thinking about the world. He looked upon the universe as closed and not infinite. He held that matter and energy were different manifestations of the same thing. His theory of relativity helped nuclear fission" (p. 97). One wonders how much value there can be in this sort of thing. The enthusiasm of the publishers' "blurb" and of the preface (by the Vice-Chancellor of McGill) can only be regarded as tributes to the author's eminence.

D. A. REES.

Books also received:

R. F. HARROD. *Foundations of Inductive Logic.* Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1956. Pp. (xv) & 290. 24s.

PAUL TILLICH. *The Religious Situation.* (Tr. by H. R. Niebuhr.) Thames & Hudson. 1956. Pp. 219. 12s. 6d.

ARNOLD FREEMAN. *Self-Observation.* Anthroposophical Publishing Company. 1956. Pp. 65. 6s. 6d.

GEOFFREY BULLOUGH. *Changing Views of the Mind in English Poetry.* Warton Lecture on English Poetry, British Academy, 1955. Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. 21. 3s. 6d.

BERTRAND RUSSELL. *John Stuart Mill.* Lecture on a Master Mind. Henriette Hertz Trust of the British Academy, 1955. Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. 16. 3s. 6d.

W. C. KNEALE. *The Idea of Invention.* Annual Philosophical Lecture. Henriette Hertz Trust of the British Academy, 1955. Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. 23. 3s. 6d.

STEFAN THEMERSON. *Factor T.* Gaberbocchus Press Ltd. 1956. Pp. 65. 6s.

JOHN LEVY. *The Nature of Man according to the Vedanta.* Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1956. Pp. (vi) & 101. 12s. 6d.

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, S.J. *Bergson on Morality.* Dawes Hicks Lecture on Philosophy, British Academy, 1955. Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. 19. 3s. 6d.

SIR DAVID ROSS. *Clement Charles Julian Webb,* 1865–1954. Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. 8. 2s. 6d.

W. C. HELMBOLD and W. G. RABINOWITZ. (Trans. & Introduction.) *Plato's Phaedrus.* The Liberal Arts Press, New York. 1956. Pp. (xvii) & 75. 60 cents.

GREGORY VLASTOS (Ed.). *Plato's Protagoras.* B. Jowett's translation revised by Martin Ostwald. The Liberal Arts Press. 1956. Pp. (lvii) & 69. 75 cents.

MORRIS GINSBERG. *On the Diversity of Morals.* Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy. Vol. I. Heinemann. 1956. Pp. (xiv) & 329. 25s.

MORRIS GINSBERG. *Reason and Unreason in Society.* Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy. Vol. II. Heinemann. 1956. Pp. 326. 21s.

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS. *Exposition of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle.* (Trans. by Pierre Conway, O.P.) M. Doyon, Quebec. 1956. Pp. (xvi) &449. $6.00.

LEIBNIZ. *Philosophical Writings.* (Trans. by Mary Morris. Intro. by C. R. Morris.) Everyman Library. J. M. Dent & Sons. 1956. Pp. (xxxiii) & 284. 7s.

WILLIAM KLUBACK. *Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of History.* Columbia University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. (x) & 118. 24s.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN. *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.* (Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe.) Basil Blackwell. 1956. Pp. (xix) & 204. 37s. 6d.

SISTER ANNE MARY TAMME, O.P. *A Critique of John Dewey's Theory of Fine Art in the Light of the Principles of Thomism.* The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C. 1956. Pp. (xi) & 131. $1.50.

HANS REICHENBACH. *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy.* University of California Press. (Agents: Cambridge University Press.) 1956. Pp. 333. 13s. 6d.

NATHANIEL LAWRENCE. *Whitehead's Philosophical Development.* University of California Press. (Agents: Cambridge University Press.) 1956. Pp. (xxi) & 370. 37s 6d.

LOUIS O. KATTSOFF. *Logic and the Nature of Reality.* Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. (Agents: B. T. Batsford Ltd.) 1956. Pp. 246. 27s.

A. D. DHOPESHWARKAR. *Krishnamurti and the Experience of the Silent Mind.* Chetana, Bombay. 1956. Pp. 177. 6s.

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN. *Outlines of Hinduism.* Chetana, Bombay. 1956. Pp. (xiv) & 312. 11s. 6d.

IRVING L. HOROWITZ. *The Idea of War and Peace in Contemporary Philosophy.* Paine-Whitman, New York. 1957. Pp. (xx) & 224. $4.50.

EDWARD LE ROY MOORE. *The Robinson from Mars Papers.* Vol. I. Books I & II. Exposition Press, New York. 1956. Pp. 128. $3.50.

THEODORE MEYER GREENE. *Our Cultural Heritage.* Rockwell Lectures. Elsevier Press Inc., Texas. 1956. Pp. (xii) & 257. $3.50.

KENNETH BOULDING. *The Image.* Michigan University Press. (London: Oxford University Press.) 1957. Pp. 175. 30s.

CHARLES PARKIN. *The Moral Basis of Burke's Political Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1956. Pp. (viii) & 145. 12s. 6d.

A. N. PRIOR. *Time and Modality.* Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. (viii) & 148. 25s.

SIR HAROLD JEFFREYS. *Scientific Inference.* Second Edition. Cambridge University Press 1957. Pp. (viii) & 236. 25s.

D. C. SOMERVELL. *Arnold Toynbee. A Study of History. Abridgment of Volumes* VII–X. Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. (xii) & 414. 25s. (U.K. only).

C. W. Hume. *The Status of Animals in the Christian Religion.* Universities Federation for Animal Welfare. 1957. Pp. (x) & 109. 8s. 6d.

Antoine Augustin Cournot. *An Essay on the Foundations of our Knowledge.* (Trans. and Introduction by Merritt H. Moore.) Liberal Arts Press, New York. 1956. Pp. (lxx) & 615. $9.00.

Charles Frankel. *The Case for Modern Man.* Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1957. Pp. 210. 18s.

Raymond Aron. *German Sociology.* Heinemann. 1957. Pp. (viii) & 141. 16s.

J. R. Smythies. *Analysis of Perception.* Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1956. Pp. (xiii) & 140. 21s.

J. W. Gough. *The Social Contract.* (Second Edition.) Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. (viii) & 259. 30s. (U.K. only). The first four chapters are reprinted largely as in the First Edition, but there are considerable changes from there onwards, with additional pages on Coleridge and Hegel and a drastic revision of the discussion of Rousseau.

Clarence Irving Lewis. *Mind and the World-Order.* Dover Publications Inc., New York. 1956. Pp. (xiv) & 446. $1.95. A paper-back edition of C. I. Lewis's well-known book first published in 1929.

R. J. Henle. *Saint Thomas and Platonism.* Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. 1956. (Agents: B. T. Batsford Ltd.) Pp. (xxiii) & 487. 60s. Part I consists of the texts in which St. Thomas mentions Plato or the "Platonici," and Part II is a study of St. Thomas's debt to critics of Platonism.

Fuishiki Okamoto. *New Philosophy for the People.* Book I. *Eternal Life.* The Institute for Free Discussion of Absolute Truth and Ideal, Tokyo. Pp. (xxx) & 448. $4.00. Book II. *Ideal Society.* Pp. (xiv) & 890. $6.00.

Muhsin Mahdi. *Ibn Khaldûn's Philosophy of History.* George Allen & Unwin. 1957. Pp. 325. 30s. An exposition of the views of the 14th century Muslim philosopher and theologian.

Robert N. Beck. *The Meaning of Americanism.* Philosophical Library, New York. 1956. Pp. (xii) & 180. $4.75. This book won the $1000 prize in the 1956 Philosophical Library essay contest.

Paul Halmos. *Towards a Measure of Man.* Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1957. Pp. (viii) & 250. 28s.

Carl H. Hamburg. *Symbol and Reality.* Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. 1956. Pp. (viii) & 172. 25s. A survey of Cassirer's philosophy concluding with a criticism of positivist theories of signs in the light of Cassirer's views.

A. J. Arberry. *Revelation and Reason in Islam.* George Allen and Unwin. 1957. Pp. 122. 12s. 6d.

Basil Mitchell (Ed.). *Faith and Logic: Oxford Essays in Philosophical Theology.* George Allen & Unwin. 1957. Pp. 222. 21s.

Avrahm Yarmolinsky. *Dostoevsky.* Arco Publishing Co. Ltd. 1957. Pp. (xii) & 434. 30s.

A. R. C. Duncan. *Practical Reason and Morality.* Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd. 1957. Pp. (xviii) & 182. 18s.

Edward A. Sillem. *George Berkeley and the Proofs for the Existence of God.* Longmans, Green & Co. 1957. Pp. (x) & 236. 21s.

Kewal Motwani. *India's Ancient Literature.* Ganesh & Co., Madras. 1956. Pp. 55. Re. 1s.

Charles H. Patterson. *Moral Standards.* Second Edition. The Ronald Press Company, New York. 1957. Pp. (ix) & 535. $5.50.

Gustav Bergmann. *Philosophy of Science.* University of Wisconsin Press. 1957. Pp. (xiii) & 181. $4.75.

J. G. Bennett. *The Dramatic Universe.* Vol. I. *The Foundations of Natural Philosophy.* Hodder & Stoughton. 1956. Pp. (xlii) & 534. £2 2s.

PLOTINUS. *The Enneads.* (Trans. by Stephen MacKenna. Revised by B. S. Page. Preface by E. R. Dodds. Introduction by Paul Henry, S.J.) Faber & Faber. 1956. Pp. (li) & 635. 63s.

JACOB KOHN. *The Moral Life of Man.* Philosophical Library, New York. 1956. Pp. (x) & 252. $3.75.

SAMUEL BELKIN. *Essays in Traditional Jewish Thought.* Philosophical Library, New York. 1956. Pp. 191. $3.50.

HANS REICHENBACH. *The Direction of Time.* University of California Press. (London: Cambridge University Press.) 1957. Pp. (ix) & 280. 41s. 6d.

HENRI SÉROUYA. *Initiation à la Philosophie Contemporaine* suivi de *Les Philosophies de l'Existence.* Nouvelle Edition. Librairie Fishbacher, Paris. 1956. Pp. 312.

PIERRE THÉVENAZ. *L'Homme et Sa Raison: Raison et Histoire.* Cahiers de Philosophie, Editions de la Baconnière, Neuchatel. 1956. Pp. 190. Fr. 8. (Swiss).

PIERRE THÉVENAZ. *L'Homme et Sa Raison: Raison et Conscience de Soi.* Cahiers de Philosophie, Editions de la Baconnière, Neuchatel. 1956. Pp. 325. Fr. 12.—(Swiss).

ROGER LEFÈVRE. *L'Humanisme de Descartes.* Presses Universitaires de France. 1957. Pp. (viii) & 284. 800F.

FIAMMETTA BOURBON DI PETRELLA. *Il Problema Dell'Arte e Della Bellezza in Plotino.* Le Monnier, Florence. 1956. Pp. 174. L.850.

NICOLA ABBAGNANO. *Possibilità e Libertà.* Taylor, Torino. 1956. Pp. 249. L.1500.

EMMANUELE RIVERSO. *La Costruzione Interpretativa del Mondo.* Instituto Editoriale del Mezzogiorno. 1956. Pp. 320. L.2800.

OSCAR FEYERABEND. *Das Organologische Weltbild.* Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen. 1956. Pp. (xi) & 273. DM.15.

NICOLAI HARTMANN. *Kleinere Schriften.* Band II. *Abhandlungen zur Philosophie-Geschichte.* Walter De Gruyter & Co., Berlin. 1957. Pp. 364. DM.28.

WOLF WEILGART. *Was Ist Normal Im Schatten Der Atombombe?* Gerold & Co., Wien. 1957. Pp. 130. No price given.

PAUL YORCK VON WARTENBURG. *Bewusstseinsstellung und Geschichte.* Eingeleitet und Herausgegeben von Iring Fetscher. Max Niemeyer, Tübingen. 1956. Pp. (xi) & 220. DM.19.50.

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

FOUNDED 1925

President:
THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L., LL.D., D.LITT.

Vice-President:
THE RT. HON THE EARL OF HALSBURY, F.R.I.C., F.Inst.P.

Chairman of the Council:
SIR W. DAVID ROSS, K.B.E., LITT.D., LL.D., F.B.A.

Hon. Treasurer:
SIR EDWIN S. HERBERT, K.B.E., LL.B.

Director and Secretary:
L. C. ROBERTSON, M.A.

Assistant Secretary:
JOAN M. JOYCE

Editor of Philosophy
H. B. ACTON, M.A., D.PHIL.

INSTITUTE NOTES

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The Royal Institute of Philosophy was founded in order to promote the study of philosophy within the Universities and other educational institutions and also among the educated public generally. It pursues its aim by

(1) Organizing courses of lectures;
(2) Providing those of its members who wish for it with advice on philosophical reading;
(3) Publishing a quarterly journal, PHILOSOPHY, in which philosophical problems are discussed and new books reviewed.

Philosophy is a group of studies rather than a single one, and it has been pursued by different methods at different times. The Royal Institute of Philosophy interprets the term in a wide sense, so as to include ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, the philosophy of religion, logic and the philosophy of science, the philosophy of history, political and social philosophy, and the philosophy of mind, and is not committed to any single school or method. The specialization which has taken place between the sciences and within them has made it desirable for scientists and philosophers to consider, from time to time, the relationships of the sciences to one another and to other aspects of human endeavour. Developments in psychology, psychiatry and social anthropology raise not only scientific and logical problems but also appear relevant to the ways in which men think about religion, morality and law, so that there is a constant need for unprejudiced and detailed inquiry into the precise points at which these developments are relevant and into the consequences which ought to be drawn. It is constantly desirable, too, that there be a renewal of our thinking on the questions of freedom and equality, authority and criticism, tradition and progress, which form the subject-matter of political philosophy. Persisting throughout all social changes is the deep-rooted metaphysical interest in the nature of the soul, its relation to material things, the origin of the world and the place of man in it—problems summed up by Kant as concerned with "God, freedom and immortality".

It is the object of The Royal Institute of Philosophy to provide a forum for the rational discussion of these and similar questions. This requires strenuous thinking, but it is hoped that the services which the Institute provides, and particularly the existence of a journal in which such thinking is carried out in language as free from technicalities as the nature of the subject allows, will help to maintain standards of intellectual appreciation and satisfy a cultural need.

The annual subscription to the Institute is £1 10s. Members receive the Institute's Journal, PHILOSOPHY, published quarterly, and may, of course, attend the Lectures.

ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP

Full-time students applying for election are eligible for Associate Membership which carries all the privileges of full Membership save that of participating in the government of the Institute. The period during which a student may enjoy Associate Membership is limited to three years, and the subscription is at the much reduced rate of 8s. 6d. per annum.

CENTRES

Local centres of the Institute have been established at Bangor, Newcastle and Durham. A branch has also recently been established at Los Angeles.

Forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Assistant Secretary at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C.1.

EDITOR'S NOTE

The July number of PHILOSOPHY will be mainly concerned with the Philosophy of Religion and will contain the following Articles:

Contemporary Empiricism and the Philosophy of Religion, by H. D. Lewis.
Religious Assertions in the light of Contemporary Philosophy, by A. C. Ewing.
The Argument from Design, by Thomas McPherson.
Knowledge of God, by W. D. Glasgow.
Can I have a duty to believe in God? by Jonathan Harrison.

ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARIES

At a meeting held in London on October 25, 1956, this association came formally into existence; its aims, as stated in its constitution, are "to promote the interests of libraries, scholars, and librarians" in the fields of theology and philosophy.

Its foundation membership ranges from large academic libraries to modest society libraries, as well as a number of individuals, and no doubt its numbers will grow as its usefulness becomes increasingly clear. It hopes to help members by the provision and interchange of information, and by undertaking, among other things, projects of bibliographical value. A bulletin will be issued three times a year, about the middle of each university term. This will be sent free to all members of the Association; non-members will be able to suscribe to it.

The officers are:—Chairman: Dr. Roger Thomas (Dr. Williams's Library, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1); Deputy Chairman: Rev. F. Courtney, S.J. (Heythrop College, Chipping Norton, Oxon); Hon. Secretary/Treasurer: Miss J. Ferrier (c/o Church Missionary Society Library, 6 Salisbury Square, London, E.C.4). The Editor of the Bulletin will be Mr. R. J. Hoy (School of Oriental and African Studies Library, University of London, London, W.C.1).